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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis presents a history of British Petroleum (BP), from its origins in 1901 until 2016, 
in the context of the history of British imperialism as a whole. It draws on Marxist studies 
of imperialism and the international political economy of oil. 
 
BP was a company of Britain’s empire. Its history begins in the “classical” age of 
imperialism. Its concessions were the products not just of inter-imperial rivalries but of 
inter-imperial alliances too. The change in the relative strengths of Britain and America 
necessitated a redistribution of control over Middle Eastern oil. The thesis charts this 
redivision. 
 
After the company struck oil in Alaska in 1969, BP’s production, sales and assets 
Americanised. To minimise the political risks to its US assets, BP sought to limit its 
ownership by foreign states (in particular, Britain and Kuwait) and to expand its ownership 
by Americans. At the start of the 1990s, the company again Americanised its shareholder 
base and, at the turn of the millennium, it acquired two American oil companies. It did so, 
in part, to protect its assets outside America, via the US state. 
 
In terms of ownership and a measure of control, BP became bi-national, Anglo-American. 
The thesis examines the relations between BP and the British and American states in terms 
of Marxist theories of the state. In terms of structuralist mechanisms and instrumentalist 
processes of colonisation, BP was closer to the British than the American state. And the 
company received more support from the former than the latter in the international arena. 
 
Since 2003, Russia has been BP’s largest source of hydrocarbons and BP has been Russia’s 
largest foreign producer. The thesis examines BP’s partnerships with Russian “oligarchs” 
and then with the Russian state, in particular, its equity stake and positions on the board of 
state-controlled Rosneft. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 
This thesis presents a history of British Petroleum (BP), from its origins in 1901 until 2016, in the 
context of the history of British imperialism as a whole. It draws on Marxist theories of 
imperialism, the state and accounts of the international political economy of oil. 
 
The argument in a nutshell 
 
BP was a company of Britain’s empire. Its oil concessions were in Britain’s empire. And its 
principal pre-WW2 markets were in Britain itself and in its empire. The company acquired its 
concessions in pre-existing spaces of Britain’s empire. But the discovery of oil in a territory, or the 
prospect of its discovery, and BP’s acquisition of a concession to exploit oil in a territory, magnified 
the territory’s value to British capitalism. This was because oil was becoming the lifeblood of 
capitalism. The British state thus did everything within its powers to control access to sources of 
oil, and to help British oil companies, principally BP, first to acquire concessions, and then to 
protect those concessions. BP exported industrial capital to explore for and produce crude oil, and 
to refine crude oil into products. It imported raw materials (crude oil) as well as refined oil products 
to the British market. And it exported refined oil products to Britain’s empire. 
 
The history of BP begins in the “classical” age of imperialism, an age in which rivalries between 
imperialist powers, over colonies and semi-colonies, over the division and redivision of the world, 
exploded into world wars. The history of BP is thus examined in the context of the relations 
between imperialist powers. But BP’s concessions were the products not just of inter-imperial 
rivalries but of inter-imperial alliances too. BP’s concession in Iran was acquired during a wider 
Anglo-Russian race for concessions in the country. But Britain’s main imperial rival after circa 1900 
was Germany. In this context, Britain and Russia formed an alliance in 1907. BP’s second 
concession was in Iraq, via its shareholding in the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC). This 
concession was the product of a series of rivalries and alliances between imperialist powers. 
Britain’s first rival-turned-ally for “Mesopotamian” oil was Germany. But this was a “truce” before 
a war. Its second rival-turned-ally was France. World War One accelerated the on-going change in 
the relative strengths of Britain and America. This change necessitated a redistribution of control 
over Middle Eastern oil. The thesis charts this redivision from Britain and BP to America and its 
companies. Pace Lenin, this was redistribution without war. The TPC (expanded to include US 
companies) and Red Line agreement were the first acts of Anglo-American redistribution. The next 
acts of were in Bahrain and Kuwait. 
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The end of WW2 marked the end of the “classical” age of imperialism, and the beginning of 
American hegemony and empire, and an age of inter-systemic conflict, the Cold War. In this 
context, Britain’s post-war governments’ attempts to preserve - and extend - Britain’s empire were 
only possible under American protection.1 And the cost of this protection was American 
penetration of Britain’s empire. BP’s concession in Iran was the first act of US protection-at-the-
cost-of-penetration. Anglo-American redistribution had now befallen all BP’s concessions in the 
Middle East. BP was also affected by the rise of Third World economic nationalism. This resulted 
in the loss of the company’s Middle Eastern and African concessions in the 1970s. It also resulted 
in the loss of the company’s old imperial markets. 
 
After the company struck oil in Alaska in 1969 its production, sales and assets Americanised. 
Rightly or wrongly, BP constantly feared US state hostility towards prize parts of the American oil 
industry being controlled by a company owned by non-Americans and, worse still, part-owned by a 
foreign state. To minimise the political risks to its US assets, or, to put it the other way around, to 
maximise the political protection of its US assets, BP sought to limit its ownership by such states 
(in particular, Britain and Kuwait) and to expand its ownership by Americans. In 1987, BP bought 
out Standard Oil of Ohio’s predominantly American stockholders, thereby losing the guardians of 
its US assets. Soon after it began exploring outside its OECD stronghold. At exactly this time, BP 
launched a new push to Americanise its shareholder base. New American shareholders were needed 
not just to protect its American assets but also to protect its prospective assets outside America, via 
the US state. A decade later, BP acquired two American oil companies. The takeovers Americanised 
BP’s production, sales and assets, as well as its shareholders and board of directors. One reason for 
the acquisitions was to increase BP’s ability to call on the American state for support in the 
international arena. 
 
Was BP now “British” or “Anglo-American” capital? Answering this question is difficult because 
the “nationality” of capital is under-theorised. One approach is to examine the nationalities of the 
owners (shareholders) and controllers (directors) of the company. On this basis, BP was now more-
or-less bi-national, more British than American up until 2010, but equally British and American 
thereafter. Given the limitations of theory here, the question is reframed as follows: What has been 
the relationship between BP and the British and American states? In terms of the instrumentalist 
argument that members of the capitalist class occupy or “colonise” positions in the state apparatus, 
BP had greater ties of colonisation to the British than the American state. Likewise, in terms of the 																																																								
1 The Second World War accelerated the shift in the relative strength of Britain and America. In parallel, 
Anglo-American redivision accelerated. 
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structuralist argument that a national state is dependent on BP to the extent that the company 
contributes to the national economy, the British state was more dependent on BP’s domestic 
operations than the American state was. This finding - of greater ties of colonisation and 
dependencies between BP and the British as opposed to American state - is consistent with the 
support BP received in the international arena from the two states: Whereas the US state did 
protect BP’s Russian assets on one occasion, BP received more support from the British than the 
American state, and less support from the American state than ExxonMobil (America’s largest oil 
company).  
 
The thesis then turns from America to post-Soviet Russia. BP’s first investment in Russia came in 
1997. It saw an opportunity to sell Russian natural gas to China. Since 2003, Russia has been BP’s 
largest source of hydrocarbons and BP has been Russia’s largest foreign producer. There were 
regular threats to BP’s Russian assets, from “oligarchs” and, in the context of nationalisation and 
the parallel hardening of the Russian state’s line towards foreign energy companies, from state-
controlled companies. The British state was more willing but less able to protect BP’s Russian 
assets than its American counterpart. The American state protected BP on one occasion, by 
threatening to withdraw a loan to BP’s “oligarch” rivals from the US’s official export credit agency. 
In contrast, the British state tried to protect BP on numerous occasions but without success. 
Despite all this, BP’s partnership with “oligarchs” proved highly profitable. But, in the context of 
nationalisation, BP jettisoned its “oligarch” partners for an equity stake and positions on the board 
of state-controlled Rosneft in 2013. This is how things stand. In the context of US and EU 
sanctions against Russia over Ukraine (sanctions BP lobbied against), and deteriorating Anglo-
Russian political relations, one of the UK’s very biggest capitalist concerns is producing almost 
one-third of its hydrocarbons via its stake in one of Russia’s national energy companies. 
 
Marxist studies of British imperialism as a whole 
 
This is my argument in a nutshell. The aim is to fit BP into the history of British imperialism as a 
whole. This section reviews the Marxist literature on that history. I include only texts and authors 
that explicitly identify themselves as Marxist (at the time of publication). Given the volume of the 
literature, the review is more-or-less restricted to studies of British imperialism as a whole, as 
opposed to narrower accounts of, for example, the City, or British imperialism in Malaya. The 
review begins, like BP’s history, with the “classical” age of imperialism. 
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The loss of Britain’s industrial monopoly or in other words the emergence of a competing group of 
industrial powers heralds the “Great Depression” and the era of classical imperialism the fusion of 
economic and political rivalry. This view is widely shared. For example R. Palme Dutt, a leading 
theoretician in the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPBG) when he wrote his 1957 The Crisis of 
Britain and the British Empire, argues that 
‘it was the Great Depression of the eighteen-seventies, when for the first time Britain’s export supremacy 
began to weaken before the advance of new industrial rivals, which ushered in the new phase of the 
extending export of capital and the scramble for new colonial acquisitions’ (Dutt 1957: p.75) 
A. L. Morton, chair of the Historians Group of the CPGB at the time the second edition of his A 
People’s History of England was published in 1948, argues that with the start of the age of imperialism 
in 1871 the British economy acquired a new basis: ‘Instead of the old and now vanishing industrial 
monopoly… there was a narrower but more complete colonial monopoly’ (Morton 1965: p.422). 
Last but not least Perry Anderson, writing in New Left Review in 1964, discusses the rise in the 1880s 
of what he calls ‘military-industrial imperialism’: 
‘Military-industrial imperialism’ proceeded by straight conquest; it was a product of the fear of rival European 
imperialisms... It thus marks the moment at which British world supremacy was no longer unquestioned.’ 
(Anderson 1964: p.34n.6) 
 
The start of the classical age of imperialism is coincident with the beginnings of Britain’s relative 
decline as an imperial power. This thesis does not take part in the debate on the explanation of 
Britain’s decline. But since the history of BP is framed by this phenomena I want to give a flavour 
of this debate by presenting two seminal accounts: Anderson’s Origins of the Present Crisis and Eric 
Hobsbawm’s Industry and Empire. For Anderson, the factors behind the malady of British capitalism 
are 
‘The agrarian and aristocratic stamp of English rulers in the era of the Pax Britannica, the subordination of 
bourgeois manufacturers and mill-owners to them, with all the consequences—economic, political and 
cultural—that followed from the cadet role of industrial capital in the Victorian age’ (Anderson 1987: p.20) 
A later article boils down his explanation: The fundamental origin of British capitalism’s decline is its 
initial priority (Anderson 1987: p.71). Hobsbawm’s explanation of Britain’s decline (which he dates 
from 1860) centres on the disadvantages of being the industrial pioneer - including ‘a rather archaic 
technology and business structure which may become too deeply embedded to be readily 
abandoned, or even modified’ (Hobsbawm 1999: p.xii). But this factor, he argues, must be analysed 
alongside another: Britain’s unique position in the world economy. Because of this position Britain 
did not have to compete against its new industrial rivals it could evade them. It could retreat into 
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both empire and free trade. ‘And our ability to evade helped to perpetuate the archaic and 
increasingly obsolete industrial and social structure of the pioneer age’ (Hobsbawm 1999: p.xii).2 
 
A debate in which this thesis does take part concerns explanations of the expansion of the British 
empire in the classical age of imperialism. Following Lenin Dutt argues that the decisive economic 
driving force behind the new colonial aggression was the export of capital (Dutt 1957: pp.52,311). 
Morton contends that the export of capital and territorial expansion were linked as both cause and 
effect (Morton 1965: p.425). Michael Barratt Brown disagrees: ‘In the case of the British Empire, 
overseas investment was not the cause of the imperial expansion that took place at the end of the 
nineteenth century’ (Barratt Brown 1970: p.450). The exception was southern Africa; here there 
was a direct investment interest in empire (Barratt Brown 1970: p.88).3 I will argue that the export 
of capital by BP does not explain Britain’s tightening imperial grip in the Middle East in this period. 
 
Central to BP’s history is inter-imperial relations. Morton argues that, in the period of colonial 
expansion, roughly up until 1900, Britain was most often in conflict with France. From then 
onwards, Germany became Britain’s main rival. In the period before the First World War, Anglo-
Germany rivalry centred on the Balkans, South America and the Turkish empire (Morton 1965: 
pp.428-9). After the Anglo-Boer war (1899-1902), Britain began looking for an ally in Europe. 
Britain first approached Germany ‘but Germany put too high a price upon her friendship’ (Morton 
1965: p.431). Instead, Britain formed an alliance with France and then with Russia. Prior to the 
Anglo-Russian entente of 1907, the two imperial powers were (long-standing) rivals in Central Asia 
and the Near East. Their partition of Iran (which was part of the entente) ‘was intended not only to 
let Russia and Britain in but to keep Germany out’ (Morton 1965: p.435). As we shall see the 
history of BP before WW1 intersects with these inter-imperial rivalries and alliances. 
 
  
																																																								
2 Anderson’s explanation also includes Hobsbawm’s second factor. He argues that ‘Instead of organizational 
or technological renovation, British industry drew on the assets of empire (Anderson 1987: p.42). Morton’s 
explanation of Britain’s decline centres on this second factor. For him ‘The main reason for this relative 
decline was the existence of the British empire and the opportunities it afforded the investment of capital at 
an unusually high rate of profit’ (Morton 1965: p.427). Henk Overbeek’s explanation bears the imprint of 
both Anderson’s and Hobsbawm’s views (Overbeek 1990). Other countries responded to the Great 
Depression with tariffs. Britain clung to free trade. For explanations of this policy see Hobsbawm (1999: 
pp.222-3) and Anderson (1987: pp.42-4). 
3 Instead, Barratt Brown’s argument is as follows: ‘British moves in Africa and elsewhere may… be seen as a 
reaction to the challenge of German and American capitalists to Britain’s dominant position as the world 
power. To emphasise the overall interests of British capitalism is not to replace economic by political 
explanations for the expansion of empire… but rather to show the political as arising out of the total 
economic interest. Power, prestige and security were aims which reflected Britain’s basic economic interest in 
world free trade’ (Barratt Brown 1970: p.98). 
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The history of the company from WW1 is shaped mostly decisively by Anglo-American relations. 
Britain decided to fight Germany and to ally with the USA (Gamble 1981: p.59). This was a 
momentous choice for the future direction of British history. Anderson argues that this choice was 
almost inescapable for Britain’s rulers: 
‘The strategic exigency of shielding a maritime empire from America’s potential sea-power, the economic 
linkage of long-standing investments in the US, the cultural ties of a common language and elite descent, the 
paramount advance of transatlantic industry, all pointed in the same direction.’ (Anderson 1987: p.45) 
Britain won the war only because of its alliance with the stronger of its imperial rivals (the USA) 
against the weaker (Germany). Nevertheless the price of this alliance was high (Anderson 1987: 
pp.44-5). As Henk Overbeek argues: 
‘The ambiguous relationship between Britain and the United States which would dominate the years after 
1941 had thus already been established thirty years earlier: Britain depended upon the US for the ultimate 
protection of its imperial interests, but would have to pay a heavy price for that protection, viz., the 
admittance of the US into most of its sphere of influence.’ (Overbeek 1990: p.55) 
This is an essential part of the history of BP. Pace Lenin, this was Anglo-American redistribution 
without war. 
 
In contradictory fashion, World War One both weakened the foundations of capitalism in Britain 
and expanded its empire, most notably in the Middle East. This expansion of empire in the Middle 
East is also central to the story of BP. In 1916 Britain and France carved up the old Ottoman 
Empire via the Sykes-Picot Treaty. John Callaghan argues that this imperial expansion had multiple 
motivations. First, in the eyes of the strategists, it was needed to check the Russians (and after the 
Russian Revolution, to check Bolshevism), now that Britain had recognised Russia’s claims to 
control the Straits and Constantinople. Second, Lloyd George, the prime minister, considered the 
Middle Eastern territories as possible bargaining chips (whenever the time for bargaining came). 
Third, the Middle East was considered to have abundant oil, essential for the Royal Navy. Fourth, 
in strategic terms, the Middle East was regarded as crucial to the defence of India (Callaghan 1997: 
pp.23-5). 
 
Just as the crisis of capitalism at the end of the nineteenth century marks a moment of 
metamorphosis in British imperialism, from the Pax Britannica to [relative decline and] the age of 
classical imperialism, so too does the crisis of capitalism in the interwar years. Between the end of 
the war and the circa 1929-32 “Great Slump” the British ruling class yearned ‘for a return to the 
“normalcy” of 1913’ (Callaghan 1997: p.19; see also Hobsbawm (1999: p.130)). Normalcy ‘was 
understood as British ascendancy in a multilateral, global trading system’. In broad terms, Callaghan 
puts this ‘utterly far-fetched’ policy down to a ‘Great Power Complex’: ‘British politicians 
effectively ignored the signs of national decline and persisted with the country’s over-blown world 
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role’ (Callaghan 1997: pp.vii,19).4 A central part of the return-to-normalcy policy was the decision 
to return to the Gold Standard at the pre-war value of Sterling. Overbeek explains this decision in 
terms of the hegemony of the financial and commercial bourgeoisie (the City) in Britain’s power 
bloc in the 1920s. The return to gold was backed by the City but opposed by domestic industrial 
capital (represented by the Federation of British Industry) (Overbeek 1990: pp.55,59,68; see also: 
Anderson (1987); Ingham (1984); Longstreth (1979)). 
 
The Great Slump changed everything. It killed the liberal world economy. When British industry 
lost its monopoly, the City of London’s world domination ‘became, if anything, more complete 
than ever before in 1870-1913’ (Hobsbawm 1999: p.223; see also Anderson (1987: p.42)). After 
1919, the City appeared to recover (Hobsbawm 1999: pp.130-1,188-9). This illusion was destroyed 
by the Great Slump. In Hobsbawm’s words, ‘British trade and finance could no longer regain what 
British industry lost’ (Hobsbawm 1999: p.188). In other words, ‘Britain now had neither adequate 
visible nor adequate invisible income’ (Hobsbawm 1999: p.131). 
 
The Great Slump killed the return-to-normalcy policy. Britain left the Gold Standard in 1931. 
Instead, a so-called “Sterling Bloc” centred on empire was constructed. Free Trade was abandoned. 
Instead, there was a turn to ‘protection from international competition through imperial preference 
and international cartellization’ (Overbeek 1990: p.81). The thesis will discuss BP’s turn to 
international cartellization.5 Britain’s turn to imperial protection in 1932 was, in no small part, a 
defence against American penetration of Britain and its empire (Overbeek 1990: p.78). Before this 
turn, as we shall see, BP had been on the wrong end of  a ‘successful American campaign to 
counter the burgeoning British oil monopoly in the Middle East’ (Callaghan 1997: p.44). 
 
Barratt Brown argues that capitalism in Britain now looked much more like Lenin’s picture of 
imperialism. By the 1930s: 
‘Industry was much more concentrated, capital more centralised, the control of finance-capital over industry 
much greater and the influence of the representatives of the most powerful sections of banking and industry 
upon government policy much more profound’ (Barratt Brown 1970: p.148). 
But the crucial development of the decade was the new links forged ‘between the great vertically 
integrated combines and the colonial empire’ (Barratt Brown 1970: p.148). Empire’s increased 
economic significance after the Great Slump is not disputed (Callaghan 1997: p.54; Overbeek 1990: 
p.90). And economic concentration was very much greater (Hobsbawm 1999: p.191). But there is 
																																																								
4 Of course, the expansion of empire in the Middle East was part of this return-to-normalcy policy and the 
‘Great Power Complex’. 
5 For a discussion of world cartels and British imperialism, see Barratt Brown (1970: pp.125-31). 
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no agreement on the question of finance capital. For example, both Anderson and Overbeek argue 
that it never developed in Britain (Anderson 1987: p.44; Overbeek 1990: p.51).6 
 
As Anderson argues: 
‘The Second World War... repeated the experience of the First at a lower loop down the same spiral. England 
escaped defeat in 1940-41 thanks, once again, to its compact with the United States... But US technology and 
matériel came at a crippling price. Washington fine-tuned its aid with more or less cold calculation to shore 
Britain up as a forward barrier against German domination of Europe, yet whittle it down as an economic 
and territorial competitor in the world at large. As London’s financial reserves were expended and its 
overseas assets liquidated, and it was forced to pledge an end to imperial preference, economic autonomy 
drained away and present alliance became future subordination.’ (Anderson 1987: pp.46-7) 
As Callaghan notes, America’s wartime talk of free trade as well as the rights of colonies to national 
sovereignty and self-determination added up to the end of Britain’s empire and its Sterling Bloc 
(Callaghan 1997: p.79). 
 
Despite this, the 1945-51 Labour government attempted to preserve - and even to extend - Britain’s 
empire (Overbeek 1990: p.93; Callaghan 1997: p.93; Anderson 1987: p.58). At the end of the war, 
the country’s major imperial assets were ‘the rubber and tin of Malaya, the rich mining deposits of 
central and southern Africa, and above all the oil deposits of the Middle East’ (Hobsbawm 1999: 
p.128). The post-war government attempted to solve its economic difficulties by intensified 
colonial exploitation, in particular, of these principal assets of empire (Dutt 1957: p.258; Callaghan 
1997: p.100).7 Britain’s Middle Eastern oil assets were (principally) in BP’s hands. What was at stake 
was not just the profits of Britain’s oil companies. The oil was also contributing to the balance of 
payments, ‘strengthening the value of the pound and expanding British overseas investment’ 
(Barratt Brown 1970: p.242). In addition, there was the critical issue of control of access to oil. 
There were, of course, losses to Britain’s empire after the war, notably the (unavoidable) loss of 
India. But there were also gains, notably in Libya, the redistribution of a former Italian colony (see: 
Callaghan 1997: pp.91-3; Dutt 1957: p.159). As we shall see, BP has a place in the history of British 
imperialism here too. 
 
  
																																																								
6 Despite the centrality of the topic to Marxist studies of British imperialism, this thesis does not discuss the 
relationship between British industry and the City of London. 
7 Of course, ‘the involuntary contribution and sacrifice of Britain’s dependencies to its war effort was [also] 
considerable’ (Callaghan 1997: p.85). On Britain, the sterling area and Malaya in the period 1945-60, see Alex 
Sutton’s (2015) The Political Economy of Imperial Relations. 
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It was only possible to attempt to preserve - and extend - Britain’s empire under American 
protection (Anderson 1987: p.58; Overbeek 1990: p.55). And this meant American control of the 
UK’s role in the world (Anderson 1987: p.55; Dutt 1957: p.147). Dutt describes the Anglo-
American relationship after the war as one of ‘antagonistic partnership’ (Dutt 1957: p.147)  
‘This follows from the two-sided position of the British imperialists whose counter-revolutionary class 
interests align them with the American imperialists, at the same time as their sectional imperialist economic-
political interests bring them into repeated conflict.’ (Dutt 1957: p.465) 
Anglo-American unity was based, in part at least, on fighting a common enemy, the Soviet Union 
and the Left (Callaghan 1997: p.98; see also: Barratt Brown 1970: p.228; Anderson 1987: p.47). But 
the two capitalist powers were also economic rivals. And America was the dominant power. As a 
result, its protection of Britain’s empire came at the cost of its penetration of that empire and of 
Britain itself (Overbeek 1990: p.55). 
 
Iran was the first act of overt protection-at-the-cost-of-penetration, the first arena of overt Anglo-
American redistribution (van der Pijl 2006: p.45). In 1951, the country’s new prime minister, 
Mohammad Mussadiq, nationalised the operations of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (soon 
renamed BP). It took an Anglo-American orchestrated coup to oust him; ‘Great Britain proved 
unable to resolve the matter, and was forced to turn to the United States for help’ (Overbeek 1990: 
p.98). After the coup, 40 per cent of Iran’s oil production was redistributed to five US oil 
companies. Then, in 1956, British and American imperialism clashed in Egypt. Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, Egypt’s leader, nationalised the Suez Canal Company. As Overbeek notes, ‘The canal 
represented a considerable British interest: Britain owned 44 per cent of the Canal Company, and 
25 per cent of British overseas trade went through it’ (Overbeek 1990: p.98). In response to the 
nationalisation,  Britain, alongside France and Israel, launched a military attack on Egypt. America’s 
imperial interests collided directly with those of Britain, and it (ignominiously) halted the Suez 
expedition. This was another act of Anglo-American redistribution (van der Pijl 2006: p.48; 
Overbeek 1990: pp.98-9; Anderson 1987: p.56). 
 
Was Suez a turning point? Overbeek thinks so. In the postwar period before Suez, he argues, 
developments in the “superstructure” lagged behind developments in the “basis” (Overbeek 1990: 
p.88). Economically, the colonies were of diminishing importance, whilst the significance of the 
industrialised capitalist economies, in particular, in Western Europe, was rising.8 And yet, politically, 
a foreign policy ‘appropriate to a bygone era’ persisted, a strong partnership with the USA to 
																																																								
8 It was in ‘Western Europe where the fastest growing markets were located for Britain’s Fordist industries’ 
(Overbeek 1990: p.88). 
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protect Britain’s empire, whilst opportunities for a closer relationship with Western Europe were 
not taken (Overbeek 1990: pp.88,100,107).9 
‘The Suez fiasco led to a realignment of interests in which the colonial fraction of the bourgeoisie was left in 
disarray, and new forces came to the fore, finding political expression in Macmillan’s premiership.’ (Overbeek 
1990: p.7) 
Macmillan’s administration liquidated the remains of British Empire and applied - albeit 
unsuccessfully - to join the EEC. The “basis” and “superstructure” were back in sync (Overbeek 
1990: pp.99-102,110).10 There was:  
‘still one more logical conclusion to be drawn from the Suez debacle: Britain’s military role “East of Suez” 
was a millstone around the country’s neck and had to be abandoned for the restructuring of Britain’s position 
in the world to be completed.’ (Overbeek 1990: p.103)11 
In contrast to Overbeek, Anderson does not think Suez was a major turning point. Even after Suez, 
‘illusions of empire’ continued. This was one reason why EEC entry was not contemplated shortly 
after Suez; the Commonwealth was still thought to be superior (Anderson 1987: pp.56-7). When 
the Labour Party, under Harold Wilson, returned to office in 1964, there was no change to 
conventional definitions of British capitalism’s world role: ‘The Commonwealth and the American 
Protectorate which guaranteed it remained mentally untouchable’ (Anderson 1987: p.59).12 Instead, 
Anderson argues, the foreign policy turning point occurred under the 1970-74 Tory government, 
led by Edward Heath. EEC entry was now the centrepiece of the government’s strategy for 
economic renewal (Anderson 1987: p.63). 
 
In the 1970s, Britain’s continued national decline intersected with international depression 
(Anderson 1987: p.63; Overbeek 1990: p.122,141).13 As a result, the country’s entry into the 
Common Market misfired; the EEC lost its dynamism as soon as Britain joined it. At the same 
time, the “West” was confronted by new contenders. The first of these was the Middle East and 
OPEC. This resulted in the loss of BP’s Middle Eastern and African concessions in the 1970s. The 
OPEC revolt ‘activated and politically synchronised’ other contenders: the Soviet bloc and a new 
Third World coalition for a New International Economic Order (van der Pijl 2006: p.115). The 
Anglo-American response was a global neo-liberal offensive. In 1976, the British crisis deepened 																																																								
9 Callaghan’s Great Power Complex argument is very similar (Callaghan 1997: p.vii). 
10 Overbeek argues that Macmillan’s first priority was to restore the relationship with the USA (Overbeek 
1990: p.99). But he does not explain Britain’s continued interest in a strong partnership with the US after the 
liquidation of the British Empire. 
11 Withdrawal “East of Suez” meant Britain ending its treaty obligations to protect Kuwait (as well as Bahrain, 
Qatar and the “Trucial States”), the largest source of BP’s crude oil in the 1960s. 
12 In addition: ‘The Sterling Area with the City at the centre of it, and the NATO-SEATO alliances with the 
functions of sub-imperial buffer that followed from them, continued to be regarded as intrinsic to the 
definition of Great Britain’ (Anderson 1987: p.59). 
13 Some Marxists explain Britain’s continued relative decline in terms of a weak British state and a strong City 
of London (Aaronovitch 1981; Gamble 1981; Rowthorn 1971). Others explain it in terms of the problem of 
trade union strength (Glyn & Harrison 1980; Kilpatrick & Lawson 1980; cf. Fine & Harris 1985). 
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and the Labour government turned to the IMF for a loan. The IMF’s conditions, including the sale 
of some of the government’s shares in BP, implied the demise of Keynesianism.14 It was replaced 
by “Thatcherism”, a British variant of neo-liberalism. Thus, as in the previous two crises of 
capitalism, British capitalism metamorphosed. 
 
Margaret Thatcher’s governments followed America’s “unilateralist” lead (for example, in the US 
military attack on Libya in 1986).15 For Overbeek, this constituted a break with post-Suez foreign 
policy. For him, this policy was guided by President Kennedy’s concept of “Atlantic Partnership”: a 
strong alliance between the USA and the EEC, which Britain attempted to join after 1961 
(Overbeek 1990: pp.181-2,187,208). For Anderson, following America’s lead did not constitute a 
break. As we have seen, he argues that a foreign policy turning point occurred, not post-Suez, but 
under Heath’s government. And for Anderson, Heath’s external policy constituted only ‘an 
imperceptible distancing from the US’ (Anderson 1987: pp.63,67). Thatcher’s governments also 
liberalised the City, to assure its international competitiveness. Liberalisation led to a quantum leap 
in foreign banks operating in the City, and to a surge in (principally, portfolio) investment overseas. 
Britain was turning into a rentier economy (again) (Overbeek 1990: p.196-7; Anderson 1987: pp.68-
70).16 
 
This is where this review must stop. As far as I am aware, there are no Marxist studies of British 
imperialism as a whole in the post-Cold War period. There are also no Marxist studies of either of 
the two foci of this thesis in this period: Anglo-American and Anglo-Russian relations. 
 
  
																																																								
14 For discussion of Britain’s 1976 IMF loan see: Brett (1985); Overbeek (1990); Panitch & Gindin (2012); 
Rogers (2009). 
15 Most Marxist accounts of Thatcherism say very little about British imperialism. This is true of the most 
celebrated contributions by Stuart Hall and Bob Jessop and their co-authors (Hall & Jacques 1983; Jessop et 
al. 1988). It is also true of the most recent: Alexander Gallas’s (2016) The Thatcherite Offensive. 
16 Anderson borrows from Geoffrey Ingham’s (1984) Capitalism Divided? The City and Industry in British Social 
Development. For a contrasting view of the City, see Tony Norfield’s (2016) The City. See also Ingham’s (2018) 
review of Norfield’s book. Another important Marxist text on the City is Jerry Coakley’s and Laurence 
Harris’s (1983) The City of Capital. 
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Past research on BP 
 
There is very little literature on BP at present, of interest to a thesis on British imperialism that is. 
Henry Longhurst’s Adventure in oil: the story of British Petroleum was published back in 1959. The 
author remarks of the company: 
‘For myself, ever since I first saw the wonders that had been created from nothing in Persia, I have seen it as 
a story… of thousands of human beings, of many nationalities, who in fifty years have brought it to life by 
spending the best part of their own lives in its service.’ (Longhurst 1959: p.9) 
He adds: ‘That Sir Winston Churchill has honoured their Company’s story with a foreword will be 
as great a source of pride and pleasure to those who have worked for it as it is to the author’ 
(Longhurst 1959: p.10). This book does not contribute much to a Marxist study of British 
imperialism. The best, but almost the only, books on BP are the three-volume official history of the 
company written by Ronald Ferrier and James Bamberg. These books are an invaluable source for 
the thesis. However, the official histories end in 1975 so don’t cover most of period covered by 
Chapter 4 or any of Chapter 5. Of course, lots of the discussion in the official histories is not 
relevant to a political economy of British imperialism, for example, the management of the 
company, the achievements and shortcomings of various chairmen, how the company responded 
culturally to the rise of new competitors etc. More importantly, the official histories fit the history 
of BP into a history of British imperialism as a whole, to a limited extent only. And even to the 
extent that they do, it is an “uncritical” as opposed to “critical” (let alone Marxist) history of British 
imperialism. A few examples of omissions from the official histories make this clear. There is 
discussion of Anglo-Russian rivalry in Iran, but no discussion of the Anglo-Russian entente in 
1907, its partition of Iran, the location of BP’s concession compared to the British and Russian 
spheres and neutral zone, the assignment of the hitherto neutral zone to Britain in 1915. Instead of 
a discussion of the British state protecting BP’s oilfields during WW1, there is a discussion of 
administration, technical operations and marketing during the war. In Ferrier’s 635 pages on the 
period 1901-32, there is just 8 pages on “Mesopotamia”. There is no discussion of either the Anglo-
German or Anglo-French rivalry-turned-alliance for this concession (hence no discussion of Sykes-
Picot, the British army’s dash to occupy Mosul at the end of the war, San Remo etc.). There’s no 
discussion of Britain’s imperial hold on Iraq after the end of the “mandate”. There is no discussion 
of the Anglo-American orchestrated coup to oust Mussadiq. No discussion of Libya as a British 
client state until its nationalist, republican coup etc. A short illustrated history of BP by Berry 
Ritchie takes the company’s official history up until 1995, but the limitations of such a work go 
without saying. BP’s Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010 produced a small industry of books on the 
topic, mostly by journalists. But these books rarely stray far from their focus into a wider narrative 
on the company. And there have been no Marxist or other critical studies of BP. This is the gap the 
thesis hopes to fill.   
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Research questions 
 
Major research question: 
How does the history of BP fit into the history of British imperialism as a whole? 
 
Minor research questions: 
What support did BP receive from the British state? 
 
How does the history of BP intersect with inter-imperial relations in the “classical” age of 
imperialism? 
 
How does the history of BP intersect with Anglo-American redistribution, in particular, of Middle 
Eastern oil? 
 
How did BP attempt to protect its US assets in the light of its fears of American state hostility 
towards it? 
 
Why did BP want to Americanize itself at the end of the 1980s? 
 
Was BP “British” or “Anglo-American” capital after 1998? 
 
What has been the relationship between BP and the British and American states since 1998? 
Has BP had greater ties of “colonisation” to the British than the American state?  
Has the British state been more dependent on BP’s (domestic) operations than the 
American state was? 
Has BP received more support in the international arena from the British than the 
American state? Has ExxonMobil (America’s largest oil company) received more support 
than BP from the American state? 
 
What has been the position of foreign energy companies in the upstream Russian oil industry? 
 
What were the threats to BP’s Russian assets?  
 
How did the British and American states attempt to protect BP’s assets from these threats? 
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Methods 
 
The thesis is a case study. This is the basic research design. It is a study of just one case, BP, in 
depth. The case of BP was chosen because of the importance of the company to British 
imperialism from the start of the twentieth century to the present. On various metrics, BP has been 
one of British capitalism’s largest companies. But BP has also been, and remains, one of the world’s 
largest oil companies. And oil has been, since BP’s first concession in Iran, and remains central to 
capitalism, both economically and militarily. The case was chosen given my interest in British 
imperialism and oil. Another one of the world’s largest oil (better, energy) companies is Royal 
Dutch Shell. This is an Anglo-Dutch company. This would make for an interesting case study too 
but would require an analysis of both British and Dutch imperialisms and their relation. It was 
decided to focus on the more straightforward case of BP.17 The aim is to describe and explain what 
is going in the particular case of BP for its own sake. The case has not been selected for its capacity to 
be informative about Marxist theories of imperialism or a larger constellation of cases (e.g., Britain’s 
largest capitalist companies). Despite not being selected for this purpose, the case of BP is used to 
comment on wider debates on the export of capital and expansion of empire at the end of the 
nineteenth century, on theories of imperialism in the “classical” age of imperialism, and on the 
interpenetration of “national” capitals in the post-WW2 era. Nevertheless, I tread cautiously on the 
issue of generalizability from a case study of one. The last point to make on the case study design is 
that it employs emergent design. That is, the research design evolved during the analysis of the case 
as I focused on what I considered to be the most significant features of the case. The greatest 
changes to the design came during the analyses of the Americanisation of BP. No-one has written 
on this subject before so the research benefits from the emergent design. The research questions 
are those that emerged during the research. 
 
  
																																																								
17 And since I can’t read Dutch. 
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Sources 
 
The sources used are best described on a chapter-by-chapter basis, given the different nature of the 
research in each chapter. Chapter 3 presents a history of BP and its relation to British imperialism, 
from its original concession for the exploration and production of Iran’s oil up until the 
nationalisations of its Middle Eastern and African concessions in the 1970s. Given the breadth of 
the subject matter of this chapter, the thesis relies on an examination of secondary sources. The 
specialised historical studies consulted range from the official histories of BP, to histories of the oil 
industry in particular countries, to histories of all businesses in particular countries or areas, through 
to studies of the British empire and decolonisation. The chapter also contains some analysis of 
primary sources, however. In particular, the company’s annual reports for all years dating back to 
1945 and its reports on financial and operating information with coverage from 1974, were 
obtained from The BP (British Petroleum) Archive, based at Warwick University. Data from these 
publications, alongside data presented in BP’s official histories, are used to analyse the geographical 
distribution of the company’s sales and its crude oil production and/or sources (sources being 
production plus purchases). 
 
Chapter 4 on the Americanisation of BP is based on various sources. Part I of the chapter covers 
the period 1969-1997. Two types of sources are used here. First, to analyse BP’s acquisition of 
Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio), the sales of the British government’s shareholding and the 
company’s efforts to Americanise its shareholder base, a careful reading of articles published on BP 
in the Financial Times, Economist, Wall Street Journal and Washington Post. Another valuable source here 
is Jim Bamberg’s official history of the company. Second, to examine the Americanisation of BP’s 
operations and ownership, an analysis of data collected from BP and Sohio annual reports and 
reports on financial and operating information. 
 
Part II of the chapter covers the period 1998-2016. As in Part I, Part II analyses newspaper articles, 
and information obtained from reports published by BP and the companies it acquired in this 
period, Amoco and ARCO. But Part II contains additional sources too. First, for each of 59 people 
on BP’s board of directors since 1995, information has been collected on their nationality, other 
company directorships whilst on the board, and positions occupied within state apparatuses before, 
during and after serving on the board. This information was obtained mainly from BP (and other 
company) annual reports, Companies House, collations of biographies - including, Who’s Who & 
Who Was Who, Marquis Who’s Who, Who’s Who in American Politics and Nexis Biographies - British 
government and parliament websites, and personal communication with directors. Second, BP’s 
contribution to hydrocarbon production, gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and employment in 
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the UK and USA is examined. Data on UK and US hydrocarbon production are from the well-
respected BP Statistical Review of World Energy. Data on UK and US GFCF and employment are from 
the World Bank and ILO. Third, to examine British state support for BP in the international arena, 
an analysis of newspaper reports, British government internal documents/communications released 
under the Freedom of Information Act, and reports published by the British government and 
parliament. 
 
Chapter 5 is on BP’s position in post-Soviet Russia. Two types of source material are used in this 
chapter. First, the thesis compares BP with other foreign energy companies in Russia, in terms of 
hydrocarbon production volumes. After establishing the foreign companies operating in the 
country - not a trivial task - the analysis is based on information published in each company’s (and 
in one case the company’s partner’s) annual reports in various years. Second, the thesis examines 
BP’s Russian investments, the threats to these assets and the efforts of the British and American 
states to protect them. The analysis here is based on various sources, in particular, the Financial 
Times, Economist, and Moscow Times, the specialist oil industry press, including Oil & Gas Journal and 
Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, information published by BP and Russian companies, in the form 
of annual reports, websites and press releases etc., and the autobiography of BP’s ex-CEO, John 
Browne. 
 
An important source for the thesis is newspapers. Historians and social scientists frequently mine 
newspapers to learn facts about specific events (including basic information about who did what, 
when, how, and where) and to find details surrounding these events. Newspaper articles have the 
advantage of being close in time and space to the events concerned. But given the need to write in 
haste articles are often incomplete and inaccurate. Newspapers tend to reflect a particular point of 
view, in particular, the economic and political interests of their owners. 
 
The thesis relies, in particular, on the Financial Times so a brief discussion of this publication 
follows. After 1957, the FT was majority-owned by Lord Cowdray’s Pearson empire. At that time, 
the Pearson conglomerate had interests in oil and gas production, finance and industrial holdings. 
In the 1990s, Pearson sold off some of its non-media interests, including Camco oil. In 2015, the 
FT was sold to Japanese media group Nikkei. The FT encouraged its readers to vote for Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979 and in the 1980s 
‘The FT’s editorial line consistently supported the Thatcher government’s supply-side measures, praising anti-
union legislation, tax reforms and the movement towards the privatisation of utilities. But there remained a 
strong Keynesian theme in its call for initiatives to cure unemployment.’  
(Greenslade 2004: p.533) 
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It endorsed Tony Blair’s New Labour, but opposed the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and has backed the 
Conservative Party in the last three general elections (in 2010, 2015 and 2017). 
 
A decision was made not to consult sources in The National Archives. When the PhD was started in 
2012, and initial decisions were made about sources, under the 30-year-rule, public records were 
available up until 1982. In 2013, the government began to move towards releasing records when 
they were 20 years old. So, during 2013, The National Archives received records from 1983 and 1984. 
Nevertheless, the decision on whether or not to consult the public records pertained principally to 
the analysis of BP from its origins in 1901 up until 1979 (i.e., Chapter 3). The breadth of the subject 
matter of this chapter is very broad. It is broad in the time period covered, 80 years. It is broad in 
that it examines BP’s concessions in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Nigeria and Libya, as 
well as the concession in Bahrain. In addition, it examines BP’s markets across the world. One 
method of distinguishing historical research is to ask whether they are based chiefly on primary or 
secondary sources. As a rule, the broader the topic, the more the research tends to rely on 
secondary works (Brundage: pp.25-6). Given the wide scope of the subject matter of this chapter, it 
was decided to rely primarily on secondary sources. As a result, Chapter 3 synthesises more 
specialised historical research. P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins make the same choice in their well-
respected British Imperialism (Cain & Hopkins 1993a; Cain & Hopkins 1993b). Their books relies on 
secondary sources only. Many of their chapters are similar in scope (and word length) to mine, e.g., 
The Ottoman Empire and Persia, 1838-1914, or, The Dominions, 1914-39 (covering Australia, South 
Africa, New Zealand and Canada). For the same reason, it was decided not to consult the BP 
Archive, except for annual reports and accounts. The scope of the archive is as follows: 
‘Core business records are available including documents of incorporation; General and Board minutes; 
accounts, schedules and shareholder records. The Archive also includes Company magazines; annual reports 
and accounts; photographs; films; public relations materials and D'Arcy family albums.’ (Jisc Archives Hub 
2018) 
But, even now, the records are opened up to the end of 1976 only. So again, the decision on 
whether or not to consult the BP archive pertained principally to the analysis of Chapter 3. 
 
The thesis proceeds as follows. The next chapter (Chapter 2) discusses Marxist theories of 
imperialism, the state and accounts of the international political economy of oil. The thesis then 
turns to the history of BP and its relation to British imperialism. Chapter 3 examines the company’s 
colonial origins and takes the story up until the nationalisations of its concessions in the 1970s. The 
Americanisation of BP - from 1969 - and its limits is the subject of Chapter 4. Chapter 5 then 
explores BP’s position in Russia since 1997, before Chapter 6 concludes. 
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2. Marxist theories of imperialism, the state and of the 
international political economy of oil 
 
 
This chapter is in three parts. The first part considers four debates within Marxist theories of 
imperialism. The first concerns the definition of ‘imperialism’ itself. The others are of particular 
relevance to the thesis. These are: relations between imperialist powers - in particular, the concepts 
of inter-imperial rivalry, ultra-imperialism and US super-imperialism - internationalisation-
transnationalisation-globalisation and the relative strength of the imperialist powers. The second 
part presents a conceptualisation of the state. The third part is on Marxist accounts of the 
international political economy of oil. This discussion has a chronological structure starting with 
accounts of the post-WWII period. This is followed by studies of the nationalizations of oil 
production and sharp oil price rises in the 1970s. Finally, a spectrum of views on the post-Cold War 
era is considered. 
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Part I. Debates in Marxist theories of imperialism 
 
Definitions of imperialism 
 
How have different writers defined the word “imperialism”? For Rudolf Hilferding and Nikolai 
Bukharin, imperialism is the policy of finance capital.1 Hilferding says this policy ‘has three 
objectives: (1) to establish the largest possible economic territory; (2) to close this territory to 
foreign competition by a wall of protective tariffs, and consequently (3) to reserve it as an area of 
exploitation for the national monopolistic combinations’ (Hilferding 1981: p.326). Bukharin adopts 
Hilferding’s description of this policy (Bukharin 1966: p.107).2 This is a policy, in competition with 
other imperial powers, of maximal colonial expansion, with colonies closed off to other imperial 
powers to be exploited by the colonising power alone (Hilferding, 1981; Bukharin, 1966). This is 
also Karl Kautsky’s definition of “imperialism” as opposed to “ultra-imperialism” (Kautsky, 1970). 
It is also very close to Rosa Luxemburg’s definition: ‘Imperialism is the political expression of the 
accumulation of capital in its competitive struggle for what remains still open of the non-capitalist 
environment’ (Luxemburg, 2003: p.426). Central to Luxemburg’s definition is the geographical 
expansion of capitalism. Likewise, Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin define capitalist imperialism as the 
role played by capitalist states in the spatial extension of capitalism (Panitch & Gindin, 2005).3 
 
In contrast to Hilferding, Bukharin and Kautsky, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin defines imperialism, not as a 
policy, but as a stage of capitalism, the monopoly stage (Lenin, 1968). Lenin focuses on the 
economic aspects of imperialism. His ‘briefest possible definition of imperialism’ is ‘imperialism is 
the monopoly stage of capitalism’ (Lenin 1968: p.83). More fully, imperialism includes the following 
five basic features: 
(1) the concentration of production and capital has developed to such a high stage that it has created 
monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life; (2) the merging of bank capital with industrial capital, 
and the creation, on the basis of this “finance capital”, of a financial oligarchy; (3) the export of capital as 
distinguished from the export of commodities acquires exceptional importance; (4) the formation of 
international monopolist capitalist associations which share the world among themselves, and (5) the 
territorial division of the whole world among the biggest capitalist powers is completed (Lenin 1968: p.83).4 																																																								
1 “Finance capital” is the product of the merger of industrial and financial capital. 
2 For Hilferding, this policy is based on finance capital’s interest in capital export, both of loan and industrial 
capital, markets, and raw materials. Likewise, Bukharin argues that imperialism is rooted in increased 
competition between state capitalist trusts in world sales markets, in world markets for raw materials, and for 
capital investment spheres. 
3 With imperialism understood ‘as a form of extended political rule’, Panitch and Gindin define capitalist 
imperialism as ‘the role played by capitalist states in the spatial extension of the law of value and of capitalist 
social relations’ (Panitch & Gindin 2005: pp.103-4). 
4 In addition, imperialism is parasitic and decaying capitalism. 
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Ernest Mandel argues that the era of “late capitalism” is ‘merely a further development of the 
imperialist, monopoly-capitalist epoch’ so that Lenin’s study of Imperialism ‘remain[s] fully valid for 
late capitalism’ (Mandel, 1975: p.10). Nicos Poulantzas also follows Lenin in defining imperialism as 
the monopoly stage of the capitalist mode of production (Martin, 2008: pp.224-225). 
 
Lenin’s analysis focuses more on inter-imperial rivalries than on metropolis-periphery relations. An 
alternative class of definitions of imperialism focuses on the exploitation of some areas by others. 
For example, Samir Amin defines imperialism as the construction and reproduction of dominant 
centres and dominated peripheries (Amin 2004: p.13).5 Asymmetrical relations between cores and 
peripheries are based on the enjoyment by cores vis-à-vis peripheries of one or more 
“monopolies”. From the Industrial Revolution to the decades following WWII the monopoly was 
an industrial one - the cores were industrialised, the peripheries were not. Exceptionally between 
1950 and 1980 ‘the victory of national liberation movements and/or socialist revolutions… enabled 
the peripheries to impose a revision of the old asymmetrical terms of the global system and to enter 
the industrial age’ (Amin 2006: pp.3-4). But the collapse of the Soviet Union and Third World’s 
national-populist regimes meant the beginnings of a new phase of imperialism. Asymmetrical 
relations between cores and peripheries were based now on five new monopolies: technological 
monopoly, control of worldwide financial markets, monopolistic access to the world’s natural 
resources, media and communications monopolies, and monopolies over weapons of mass 
destruction (Amin 2003: pp.61,63-64; Amin 2006: pp.4,34).6 Like Amin, Ellen Meiksins Wood 
defines imperialism as the transfer of wealth from weaker (or subordinate) to stronger (or imperial) 
states (Wood 2003: pp.3-4). Under capitalist imperialism, the basis of this transfer of wealth is the 
imposition and manipulation of the economic imperatives of the market, i.e., the economic power 
of capital. However, the economic power of capital requires the support of the extra-economic 
(political, military, judicial) power of capital.7 This is based on Wood’s argument about capitalism’s 
distinctive detachment of the economic power of capital from the extra-economic power of capital, 
i.e., the separation of the economic and political. 
 
  																																																								
5 For Amin, the process of capital accumulation on a global scale is by nature imperialist. In other words, 
imperialism pace Lenin is ‘the permanent stage of capitalism’ (Amin 2003: p.57). 
6 The boom (1945-70) and crisis (1970-) were tied to these phases of imperialism. The boom was based on 
the complementarity of the national social-democratic project in the West, the "Bandung project" in the 
periphery, and the Soviet project. The collapse of these projects 'inaugurated a structural crisis of the system' 
(Amin 2003: pp.11,15). 
7 ‘[T]he role of extra-economic force, in capitalist imperialism as in capitalist class domination, is opaque, 
because in general it operates not by intervening directly in the relation between capital and labour, or 
between imperial and subordinate states, but more indirectly, by sustaining the system of economic 
compulsions, the system of property (and propertylessness) and the operation of markets.’ (Wood 2003: p.4) 
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A comment on David Harvey’s theory of imperialism to end this discussion. Harvey defines 
capitalist imperialism as a ‘contradictory fusion’ of territorial and capitalistic logics of power 
(Harvey 2003a: p.26). The territorial logic is a ‘political project on the part of actors whose power is 
based in command of a territory and a capacity to mobilize its human and natural resources 
towards political, economic, and military ends’ (Harvey 2003a: p.26). The capitalistic logic is ‘the 
molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’ (Harvey 2003a: p.26). These two 
logics are distinct but intertwined (Harvey 2003a: p.29). And they are intertwined in such a way that 
the capitalistic logic typically dominates the territorial logic (Harvey 2003a: p.33).8 The capitalistic 
logic of imperialism takes two forms. First, it is ‘typically about exploiting the uneven geographical 
conditions under which capital accumulation occurs and also taking advantage of’ asymmetrical 
spatial exchange relations (Harvey 2003a: p.31). Asymmetrical exchange relations ‘get expressed 
through unfair and unequal exchange, spatially articulated monopoly powers, extortionate practices 
attached to restricted capital flows, and the extraction of monopoly rents’ (Harvey 2003a: p.31). As 
a result of these asymmetries the ‘wealth… of particular territories are augmented at the expense of 
others’ (Harvey 2003a: p.32). One of the state’s key tasks is to orchestrate these asymmetries to 
nourish its wealth and hence power (Harvey 2003a: p.32). This is close to metropolis-periphery 
conceptualisations of imperialism. The second form of the capitalistic logic of imperialism is about 
“spatio-temporal fixes” to the capital surplus problem, and specifically since circa 1970/73 
“accumulation by dispossession” (ongoing primitive or original accumulation).9 This form bears a 
resemblance to conceptualisations of imperialism in terms of the geographical extension of 
capitalism. 
 
  
																																																								
8 How exactly the two logics intertwine is not clear. As Harvey himself admits, he does not do ‘a very good 
job’ in theorising the state (Harvey 2007: p.67). 
9 The hallmark of “new imperialism” since circa 1970/73 is ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (Harvey 2003a: 
p.180). Harvey’s starting point for this argument is his acceptance of ‘the empirical evidence offered by 
[Robert] Brenner, which sees a chronic and enduring problem of overaccumulation pervading the whole of 
capitalism since the 1970s’ (Harvey 2003a: p.108). Overaccumulation crises ‘are typically registered as 
surpluses of capital… and surpluses of labour power side by side, without there apparently being any means 
to bring them together profitably to accomplish socially useful tasks’ (Harvey 2003a: p.88). Accumulation by 
dispossession is ongoing primitive or original accumulation. It helps solve the overaccumulation problem in 
two ways. First, it releases ‘a set of assets… at very low (and in some instances zero) cost. Overaccumulated 
capital can seize hold of such assets and immediately turn them to profitable use’ (Harvey 2003a: p.149). 
Second, it provides ‘a means to visit the costs of devaluation of surplus capitals upon the weakest and most 
vulnerable territories and populations’ (Harvey 2003a: p.185). In short, Harvey proposes ‘one simple golden 
rule if we are to identify what is “new” about the new imperialism: follow the capital surpluses and look for 
the geographical and territorially-based practices that attach to their absorption or devaluation’ (Harvey 2007: 
p.70). 
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I don’t treat imperialism as either a policy or a stage of capitalism. Instead, I understand imperialism 
as structural to, inherent to, capitalism, from its origins, with colonial plunder being part of 
primitive accumulation, to the present. In other words, I agree with Amin that imperialism is ‘the 
permanent stage of capitalism’ (Amin 2003: p.57). Like him, I also understand imperialism as a 
mode of capitalist exploitation of some areas by other areas. 
 
Relations between imperialist powers: Inter-imperial rivalry, ultra-imperialism and US super-imperialism 
 
Discussion of the relations between imperialist powers focuses on the concepts of inter-imperial 
rivalry, ultra-imperialism and US super-imperialism. The theory of ultra-imperialism is Kautsky’s 
and Lenin’s critique of this theory is the seminal work on inter-imperial rivalry.  
 
In a 1914 article, Kautsky argues that ‘the constant drive of the industrialized capitalist countries to 
extend the agricultural zones involved in trade relations with them, takes the most varied forms’ 
(Kautsky 1970: 42). One form is imperialism, but this was preceded by another form, free trade. 
Kautsky argues that imperialism, ‘the striving of every great capitalist State to extend its own 
colonial empire in opposition to all the other empires of the same kind’, ‘has produced sharp 
contradictions between the industrialized capitalist States’, and, in turn, World War (Kautsky 1970: 
44). However, there is ‘no economic necessity’ for imperialism, and the arms race between imperialist 
states it produces, to continue after the World War (Kautsky 1970: 44, italics in original). On the 
contrary, imperialism has become a ‘hindrance’ to the development of capitalism (Kautsky 1970: 
45). For Kautsky, ‘[e]very far-sighted capitalist today must call on his fellows: capitalists of all 
countries, unite!’ (Kautsky 1970: 45). This is because of, first, ‘the growing opposition of the more 
developed of the agrarian zones’ to all of the imperialist states together, second, ‘the growing 
opposition of the proletariat of the industrial countries against every new increase of their tax 
burden’ (as a result of the arms race), and, third, ‘the arms race and the costs of colonial expansion’ 
threaten ‘the rapid increases of capital accumulation and thereby capital export, i.e., the basis of 
imperialism itself’ (Kautsky 1970: 45). Hence, Kautsky argues that, ‘from the purely economic 
standpoint’, the phase of imperialism may be succeeded by a phase of ‘ultra-imperialism’, i.e., ‘by a 
holy alliance of the imperialists’ (Kautsky 1970: 46). 
 
Lenin criticises Kautsky’s theory of ultra-imperialism. The great powers struggle for the division 
and redivision of the world. For Lenin, the ‘only conceivable basis’ for the division of the world ‘is 
a calculation of the strength of those participating, their general economic, financial, military 
strength, etc.’ (Lenin 1968: 112, italics in original). However, ‘the relative strength of the imperialist 
powers’ inevitably changes over time, because of uneven development, and this necessitates a 
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redivision of the world (Lenin 1968: 112). This, in turn, necessitates war, as the only means of 
redivision, as the only means to overcome disparities ‘between the development of productive 
forces and the accumulation of capital on the one side, and the division of colonies and spheres of 
influence for finance capital on the other’ (Lenin 1968: 92). Thus, ‘imperialist wars are absolutely 
inevitable’ (Lenin 1968: 8). This is not to say that ultra-imperialist alliances may not arise, indeed, 
they have actually arisen. However, ‘“ultra-imperialist” alliances, no matter what form they may 
assume, whether of one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing all 
the imperialist powers, are inevitably nothing more than a “truce” in periods between wars’ (Lenin 
1968: 112, italics in original). 
 
Bob Rowthorn provides a definition of US super-imperialism. Since he defines it in 
contradistinction to ultra-imperialism and inter-imperial rivalry it is best to present his three 
definitions together. 
‘US super-imperialism in which all other capitalist states are dominated by the United States and have 
comparatively little freedom to choose their policies and control their economies in ways opposed by the 
American state. America acts as the organizer of world capitalism, preserving its unity in the face of socialism. 
This domination may not, of course, operate smoothly—for antagonisms will not be eliminated but merely 
contained. 
Ultra-imperialism in which a dominant coalition of relatively autonomous imperialist states performs the 
organizing role necessary to preserve the unity of the system. For this to work the antagonisms between the 
members of the coalition must not be so severe that they overcome the interest they have in maintaining the 
coalition. 
Imperial Rivalry in which the relatively autonomous states no longer perform the necessary organizing role, or 
perform it so badly that serious conflicts break out between them and the unity of the system is threatened. 
For this to happen the antagonisms between states must be severe.’ (Rowthorn,1971:pp.31-32,italics in 
original) 
There are two axes to Rowthorn’s conceptualisation. First, the unity of the bloc of imperialist 
powers. In the case of ultra-imperialism and US super-imperialism the imperialist bloc is united, in 
the case of inter-imperial rivalry it is disunited. Second, the autonomy of powers within the 
imperialist bloc. Whereas under US super-imperialism all other imperialist powers are dominated by 
the USA, under ultra-imperialism and inter-imperial rivalry they are relatively autonomous from it. 
Rowthorn identifies three points of difference between advocates of inter-imperial rivalry, ultra-
imperialism and US super-imperialism: 
‘1. the relative strength of US capital and the related question of the degree to which it can dominate Europe 
and Japan by capturing most key industrial sectors; 2. the severity and nature of the antagonisms between 
different national capitals; 3. the extent to which the common fear of socialism can overcome those 
antagonisms which do exist.’ (Rowthorn, 1971: p.34) 
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With regard to the first point, Rowthorn argues that writers assume that the relative autonomy of a 
nation’s state is determined by the relative strength of its capital. In contrast, Rowthorn argues that 
there is no one-to-one correspondence between these two things. We return to this first point of 
difference below. 
 
Mandel also discusses the models of super-imperialism, ultra-imperialism and inter-imperial 
rivalry.10 For him: 
‘In the final analysis, the respective realization of each of these models depends on the predominant form 
taken by the international centralization of capital, however important may also be the temporarily 
autonomous weight of military or political forces.’ (Mandel, 1975: pp.334-335) 
Mandel uses the term “international centralisation of capital” to mean the fusion of capitals of 
different national origins and controls under a common command. In the model of super-
imperialism, the outcome of these fusions is a single dominant national imperialist class in the 
international field, with other national imperialist classes as junior partners at most. In Mandel’s 
model of inter-imperial rivalry fusions occurs at the continental level. For the West European EEC 
area, this ‘seems at least possible, if not even probable’ (Mandel, 1975: p.326). The outcome is inter-
continental imperialist competition. Nevertheless, in the conjuncture in which Mandel was writing, 
‘global inter-imperialist world wars have become extremely unlikely, if not impossible’ (Mandel, 
1975: p.333). Finally, in the model of ultra-imperialism fusions occurs at the global level. Uneven 
development prevents this, Mandel argues. We will return to this issue of the internationalisation of 
capital below. 
 
In recent writings on imperialism, Alex Callinicos’s is a theory of inter-imperial rivalries, whilst 
Panitch and Gindin’s is the closest to a theory of ultra-imperialism (Callinicos, 2009; Panitch & 
Gindin, 2012). Peter Gowan’s analysis of the Cold War period is the quintessential account of US 
super-imperialism (Gowan, 2006). Kees van der Pijl’s Global Rivalries combines rivalries between the 
heartland and a succession of contender states with ‘the “ultra-imperialist” moment in the form of 
a relatively unified “West”’ (van der Pijl, 2006: p.xi). Let’s examine each briefly. 
 
Like Harvey, Callinicos adopts a two logics approach to the theorisation of capitalist imperialism. 
For Callinicos capitalist imperialism is constituted by the intersection of economic competition 
between capitals and geopolitical competition between states (Callinicos 2009: p.15). In turn, 
geopolitical competition comprises of the rivalries among states ‘over security, territory, resources 																																																								
10 Mandel’s definition of super-imperialism is similar to Rowthorn’s. For Mandel, in the model of super-
imperialism, ‘a single imperialist power possesses such hegemony that the other imperialist powers lose any 
real independence of it and sink to the status of semi-colonial small powers’ (Mandel, 1975: p.331). 
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and influence’ (Callinicos 2009: pp.15,74). Callinicos treats the state system ‘as a dimension of the 
capitalist mode of production’ (Callinicos 2009: p.83). In particular, he argues that: 
‘we must assume that capitalists and state managers constitute distinct groups of actors with different 
interests - respectively, in expanding their capital and in maintaining the power of their state against both the 
population subject to it and other states.’ (Callinicos 2009: pp.84-85) 
Nevertheless, following the arguments of Fred Block, state managers tend to act in the interests of 
capital (Callinicos 2009: pp.85-86).11 The upshot of this theorisation of capitalism imperialism is 
that economic competition between national capitals tends to beget geopolitical competition 
between national states. In addition, this tendency is exacerbated in periods of economic crisis.12 
 
Panitch and Gindin argue that a US informal empire was established after 1945, and, similar to 
Wood, that ‘this was a crucial moment in the historical differentiation between the economic and 
political’ (Panitch & Gindin 2012: p.6).13 This informal empire ‘succeeded in integrating all the 
other capitalist powers into an effective system of coordination under its aegis’, with the US state 
‘superintending global capital’ (Panitch & Gindin 2005; 2012: p.8). This meant an 
“internationalisation of the state”, in that national states ‘had to accept some responsibility for 
promoting the accumulation of capital in a manner that contributed to the US-led management of 
the international capitalist order’ (Panitch & Gindin 2012: p.8). In this informal empire: 
“national capital”, in the shape of firms with dense historic linkages and distinct characteristics, did not 
disappear. Nor did economic competition between various centers of accumulation. But the interpenetration 
of capitals did largely efface the interest and capacity of each “national bourgeoisie” to act as the kind of 
coherent force that might have supported challenges to the informal American empire. Indeed they usually 
became hostile to the idea of any such challenge, not least because they saw the American state as the 
ultimate guarantor of capitalist interests globally. (Panitch & Gindin 2012: p.11)14 
 
  
																																																								
11 More specifically: ‘The convergence posited by Block… occurs between the interests of the managers of a 
given state and those of specific constellations of individual capitals particularly concerned with and having 
leverage over the state in question (a set that is unlikely to be coextensive with that of the capitals based in the 
state in question)’ (Callinicos 2009: p.87). 
12 Callinicos argues that ‘the Long Boom of the 1950s and 1960s helped to cement the US system of alliances 
in Western Europe and East Asia’ (Callinicos 2009: p.175). In contrast, in the phase of imperialism after the 
Cold War, a global economy characterised by a persisting crisis of profitability ‘is liable to be harder to 
manage cooperatively than one where a sustained and generalized expansion improves the situation of all the 
players’ (Callinicos 2009: p.207). 
13 For Wood, the US is the first truly capitalist empire. 
14 The US informal empire ‘did not spawn a “transnational capitalist class,” loosened from any state moorings 
or about to spawn a supranational global state’ (Panitch & Gindin 2012: p.11). 
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In one of his later works, Gowan argues that while concepts such as global hegemony or Pax 
Americana can be used to understand American grand strategy, a more precise operational concept 
is that of primacy. The doctrine of primacy: 
see[s] other capitalist liberal democracies as the main potential threats to American interests... [It] may also 
see China, of course, as eventually falling into the same category. The reasons why these powers could pose a 
threat is because of their industrial and technological capacities and because of the possibility of their forming 
regional blocs that could then have a scale that would make them equal to the US. 
There is an obvious capitalist economic dimension to this potential threat as well: such regional powers 
would also be very large centres of capital accumulation, generating huge credit power, product market power 
and bases for launching new growth sectors. They would thus also act as magnets for swathes of other 
capitalisms in their vicinity. And they could use these capacities to challenge the US on the rules of the 
international capitalist economy. (Gowan 2006: pp.137-8). 
Primacy’s programme for addressing these potential threats is US leadership and management of 
other states’ relations, above all, the main core capitalist states’ relations, with the rest of the world. 
This ‘policy of US global management of world politics’ is centred upon security alliances, with a 
hub-and-spokes character, ‘in which the American state takes charge of the main external security 
challenges confronting its allies’ (Gowan 2006: p.138).15 During the Cold War: 
‘The specific form of the community-under-primacy was that of a set of military-political alliances all led by 
the United States and all directed against the Soviet bloc and communism. The US began a campaign to 
organise a great global cleavage between the US and the USSR, drew the whole of the capitalist core into 
military alliances against the USSR and then adopted a drive of aggressive confrontational pressure upon the 
Soviet bloc with forward deployments of US forces. This then established a real political and material 
structure of confrontation between the two blocs. And it was this bipolar bloc structure which underpinned 
American primacy over the core. The structure threatened the security of the subordinate allies in ways that 
only US strategic services could tackle. And because US actions vis-à-vis the Soviets could have grave 
consequences for the allies, they had to be obsessively concerned to influence Washington’s policy.’ (Gowan 
2006: p.140, italics in original) 
And ‘the precondition for influence was that they should be loyal and useful allies’ (Gowan 2003a: 
p.5). In an earlier work, Gowan described this as the protectorate system, with US protection of 
Western Europe and Japan. Switching lens from primacy to hegemony, US Cold War hegemony 
combined coercion and consent. During the 1950s and 1960s, the protectorate system ‘remained 
predominantly consensual’ (Gowan 2003a: pp.3-4). The ‘coercive dimension became increasingly 																																																								
15 In an earlier study, Gowan uses the concept of US global sovereignty. This ‘was a system of US political 
domination that approached political sovereignty over the way the [US] protectorates related to their external 
environment in the sense of that term used by Carl Schmitt: sovereign is the power which can define the 
community’s friends and enemies and can thus give the community its social substance (in this case, 
American-style capitalism); sovereign is the power which can define a state of emergency; and the 
community’s norms apply to the sovereign only in a situation judged normal by the sovereign’ (Gowan 2003a: 
pp.2-3). 
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important as... the capitalisms of the protectorates revived and inter-capitalist tensions increased in 
the 1970s’ (Gowan 2003a: p.4).16 Nevertheless the possibility of wars between core capitalist states 
was ended by the protectorate system (Gowan 2003a: p.5). 
 
In his Global Rivalries, van der Pijl contends that Lenin’s argument ‘against the idea of a stable, 
collectively managed capitalist world order remains valid’ (van der Pijl 2006: p.xi). Rivalries evolve 
according to specific historical structure: a heartland/contender structure. van der Pijl uses the term 
‘Lockean heartland’ to refer in its original incarnation to ‘a liberal, English-speaking, Protestant-
Christian world created through overseas settlement and trade in the seventeenth century’ (van der 
Pijl 2006: p.xi). According to van der Pijl: 
Taking off in the century between the English Glorious Revolution in 1688 and the American secession in 
1776, social and political development on a world scale came to revolve around a protracted struggle between 
an expanding Lockean heartland seeking to open up the rest of the world through an aggressive liberalism, 
and a succession of [Hobbesian] contender states. (van der Pijl 2006: p.xi) 
The first contender was France: it confronted the first British empire. Later Germany, Italy and 
Japan challenged the second British empire and the USA. Then the USSR confronted the wider 
West (the English-speaking world and Western Europe) (van der Pijl 2006: pp.xi-xii). In the 1970s 
new contenders emerged: the Middle East and OPEC, the Soviet bloc and a new Third World 
coalition for a New International Economic Order (van der Pijl 2006: p.115). Today the primary 
contender state appears to be China. According to van der Pijl: ‘In the end, most contender states 
have been incorporated into the expanding heartland without entirely overcoming the prior faultlines’ (van 
der Pijl 2006: p.xii, italics in original). 
 
The relationship between the English-speaking heartland and European integration has been 
characterised by alternating periods of unity and rivalry (van der Pijl 2006: p.68). European 
integration ‘was intended as a transnational constellation extending the original heartland’ with the 
aim of unifying the wider West against the USSR (van der Pijl 2006: pp.xiii,89). But it reproduced 
forms of political organisation inherited from the Hobbesian contender state experience 
incompatible with the original Lockean heartland (van der Pijl 2006: pp.xiii,15,68). Rivalry with the 
English-speaking world ‘reproduced a set of “European” attitudes and interests, including in the 
geopolitical sphere, like the relationship with Eastern Europe and Russia’ (van der Pijl 2006: p.15). 
Despite this rivalry within the wider West the two sides renounce the use of military force against 
each other (van der Pijl 2006: p.15). Hence, ‘the “ultra-imperialist” moment in the form of a 
relatively unified “West”’ (van der Pijl, 2006: p.xi). 																																																								
16 To be clear, the US state’s coercive military capacities ‘were exerted on the protectorates indirectly: through 
structuring the state security environment of the states concerned, and not at all through threatening the 
application of US military force against any protectorate’ (Gowan 2003a: p.4, italics in original). 
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Gilbert Achcar offers an alternative conceptualisation of the relations between the imperialist 
powers since the end of WWII. He argues that the US informal empire is best understood in terms 
of the feudal paradigm of overlord-vassals. For him: 
‘it was for two combined reasons that the US was willingly accepted as overlord of the Western imperialist 
system by its dominant capitalist classes. First, the huge post-1945 disparity in power between a US which 
emerged from the war much stronger than it entered and than its Western partners who were devastated and 
exhausted by the same war. Secondly, the decisive rise of the counter-systemic power of the Soviet Union, 
which extended the zone under its control (its “buffer zone”) to Central Europe thanks to the war. This 
threat was accentuated by Communist parties, socially based on the working class and/or the peasantry, 
coming out of the war with power-grabbing potential in several Western European countries, as well as in 
China and Indochina. It is this historically specific combination that turned Western Europe and Japan into 
“vassals” of the US, as Zbigniew Brzezinski very “realistically” called them.’ (Achcar, 2010) 
The Cold War’s end ushered in a unipolar moment, with a US global empire. The basis of this 
empire remains the US’s overlord-vassals relationships with Europe and Japan. Although the 
collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War foundations of these relationships, the US 
provoked Russia and China into a ‘new cold war’, both to renew the suzerain-vassals relationships 
with Europe and Japan, and to block ‘any move towards possible regional alliances - Euro-Russian 
or Sino-Japanese - which might be able to challenge American hegemony’ (Achcar, 1998: p.126; 
Achcar, 2010). In this unipolar moment, then, Europe and Japan are economic, but not political 
and military, rivals of the US; Russia and China are the main potential political and military rivals to 
the US. 
 
I examine the history of BP in the “classical” age of imperialism, using the whole tool kit of 
“classical” Marxist theories of imperialism. More specifically, when examining how BP’s history 
intersects with inter-imperial relations in this period before the end of WW2, I am open to 
interpreting those relations in terms of both rivalries (following Lenin) and alliances (following 
Kautsky). In turn, I use the case of BP to comment on these competing theories. In contrast, in the 
Cold War era, the history of BP and British imperialism as a whole is examined through the 
complementary theoretical lenses of Gowan’s super-imperialist, US protectorate system and 
Achcar’s feudal paradigm of overlord-vassals. Achcar’s argument that the US informal empire is 
best understood in terms of the US overlord having an obligation to protect its Western European 
and Japanese vassals (from the Soviet Union), and the vassals, in turn, having an obligation to 
answer calls to military service on behalf of the Overlord or pay a contribution to the cost of war 
fits our case well. 
  
 38 
Internationalisation-Transnationalisation-Globalisation 
 
A key feature of the post-WW2 era is the internationalisation or transnationalisation of productive 
capital. Despite this, for some writers, capital remains national, and competition between national 
capitals leads to competition between national states, that is, inter-imperial rivalries. Other writers 
disagree. 
 
Writing in 1975, Poulantzas argues that the internationalisation of capital in the present phase tends 
to involve the combination of capital from different nations, with these combinations taking place 
under the domination of American capital (Poulantzas, 1975: p.60). As a result of the reproduction 
of American capital within other imperialist social formations, other imperialist bourgeoisie ‘no 
longer possesses the structural characteristics of a national bourgeoisie’ (Poulantzas, 1975: p.72).17 
Instead, the relationship of these other imperialist bourgeoisies to American capital includes 
elements of both autonomy and dependency (economically, politically and ideologically). This 
results in the internationalisation of the state. By this Poulantzas means that imperialist states ‘take 
charge of the international reproduction of capital under the domination of American capital’ 
(Poulantzas, 1975: p.84).18 The crisis at the time Poulantzas was writing was not a crisis of 
American hegemony but a crisis of the whole of imperialism under American hegemony. ‘It follows 
that there is no solution to this crisis, as the European bourgeoisies themselves are perfectly aware, 
by these bourgeoisies attacking the hegemony of American capital’ (Poulantzas, 1975: p.87). 
 
The work of Panitch and Gindin draws on and is close to that of Poulantzas. For Panitch and 
Gindin foreign direct investment is the imperial glue bonding Western Europe and Japan to 
America (Panitch & Gindin, 2003: p.19). Echoing Poulantzas they argue that: 
‘With American capital a social force within each European country, domestic capital tended to be ‘dis-
articulated’ and no longer represented by a coherent and independent national bourgeoisie. The likelihood 
that domestic capital might challenge American dominance… was considerably diminished.’ (Panitch & 
Gindin, 2003: p.19) 
There is still “national capital” - in the sense of ‘firms with dense historic linkages and distinct 
characteristics’ - and “national bourgeoisie” (Panitch & Gindin, 2012: p.11, inverted commas in 
original). But the interpenetration of capitals made the idea of ‘distinct national bourgeoisies - let 																																																								
17 Poulantzas defines “national bourgeoisie” as ‘that fraction of the indigenous bourgeoisie which, on the 
basis of a certain type and degree of contradictions with foreign imperialist capital, occupies a relatively 
autonomous place in the ideological and political structure, and exhibits in this way a characteristic unity’ 
(Poulantzas, 1975: p.71). 
18 To be precise, ‘imperialist states take charge not only of the interests of their domestic bourgeoisies, but 
just as much of the interests of the dominant imperialist capital and those of the other imperialist capitals’ 
(Poulantzas, 1975: p.75). 
 39 
alone rivalries between them in any sense analogous to those that led to World War I - increasingly 
anachronistic’ (Panitch & Gindin, 2003: p.17). And we have the internationalisation of the state, 
understood in a similar way to Poulantzas uses the concept. In short, in both Poulantzas and 
Panitch and Gindin, the interpenetration of capitals under American domination means the end of 
independent national bourgeoisies in imperialist metropolises, the end of inter-imperial rivalries and 
the internationalisation of the state under American hegemony. 
 
Panitch and Gindin reject the idea of a transnational capitalist class (Panitch & Gindin, 2012: p.11). 
In contrast for Stephen Gill (amongst other writers) there are both national and transnational 
forces. Central to Gill’s analysis is the concept of a historic bloc at the international level.19 Gill 
argues that an ‘international [mainly transatlantic] historic bloc’ centred on both national and 
transnational capital as well as organised labour and the (national) state was constructed at the end 
of the 1940s and in the 1950s and lasted until the late 1960s at least (Gill 1990: p.49). Like Robert 
Cox, Gill identifies a Gramscian “crisis of hegemony” - crisis in the sense of transition - in the 
1970s and 1980s (Gill 1990: p.3). The transition or structural transformation Gill describes is from 
the ‘international historic bloc’ and ‘international economic order’ to an emerging ‘transnational 
historic bloc’ and ‘transnational liberal economic order’ (Gill 1990: pp.49-50,88). The postwar 
international economic order was undermined by transnationalisation, recession and ‘perhaps also 
the eclipse of the Cold War’ (Gill 1990: p.97). But it is the cumulative transnationalisation of the 
world political economy since 1945, accelerating in the 1970s and 1980s, that lies at the heart of 
Gill’s account (Gill 1990: p.90). Gill uses the term “transnationalisation” to refer mainly to the 
internationalisation of production/the interpenetration of capital. At the apex of the transnational 
historic bloc - based in the “Trilateral” countries or Triad - is a transnational capitalist class fraction 
(Gill 1990: p.50). In short, the balance in the historic bloc at the international level between national 
and transnational forces tilted in favour of transnational forces (Gill 1990: p.97). And whereas the 
international economic order linked together ‘economically sovereign states and national political 
economies’ primarily by trade flows, in the emerging transnational liberal economic order capital 
flows and interpenetrating investments fused the world political economy into a more integrated 
whole (Gill 1990: p.88). Like Cox before him, Gill’s account centres on the internationalisation of 
production. Similar to Cox, Gill uses the concept “transnationalisation of the state” to ‘mean a 																																																								
19 'Following Gramsci, this means a political constellation which reflects an international congruence of 
objective and subjective forces. At the overt, political level, this would be manifested in an international 
coalition of interests… [S]uch a bloc differs from a "transnational class alliance" (or an "ultra-imperialism of 
core capital"). This is because elements of more than one class are involved, under the leadership of a 
forward-looking and internationally oriented class fraction. Because of its trans-class nature, such a bloc is 
more organic and rooted in the social structure. It is also embedded in the modes of thought… of key 
individuals in government, and of groups and institutions in various civil societies in strong as well as less 
powerful nations… This means that the alliance of social forces it comprises is seen, to a large extent, as 
"natural" and legitimate by most of its members' (Gill 1990: pp.48-49). 
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process whereby state policies and institutional arrangements are conditioned and changed by the 
power and mobility of transnational fractions of capital’ (Gill 1990: p.94).20 
 
William Robinson radicalises this argument. Writing in 2004 he argues that we are in the early 
stages of the fourth epoch of world capitalism, the epoch of globalisation (Robinson, 2004: p.5). 
For Robinson, central to globalisation is the transnationalisation of production, the emergence of a 
transnational capitalist class and the rise of a transnational state. This third process is the most 
distinctive element of Robinson’s account. Under globalisation, Robinson claims, the capitalist state 
has increasingly taken the form of a transnational state (Robinson, 2004: p.87). The transnational 
state ‘is an emerging network that comprises transformed and externally integrated national states, 
together with the supranational economic and political forums’ - like the IMF, World Bank, WTO, 
G7, UN, OECD, EU and so on - ‘and has not yet acquired any centralised institutional form’ 
(Robinson, 2004: p.88, italics in original). ‘The nation-state is neither retaining its primacy nor 
disappearing but is being transformed and absorbed into the larger structure of a’ transnational 
state (Robinson, 2004: p.88). 
 
I think the issue of the “nationality” vs. “transnationality” vs. “globality” of capital is under-
theorised. For example, Panitch and Gindin insist that there is still “national capital” in the sense of 
‘firms with dense historic linkages and distinct characteristics’ (Panitch & Gindin, 2012: p.11) but 
they put “national capital” in inverted commas and their conceptualisation of it doesn’t add up to 
very much. Likewise, writings on the internationalisation or transnationalisation or globalisation of 
the state are often under-theorised too. At worst, these writings do little more than describe a view 
of the policies of states under US “free trade” imperialism. Often missing are the structural 
mechanisms making national states act, according to these theories, in the interest of capital in 
general, not just national capital. Having said all this, BP’s “Americanisation”, the subject of 
Chapter 4, is an opportunity to examine theories of the “nationality” vs. “transnationality” of 
capital and the internationalisation of the state. 
 
  
																																																								
20 For Cox, the internationalising state is the counterpart to internationalising production: Nation states 
internationalise to meet the needs of the world economy of international production (Cox 1987: p.253). What 
does Cox mean by “internationalising the state”? He makes two points. First, there is a hierarchically-
structured ‘process of interstate consensus formation regarding the needs or requirements of the world 
economy that takes place within a common ideological framework’ (Cox 1987: p.254). Second, national state 
structures change so that each state can best transform the interstate consensus into national policy and 
practice. 
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The relative strength of the imperialist powers 
 
In Marxist writings on imperialism, the relative strength of imperialist powers is a key determinant 
of relations between them. For some writers economic strength is key. For example, Immanuel 
Wallerstein argues that superior efficiencies of production lay the base for the hegemonic role 
(Wallerstein, 2004: pp.58-59). Likewise, Giovanni Arrighi contends that the state controlling ‘the 
most abundant sources of surplus capital’ tends to become hegemonic (Arrighi 2010: p.15). For 
other writers other dimensions of strength matter too. For example, Harvey argues that hegemony 
stands on productive capacity, money and military might (Harvey 2003a: p.42). And for Amin, the 
basis of the US’s hegemony over its Triad partners today is its military supremacy, needed to exploit 
the peripheries (Amin 2003: p.76).21 
 
Rowthorn’s discussion of theories of US super-imperialism, ultra-imperialism and inter-imperial 
rivalry is useful for examining the link between relative strength and relations between imperialist 
powers (Rowthorn, 1971). Combining his arguments suggests that diagnoses of unequal strength 
(with a strong America) lead to theories of US super-imperialism, whereas diagnoses of relative 
equality lead to theories of either inter-imperial rivalry or ultra-imperialism. Bukharin argued that 
equality of development of productive forces and equality of military powers are the ‘first condition 
for the formation of a more or less stable compact’ between state capitalist trusts (Bukharin, 1966: 
p.136). 
 
We can use this map of the theoretical landscape derived from Rowthorn to navigate the individual 
writings discussed earlier. Certainly diagnoses of unequal US strength lead to theories of American 
leadership if not super-imperialism. What about diagnoses of relative equality? Wallerstein argues 
that as the hegemon loses its superiority in economic efficiencies it loses its political clout too 
(Wallerstein, 2004: pp.58-59). Historically, Arrighi contends that whereas a concentration of world 
power has been associated with inter-state cooperation and phases of material expansion, a dilution 
of this power has been associated with inter-state competition and phases of financial expansion, 																																																								
21 In the immediate aftermath of WW2, Amin argues, the basis of US hegemony was the USA’s economic 
supremacy over its Triad partners combined with their alleged need for American protection from a 
“communist threat” - he doubts that the threat of a Soviet attack on Western Europe ever existed but sees it 
instead as ‘a pretext for the United States to establish its political hegemony’ (Amin 2003: pp.69-70,102). 
Later, the basis of US leadership of the Triad changed. The USA lost its economy supremacy over its Triad 
partners (Amin 2003: p.70). The new basis of its hegemony is its military might. US military might is 
indispensible since military intervention by the centres against the peripheries is essential to the new phase of 
(collective) imperialism (Amin 2003: p.76). America’s “economic advantages” - e.g., the dollar’s monopoly as 
an international currency - ‘are much less the source than the product of its political hegemonism’ and 
military might (Amin 2003: pp.75,76,79,81,100). Amin’s anti-economistic thesis is clear here: ‘The relationship 
between economics and politics, wealth and strength, involves a dialectical to-and-from movement, not a 
one-way causal link’ (Amin 2003: p.75). 
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except in the latest phase (Arrighi, 2013: p.13). For Callinicos, economic competition between 
national capitals tends to lead to geopolitical competition between national states (Callinicos, 2009). 
In other words, relative equality leads to inter-imperial rivalry. 
 
What about theorisations of relative equality leading to ultra-imperialism? Mandel’s is of course a 
theory of inter-continental imperialist competition not ultra-imperialism. But it is precisely the 
condition of relative equality in the international centralisation of capital - ‘the international fusion 
of capital without the predominance of any particular group of national capitalists’ - which leads to 
the likelihood of ‘a gradual dismantling of the power of the various bourgeois national states and 
the rise of a new, federal, supranational bourgeois state power’ within the West European EEC area 
(Mandel, 1975: p.326, italics in original). Gowan argues that inter-capitalist tensions increased in the 
1970s as the capitalisms of the Western European and Japanese protectorates revived (Gowan, 
2003a: p.4). But US-Western European relations have been a mix of conflict and cooperation since 
the Cold War ended (Gowan, 2003b). And Western Europe has an ultra-imperialist project (in 
contrast to America’s super-imperialist project) (Gowan, 2003a: p.25). What of the work of Panitch 
and Gindin? Rather than a theory of relative equality leading to ultra-imperialism, it is possible to 
interpret it as a theory of inequality leading to ultra-imperialism. They argue that the interpenetration 
of capitals occurred under US domination and ‘that it was the immense strength of US capitalism 
which made globalization possible’ (Panitch & Gindin, 2012: p.1).22 Finally, Harvey argues that the 
US has lost its superiority in production and may now have lost its superiority in finance.23 The 
consequences of this relatively equality (albeit military inequality) are uncertain and both inter-
imperial rivalry and ultra-imperialism within the Triad are possibilities (Harvey, 2003a: p.85). 
  
																																																								
22 As we have seen, they also contend that ‘In terms of the strength of American capitalism, there were 
indeed really two golden ages - the quarter-century up to the crisis of the 1970s (approximately 1948-73) and 
the quarter-century following the resolution of that crisis (approximately 1983-2007)’ (Panitch & Gindin, 
2012: p.16). 
23 For Harvey, ‘[m]oney, productive capacity, and military might are the three [material] legs upon which 
hegemony stands under capitalism’ (Harvey 2003a: p.42). From 1945 to 1970, US hegemony was three-legged 
(Harvey 2003a: p.49; Harvey 2003b: pp.82-83). From 1970 to 2000, US neo-liberal hegemony stood on just 
two legs. After 1970, America ‘lost its superiority in production’ (Harvey 2003b: pp.82-83) and ‘countered by 
asserting its hegemony through finance’ (Harvey 2003a: p.62). But the finance leg of American power was 
wobbly. US power was under threat and the root of this threat was ‘the unbalanced reliance upon finance 
capital as a means to assert hegemony’ (Harvey 2003a: p72). Finance capital is vulnerable to the production of 
real values - in industry or agriculture - and ‘[i]n the midst of all the raiding and devaluation, there arose new 
and significant complexes of industrial production’ e.g., in East and South-East Asia (Harvey 2003a: p.69). As 
a result ‘[s]ubtle lines of counter-attack against the hegemony of the United States in the realm of finance 
were emerging in the interstices of the worlds of production’ (Harvey 2003a: p.69). In addition, the US ‘may 
well now be losing financial dominance leaving it with military might alone’ (Harvey 2003b: pp.82-83). 
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Part II. A conceptualisation of the state 
 
The approach taken here is to combine instrumentalist and structuralist conceptualisations of the 
state, or, in Bob Jessop’s terms, “class-theoretical” and “capital-theoretical” approaches. A class-
theoretical approach focuses on class struggle over control of the state apparatus. In contrast, a 
capital-theoretical approach is concerned ‘with the integration of the state into the circuit of capital’ 
and ‘the effects of state power on the reproduction of capital at the economic level’ (Jessop, 1982: 
p.25). In simple terms, the approach taken here is to focus on class struggle over control of the 
capitalist state apparatus (rather than a neutral state apparatus).24 
 
In a 1965 article, Ralph Miliband identified two views of the state in Marx: instrumentalism and 
structuralism. The primary view was of ‘the state as the “instrument” of a ruling class so designated 
by virtue of its ownership or control - or both - of the main means of economic activity’ (Miliband, 
1983: p.58). The secondary view 
was of the state “as independent from and superior to all social classes, as being the dominant force in society 
rather than the instrument of a dominant class”, with Bonapartism as “the extreme manifestation of the 
state’s independent role” in Marx’s own lifetime. On the other hand… for Marx, the Bonapartist state, 
“however independent it may have been politically from any given class, remains, and cannot in a class 
society but remain, the protector of an economically and socially dominant class” (Miliband, 1983: p.58). 
Similarly, Jessop argued that ‘the Marxian analysis of state power was basically “class-theoretical” 
rather than “capital-theoretical”’ (Jessop, 1982: p.25). 
 
Writing in 1975, David Gold, Clarence Lo and Erik Olin Wright argued that recent Marxist theories 
of the state drew heavily on three implicit conceptualisations, ‘the instrumentalist, the structuralist, 
and the Hegelian-Marxist traditions’ (Gold, Lo & Wright, 1975: p.30). They argued that although 
these conceptualisations were not necessarily incompatible, many Marxists have treated them as 
such. However, they also argued that ‘Very few Marxist works on the state can be considered pure 
examples of an instrumentalist, structuralist, or Hegelian-Marxist perspective’ (Gold, Lo & Wright, 
1975: p.31). 
 
The work of Miliband, Nicos Poulantzas, and Leo Panitch and Sam Gindin illustrates the 
possibility of combining these conceptualisations. In their discussion of instrumentalist theories of 
the state, Gold et al. argued that, in contrast to G. William Domhoff, Miliband has 
																																																								
24 For this distinction between the capitalist type of state and the state in capitalist society, see Bob Jessop’s 
discussion of the Nicos Poulantzas-Ralph Miliband debate (Jessop, 2008). In this context, Jessop describes 
capitalist states ‘as states that are primarily organized to promote accumulation’ (Jessop, 2008: p.134). 
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attempted to situate the analysis of personal connections in a more structural context. While most of his 
analysis still centers on the patterns and consequences of personal and social ties between individuals 
occupying positions of power in different institutional spheres, Miliband stresses that even if these personal 
ties were weak or absent - as sometimes happens when social democratic parties come to power - the policies 
of the state would still be severely constrained by the economic structure in which it operates. Furthermore, 
he moves away from a voluntarist version of instrumentalism by stressing the social processes which mold 
the ideological commitments of the “state elite” (Gold, Lo & Wright, 1975: p.33). 
As Jessop has argued, Poulantzas’ view of the state combined structuralist and Gramscian 
moments: 
On the one hand he examines how political class domination is inscribed within the basic institutional forms 
of the capitalist state; and, on the other, he considers how the dominant class(es) and/or fractions establish 
their hegemony through specific political and ideological practices (Jessop, 1982: p.182). 
Finally, Panitch and Gindin contend that, as capitalism developed, ‘states became increasingly 
dependent on the success of capital accumulation for tax revenue and popular legitimacy’ (Panitch 
& Gindin, 2012: p.3). As we shall see, these are precisely the two structural mechanisms ‘that make 
the state a capitalist state’ proposed by Fred Block and others (Block, 1977: pp.7,12). But Panitch 
and Gindin also insist that ‘what states do in practice, and how well they do them, is the outcome 
of complex relations between societal and state actors, the balance of class forces, and, not least, 
the range and character of each state’s capacities’ (Panitch & Gindin, 2012: p.3-4). 
 
There is a need to specify the (causal) mechanisms involved in the relationship between, on the one 
hand, class and/or capitalism, on the other, the state. Consider first structuralist mechanisms. 
Commenting on Poulantzas’ most structuralist work, Block argues that Poulantzas ‘fails to explain 
adequately the mechanisms by which the state is structurally a capitalist state’ (Block, 1977: p.28). 
Similarly, Clyde Barrow asserts that ‘if structuralism is to avoid the worst kind of functionalist 
metaphysics, it must be able to specify a structural mechanism that requires the state to function 
automatically as a capitalist state’ (Barrow, 1993: p.58). Barrow contends that two mechanisms 
making the state serve capitalist ends have been ‘widely accepted in the structuralist literature’ 
(Barrow, 1993: p.58). The first, in Block’s formulation, is that ‘the capacity of the state to finance 
itself through taxation or borrowing depends on the state of the economy’ (Block, 1977: p.15). The 
second mechanism is that ‘the state’s legitimacy is dependent on the economy’ (Barrow, 1993: 
p.59). This is because ‘Citizens generally view the state’s personnel and policies as being responsible 
for their economic prosperity or lack thereof’ (Barrow, 1993: p.59). As a result of these two 
mechanisms, the marketplace, automatically and ‘without any prior coordination among capitalists’, 
punishes (rewards) unfavourable (favourable) state policies (Barrow, 1993: p.60). 
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Consider next instrumentalist mechanisms. Barrow argues that ‘The basic thesis of the 
instrumentalist approach is that modern capitalists are able to formulate public policies which 
represent their long-term class interests and to secure the adoption, implementation, and 
enforcement of those policies through state institutions’ (Barrow, 1993: p.13). He contends that 
five mechanisms establish and maintain this contingent relationship between class and state, ‘the 
colonization process, the special-interest process, the policy-planning process, the candidate-
selection process, and the ideological process’ (Barrow, 1993: p.25). The colonisation process refers 
to the occupation of positions in the state apparatus by members of the capitalist class. Citing 
Miliband (1969: p.55), Barrow asserts that ‘businessmen have not “assumed the major share of 
government” in most advanced capitalist democracies… Consequently, if capitalists are a ruling 
class, it is not primarily… because they colonize the state apparatus’ (Barrow, 1993: p.27). 
However, he also insists, again citing Miliband (1969: pp.48,56), that ‘capitalists are “well 
represented in the political executive and in other parts of the state system” and that their 
occupation of these key positions in the apparatus enables them to exercise decisive influence over 
public policy’ (Barrow, 1993: p.27, italics in original). The special-interest process ‘refers to the 
actions of formal organizations that are created to represent the interests of individual companies, 
wealthy families, specific industries, and trades in the political system’ (Barrow, 1993: p.30). The 
policy-planning process is a mechanism wherein ‘the various sectors of the business community 
transcend their interest-group consciousness and develop an overall class consciousness’ 
(Domhoff, 1978: p.61). Barrow describes Miliband’s (1969: pp.72,75) view of the ideological 
process as follows: ‘most state elites, including those who are not members of the capitalist class, 
“accept as beyond question the capitalist context in which they operate”’ and ‘the pro-capitalist 
nature of the state managers’ ideological commitments’ is explained by ‘the workings of an 
ideological system’, including schools, universities, churches and the mass media (Barrow, 1993: 
pp.28-29). 
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Part III. Marxist accounts of the international political economy of oil 
 
Post-WWII period 
 
For the period up until the 1970s, the US controlled world oil outside the Communist bloc and this 
control was a (critical) basis of its hegemony over the capitalist world. Simon Bromley’s argument, 
in a nutshell, is as follows: In the postwar period, the (predominantly US) oil majors controlled the 
world oil industry and the US was politically dominant in the major oil producing and exporting 
regions of the world (namely, the Americas and the Middle East). With Western Europe and Japan 
dependent on (US-sourced) Middle East oil (the US itself was largely self-sufficient in oil at this 
time), ‘US control over world oil became a key resource in the overall management of its global 
leadership’ (Bromley, 1991: p.86). 
 
Cyrus Bina’s characterisation of the period from the end of World War Two up until the 1970s is 
best understood alongside his periodization of the development of oil globally since the start of the 
twentieth century. The first stage in this development, from 1901 to 1950, was characterised by 
colonial/semi-colonial oil concessions and cartelised oil. World oil was controlled by what Bina 
calls the International Petroleum Cartel, more commonly known as the “Seven Sisters”. This was 
an era of imperialism, conceptualised by Bina in very similar terms to Lenin: 
‘Imperialism - as a system, as opposed to a policy (thanks to Lenin) - essentially belongs to a historical period 
in which the world is divided among imperial powers and, via their national syndicates, consortia, or 
monopolies, extend their contentious imperial interests.’ (Bina, 2013: p.140). 
 
Bina’s second stage in the development of world oil, between 1950 and 1972, was one of transition 
between the first and third stages. This stage more or less coincides with the era of Pax Americana 
from 1945 to 1979. For Bina, ‘the postwar system of Pax Americana... can be viewed as a transitory 
period that connects the era of Lenin’s Imperialism to the epoch of globalization’ (Bina, 2013: 
p.8).25 The Pax Americana was unravelled by this transformation to globalization. Bina’s third stage 
is characterised by post-cartelisation and competitive globalization. This stage ‘has been about the 
global commoditization of oil through competition’ (Bina, 2013: p.91). 
 
We are now in a position to concentrate on Bina’s account of the period from 1945 to the 1970s. 
The year 1972 marked the end of the International Petroleum Cartel (IPC) (although it began losing 
it grip in the 1950s and 1960s). Up until then, the US controlled world oil, outside the Communist 																																																								
25 This argument is problematic. The Pax Americana needs theorising. Labelling it a “transitory period” leaves 
it shapeless. 
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bloc, via the IPC. This colonial control was an ‘indispensible part of... the Pax Americana’ (Bina, 
2013: p.17). It was ‘not only an economic godsend but, more importantly, grounds for 
overwhelming political control’ (Bina, 2013: p.127). The collapse of the IPC was thus a ‘body blow 
to the Pax Americana’ (Bina, 2013: p.127).26 
 
Nationalizations of oil production and sharp oil price rises 
 
The 1970s were marked by nationalizations of oil production alongside sharp oil price rises. The 
literature is divided over its explanation of these events. The explanations of Ben Fine and 
Laurence Harris (1985) and Bina (2013) focus on the economics of the oil industry, in particular, 
the development of competition in the world industry together with the increase in the cost of 
production in the United States. Both studies argue explicitly that the Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries (OPEC) was not the cause of these events (Bina, 2013: p.96; Fine & Harris, 
1985: p.87). Gilbert Achcar (2006) explains the oil price hike in terms of economic forces. But he 
gives centre place to politics in his explanations of the nationalizations in the Middle East, 
emphasising the role of nationalist struggles against US control in the region. Adam Hanieh (2011) 
explains these nationalisations in similar terms. Like Achcar, the explanations of Petter Nore (1980) 
and Bromley (1991) include roles for both economic and political forces. Both these studies 
emphasise changes in the competitiveness of the world oil industry alongside conditions in the US 
industry, on the one hand, and, on the other, the roles of the US and oil-producing states. Let us 
consider each of these explanations in turn. 
 
We begin with Fine and Harris’s (1985) characterisation of the structure of the oil industry at the 
outbreak of the Second World War. This they argue had two major divisions. ‘On the one hand, 
there was the division between the US market and that of the rest of the capitalist world. Both were 
subject to cartel arrangements’ and the US market was protected from the rest of the capitalist 
world by tariffs (Fine & Harris, 1985: p.84). 
On the other hand, there was the division between the US majors (five of the Seven Sisters) and the other US 
producers. This division does not correspond to the previous one, since the US majors served both foreign 
and domestic markets through foreign and domestic production, respectively. (Fine&Harris,1985:p.84) 
Over the next thirty years this structure faced two problems. First, rising production costs in the 
US oil industry. Second, ‘the erosion of the world cartel’ as a result of the encroachment of the 
non-majors in international markets (Fine & Harris, 1985: p.87). The latter was a problem since 
cartelisation is necessary for the oil industry’s survival (Fine & Harris, 1985: p.82). This brings us to 
the 1973-74 oil price rises. These solved the two problems of the industry: 																																																								
26 “Collapse” is too strong. Other interpretations are presented below. 
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The large increases in the price of oil have sustained the profitability of producers in the USA and have 
guaranteed sufficient revenue in world production to bind the majors and non-majors together in a cartel that 
now includes them both. (Fine & Harris, 1985: p.87) 
For Fine and Harris then, the world cartel is reborn at this moment, for Bina it dies. 
 
The account of Bina (2013) is different from Fine and Harris’s but has much in common with it. 
For Bina, the 1973-74 oil crisis was the ‘symptom’ of the transformation from the stage of 
colonial/semi-colonial oil concessions and cartelised oil (the first stage) to the stage of post-
cartelisation and competitive globalisation (the third stage) (Bina, 2013: p.17). The nationalisations 
were not just ‘commensurate and compatible’ with this transformation, but a necessary part of it: 
the road to competitive globalization of petroleum had to run through nationalization of the oil deposits in 
the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America in the mid-1970s. These nationalizations, intended or unintended, 
had nothing to do with recartelization of oil but instead were driven by valorization of landed property (i.e., 
the ownership of subsoil oil deposits) under capitalism. (Bina, 2013: p.6) 
And the steep oil price rises? These were the result of the change in the way oil prices were 
determined, together with an increase in the cost of oil production in the US. In the stage of the 
International Petroleum Cartel, it ‘fixed and preordained’ oil prices (Bina, 2013: p.137). In the stage 
of globalisation, the long-run (global) price of oil is set by the oil production price in the highest 
cost region of the world, i.e., the United States (Bina, 2013: pp.13-14). In 1973-74 then, the (global) 
price of oil was now set by the highest cost region and the cost of production in that region 
increased (Bina, 2013: pp.18-19). 
 
Achcar (2006) is focused on the Middle East. He argues that: 
The October 1973 war… provided the occasion for an Arab oil embargo that led to a spectacular hike in oil 
prices, which the deterioration of world terms of trade to the advantage of the industrialized countries had 
held down for too long. (Achcar, 2006: p.23) 
The US benefitted from these oil price rises in a number of ways (Achcar, 2006: pp.23-24). The 
price rises weakened the competitiveness of the US’s greatest economic rivals, West Germany and 
Japan, since these rivals were more dependent on oil imports than the US itself is. The price rises 
increased the profits of US oil companies. It also increased the oil revenues (dominated in dollars) 
of the US’s Middle East allies. The US drew ‘great advantages’ from this (Achcar, 2006: p.23). By 
strengthening its Middle East allies, the increased oil revenues strengthened the US’s own grip on 
the region. In addition, Iran (one of the US’s allies) used its petrodollars to buy advanced weaponry 
from the US, increasing the profits of the US military-industrial complex. In contrast, the 
nationalizations were the result of ‘the rise of Third World economic nationalism, a corollary to the 
decline of U.S. hegemony’ (Achcar, 2006: p.24). Neither the US state nor its oil companies could 
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stop producing states nationalising production and this was a ‘major U.S. setback in the Middle 
East’ (Achcar, 2006: p.24). 
 
Hanieh (2011) is focused on the Gulf Arab states. Like Achcar, he argues that the nationalizations 
were primarily the culmination of anti-colonial and nationalist struggles that sought, in the Gulf, to 
gain control of the region’s oil reserves from US and European oil companies (Hanieh, 2011: 
pp.36-38,42-43). Negotiations between the Gulf states and the international oil companies, led by 
Ahmad Zaki Yamani, the Saudi Kingdom’s oil minister, ‘coincided with growing worldwide 
demand for oil and sagging production capabilities in the aging oil fields of the United States and 
Europe—trends that further strengthened the Middle East’s pivotal position as the world’s primary 
source of energy’, and ended in agreement to nationalise, in phases, oil reserves in the six Gulf 
states (Hanieh, 2011: p.42). 
 
Nore’s (1980) explanation of the nationalizations and oil price rises combines both economic and 
political forces. He identifies two struggles involving the oil companies, the oil-producing states and 
the US state. The producing states were struggling to increase their share of a given amount of 
surplus profits at the expense of and thus in confrontation with the oil companies. At the same 
time, the producer states, the majors and the US state were all struggling for higher oil prices (Nore, 
1980: p.71). The oil majors wanted prices rises because their profits had fallen as a result of the 
higher taxes levied on them by the producing states, together with increased competition from the 
‘independent’ oil companies, European national oil companies, and Soviet oil exports to the West. 
Nore argues that although the oil companies were ‘opposed to price increases before 1970’ they 
‘changed their pricing strategies partly at the instigation of the U.S. government’ (Nore, 1980: p.72). 
From 1970 onwards, the US government pressed for price rises to make its wells commercially 
viable and thus increase its self-sufficiency in oil, to increase the profits of its oil companies, and to 
‘deliver a serious blow to its industrial competitors in Western Europe and Japan’ (Nore, 1980: 
p.73). The nationalizations, Nore contends, resolved both these struggles (Nore, 1980: p.71).27 They 
were a necessary condition for higher oil prices (Nore, 1980: p.73). And they achieved the objective 
of the producing states in increasing their share of surplus profits (at the expense of the oil 
companies). The problem for the US was that the eventual price rises were higher than it expected 
or desired, in part because of the 1973 war. 
 
  
																																																								
27 The form of this argument is similar to that of Fine and Harris. For Nore, the nationalizations resolved the 
struggles in the oil industry. For Fine and Harris, the price rises solved the industry’s problems. 
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Bromley’s (1991) explanation of the oil price hike also combines both economic and political 
forces. His account of the postwar period has been presented already. To repeat, Bromley argues 
that the predominantly US oil majors controlled the world oil industry and the US was politically 
dominant in the major oil producing and exporting regions of the world. However, this US-ordered 
world oil industry was challenged by the late 1960s. The US had become a net importer of oil, 
weakening its position with respect to the producer-states. And the expansion of the ‘independent’ 
oil companies and of the national oil companies of Western Europe and the oil-producing states, 
weakened the control of the majors over the oil industry. According to Bromley: 
‘This increased competition [in the oil industry] resulted… in a loss of price control: as the inherent tendency 
to overproduction reasserted itself, so the level of surplus profit in the industry fell and the struggle over its 
distribution intensified. Finally, the growing struggle over the distribution of rent coincided with larger 
demands on behalf of each of the recipient parties.’ (Bromley, 1991: p.138) 
But: 
‘What began as a struggle between the majors, independents and producer-states over the distribution of the 
surplus profit… was transformed into a structurally determined coincidence of interests between the oil 
companies, producer-states and above all the United States for an increase in total surplus profits generated 
in the oil sector.’ (Bromley, 1991: p.141) 
 
What interests did the US administration have in an increased price of oil? We have already seen 
Achcar’s and Nore’s answer to this question, and Bromley’s (four-part) response combines 
(variants of) the answers of these other two writers. First, price rises would help address the US’s 
rising oil production costs, making many of its wells economically viable again, increasing its self-
sufficiency in oil, and improving its balance of payments. Second, increases in oil revenues would 
strengthen the Saudi Kingdom and Iran (US allies), both internally (that was the US State 
Department’s calculation at least) and externally (by financing the purchase of weaponry), thereby 
strengthening US hegemony in the Middle East. Third, price rises would benefit the US oil majors 
(‘a concern of immediate interest to the State Department because of its close company linkages’) 
(Bromley, 1991: p.141). Fourth, price increases would weaken the competitiveness of the US’s 
economic rivals in Western Europe and Japan, because these rivals were more dependent than the 
US on oil imports and this oil is priced in dollars. 
 
As we have seen, Bromley, like Nore, posits a common interest of the producer states, the oil 
companies and the US state in higher oil prices. However, he argues that: 
the space opened up… for a few determined radical regimes (above all Algeria and Libya) to pursue 
independent strategies was considerable… For in the early 1970s the oil market strengthened because of the 
synchronized boom of the OECD bloc and the rapid increase in US oil imports, thus helping to transform 
the oil arena from a consumer to a producer market. These market developments were exacerbated by the 
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coincidence of a shortage of refinery capacity in Western Europe and Japan, the closing of the Trans-Arabian 
pipeline and the Arab boycott during the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. With the United States and the majors no 
longer in control of either the circuit of oil capital or the strategies of the Middle East producer states, the 
eventual price increases were far larger than intended and the attendant dislocation to the global economy 
that much greater. (Bromley, 1991: p.142) 
 
For Bina, the period post-nationalizations and sharp oil price rises has been the stage of post-
cartelisation and competitive globalization. As we have seen, he argues that 1972 marked the end of 
the International Petroleum Cartel and of US control of world oil. In fact, the control of oil was 
‘next to impossible’ in the age of globalization (Bina, 2013: p.143). By the 1980s the Pax Americana 
itself was unravelled by the transformation to globalization. And a new global hegemon was not on 
the cards (Bina, 2013: p.194). Instead there was (and remains) ‘a powerful tendency toward a 
multipolar polity and diffusion of power’ in the era of globalization (Bina, 2013: p.189). And OPEC 
was (and is) nothing more than an organization of collectors of differential oil rents (Bina, 2013: 
p.76). 
 
For other writers the consequences of the nationalizations and price rises for US hegemony were 
far from apocalyptic. As we have seen, Achcar argues that the changes were a mixed blessing for 
the US: it benefitted from the price rises but the nationalizations were a major setback. 
 
The nationalizations and price rises provided vast (dollar) oil revenues for producing states, so-
called ‘petro-dollars’. This was an important change in the international political economy of oil. 
And it strengthened US hegemony (at least according to the writers discussed next). In part this 
occurred indirectly. As discussed, both Achcar and Bromley argue that by strengthening its Middle 
East allies the increased oil revenues strengthened the US’s hegemony in the region. But it also 
occurred directly. Petro-dollars flowed to the US. As Hanieh argues (focusing on the Gulf Arab 
states): ‘The US government made a special effort to ensure that Saudi petrodollars, in particular, 
were invested in US dollar-denominated bank accounts, equities, and treasury bonds’ (Hanieh, 
2011: p.44). 
 
The world oil trade was denominated primarily in US dollars. Hanieh (2011) argues that the US 
received a guarantee from the Saudi Kingdom that this would be the case (Fouskas&Gökay2005 
make the same argument) (Hanieh, 2011: p.45; Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.18).28 This strengthened 
dollar hegemony (and hence US hegemony more generally). This is emphasised by Vassilis Fouskas 
and Bülent Gökay (2005; 2012) (as well as Samir Amin, for example). They argue that an oil/dollar 																																																								
28 See David Spiro (1999: pp.x,103-105,121-124) for a careful researched study making this claim. 
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standard (or more broadly a ‘petro-dollar/weapon-dollar regime’) replaced the (recently collapsed) 
gold/dollar standard (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.17; Fouskas & Gökay, 2012: p.72). For them, the 
trading of oil (and weapons) in dollars provided a guaranteed demand for dollars ‘thus restoring the 
dollar’s role as a required reserve currency’ (Fouskas & Gökay, 2012: p.73).29 
 
Bromley argues strongly that the US reconsolidated its dominance over world oil in the 1980s 
(albeit in a different form) along with its hegemony over the rest of the capitalist world (Bromley, 
1991: p.239). For the moment of OPEC in the 1970s, the moment the US lost control, was only 
temporary: 
[T]he moment of OPEC… represented the temporary exploitation of a favourable moment in the balance of 
forces among broader economic and political transformations. And these changes were soon to lead to a 
diminution of the powers of OPEC, the international differentiation of the organization, and the subsequent 
reintegration of its dominant elements - first, Iran [until its revolution] and Saudi Arabia, and, second, the 
Gulf states - into the US economic and strategic orbit.30 (Bromley, 1991: p.243) 
Bromley identifies four (principal) bases of US control over world oil in the 1980s. These were: The 
(continued) dominance of its energy companies in world markets; its (continued) economic and 
military strength in the Middle East;31 its (continued) lesser degree of dependence on oil imports 
than Western Europe and Japan (with US self-sufficiency enhanced by the price rises); and the 
denomination of most of the world’s oil trade in its currency (Bromley, 1991:pp.6-7,207). It is 
worth noting the continuity in the bases of US control identified by Bromley; the first three of 
these are more-or-less the foundation of US control up until the 1970s (as discussed above). 
 
For Jonathan Nitzan and Shimshon Bichler (2002) the nationalizations and price rises mark the 
transition from a ‘free-flow’ era to a ‘limited-flow’ era of world oil (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: p.224). 
In the free-flow era, world oil was controlled by large private oil companies with limited 
‘interference’ by states. In contrast, in the limited-flow era, world oil was more politicised, 
controlled by an alliance of OPEC and the large private companies (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: 
pp.224,227). How did this transformation from a free-flow to a limited-flow era come about? In 
other words, how did the politicisation of oil come about? A problem arose for the majors in the 
postwar period. Competition in the industry increased not only because of the growing number of 
‘independent’ oil companies but also because of ‘the substitution of the United States for Britain as 																																																								
29 It is not obvious that this role needed restoring. Despite the dollar crisis, the currency remained the 
dominant reserve currency (see Eichengreen, Chiţu & Mehl, 2014: Figure 1). 
30 It is not obvious that Iran, the Saudi Kingdom or the Gulf oil monarchies were ever outside the US orbit in 
this period. 
31 Bromley argues that despite various ‘setbacks’, including the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, ‘the United States was able to fashion a new form of influence in the 1980s based on an 
increasingly close alliance with Saudi Arabia (and the Gulf states)’ (Bromley, 2008: p.119). 
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the leading Western power shifted the internal balance among the Seven Sisters in favour of the 
U.S.-based companies, undermining to some extent the group’s previous cohesion’ (Nitzan & 
Bichler, 2002: p.224). Increased competition led to excess capacity and falling prices. At the same 
time, ‘rising nationalism in the Middle East and Latin America called for higher royalties’ (Nitzan & 
Bichler, 2002: p.224). The problem was solved by OPEC and the nationalizations (Nitzan & 
Bichler, 2002: p.226). This limited the flow of oil and hiked-up prices. What was the nature of the 
alliance between the majors and OPEC post-nationalizations? In their 2002 book, Nitzan and 
Bichler argue that the majors continued to control output indirectly as the largest buyers of crude 
oil (as opposed to directly as producers) (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: pp.226-7). However, in a more 
recent article, they argue that OPEC determined output and prices but the large oil companies were 
indispensible to it both upstream and downstream (Bichler & Nitzan, 2014: p.11). 
 
According to Nitzan and Bichler, it was not only the interests of the majors and OPEC that had 
converged (in the new, limited-flow era). The US national interest was increasingly seen as 
synonymous with the interests of the large oil companies (and other dominant business groups) 
(Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: p.225). In addition, in the Middle East, the interests of the large oil 
companies converged with those of the large arms manufacturers (seeking to sell weapons in the 
region). Both groups wanted higher oil prices (as did a ‘a second tier of interested parties, including 
engineering companies…, as well as large financial institutions with an appetite for petrodollars’) 
(Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: p.228). The need to act together to achieve this led to the birth of the 
‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’ (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: pp.228-9). Critically Nitzan and 
Bichler argue that: 
deliberately or not, the actions of these groups helped perpetuate an almost stylised interaction between 
energy crises and military conflicts. In this process of ‘energy conflicts’, the ongoing militarisation of the 
Middle East and periodical outbreaks of hostilities contributed toward an atmosphere of ‘oil crisis’, leading to 
higher prices and rising oil exports. Revenues from these exports then helped finance new weapon imports, 
thereby inducing a renewed cycle of tension, hostilities, and, again, rising energy prices. (Nitzan & Bichler, 
2002: p.229) 
Focusing on the period of the Cold War at this point (we examine the post-Cold War period 
below), the authors argue that this mechanism was at the centre of the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli 
wars, the 1979 Iranian revolution and the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war (Nitzan & Bichler, 2002: p.236). 
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Post-Cold War era 
 
We turn now to the post-Soviet/Cold War era and present a spectrum of views. At one end of the 
spectrum, Bichler and Nitzan (2014) argue that Middle East conflicts have been driven primarily by 
the interests of leading private oil (and arms) companies. Next along the spectrum are studies that 
argue that US imperial policy (and its control of world oil) has been driven by national (imperial) 
logics (the immediate interests of US oil companies has been only one of these logics). In contrast, 
Doug Stokes and Sam Raphael (2010) argue that US imperial policy (and its control of world oil) 
has been based on both national and transnational imperial logics (although the national logic has 
been dominant). Further still along the spectrum is Bromley (2008). For him, the US has 
‘controlled’ world oil (in one sense of that word but not another) but this ‘control’ has been driven 
only by a transnational logic. At the other end of this spectrum is Bina (2013). The Pax Americana 
and US control of world oil did not survive until the end of the Soviet Union. And the US state has 
not tried to regain control of world oil (although it has tried to claim part of Arab oil rents). 
 
Bichler and Nitzan’s theory of a ‘Weapondollar-Petrodollar Coalition’ has only just been discussed 
so their account of post-Cold War energy conflicts in the Middle East can be presented succinctly. 
These conflicts have been driven by the interests of leading private integrated oil companies and 
arms contractors (in differential profits) as well as those of oil-producing states and Western states 
(particularly the United States) (Bichler & Nitzan, 2014). This logic has accounted for the 1990-91 
Gulf War, the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan and 2003 invasion of Iraq, the 2011 Arab Spring and 
associated ‘outsourced wars’ (‘the ongoing fighting in Lebanon-Syria-Iraq, which is financed and 
supported by a multitude of governments and organizations in and outside the region’), and the 
2014 war against ISIS (Bichler & Nitzan, 2014: pp.13,16). 
 
Consider next studies that argue that US imperial policy (and its control of world oil) has been 
driven by oil interests particular to the US (and at the expense of its allies and rivals). In other 
words, US imperial policy has been driven by a national (imperial) logic. Four oil-related 
explanations of US imperial policy are presented: control of access to oil, pricing of oil in dollars, 
control of producer-states’ oil revenues, and securing US oil companies’ profits. Individual studies 
typically combine these explanations together. While some studies limit these explanations to the 
Bush Jr. administrations, others apply them to the post-Cold War period as a whole (and we have 
seen already these explanations applied to the Cold War era). 
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First, it is argued that the US has sought to control access to oil, both its own access and the access 
of others (Achcar, 2013: p.106; Ahmad, 2003: pp.88,113; Amin, 2004: p.26; Beitel, 2005: p.164; 
Callinicos, 2005: p.593; Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.21; Gowan, 2003a: p.5; Harvey, 2003a: pp.24-
25). In particular, it has sought to control the access not only of its net oil-importing (potential) 
‘rivals’ but also its ‘allies’. Aijaz Ahmad argues that the US seeks control over ‘production levels, 
prices and even access’ (Ahmad, 2003: p.115). Similarly, Fouskas and Gökay argue that the US 
seeks control ‘at every stage’ i.e., upstream and downstream (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: pp.22-23). It 
is argued that this control of others’ access gives the US (massive) strategic leverage over its allies 
and rivals. 
 
Second, it is argued that the US state has sought to ensure the pricing of (the trade of) oil in dollars 
since this is a critical basis of the dollar’s role as the international reserve currency (and hence US 
hegemony) (Ahmad, 2003: pp.142,145-147; Beitel, 2005; Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: pp.24-27; 
Gowan, 2006: n.34 p.154; Harvey, 2003a: p.82). Fouskas and Gökay go as far (too far!) as to argue 
that ‘If OPEC were to decide to accepts euros for its oil, then American economic dominance 
would be practically over’ (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.27). Similarly, Ahmad argues ‘the US 
economy would face the prospect of immense shrinkage, even collapse’ if producing states 
switched pricing their oil from dollars to euros (Ahmad, 2003: p.146). Third, it is argued that the 
US state has sought to control the oil revenues of producing states (Achcar, 2013: pp.103-106; 
Gowan, 2006: n.34 p.154). In particular, it wants these petro-dollars to flow to the US. For 
example, Peter Gowan argues that the US has sought to steer ‘oil revenues through US financial 
operators’ to provide ‘a crucially important boost for US financial strength’ (Gowan, 2006: n.34 
p.154). Fourth, it is argued that the US state has acted in the immediate interest of its oil companies 
(Achcar, 2006: p.36; Ahmad, 2003: pp.115,144). Achcar argues that the US’s oil lobby represents its 
‘weightiest capitalist interests’ and that it ‘has traditionally played a key role in formulating U.S. 
foreign policy, at the very least since the Second World War’ (Achcar 2006: pp.18,36) 
 
Consider next the application of these explanations of the US’s imperial policy to its manoeuvres in 
the post-Soviet space (in particular over Caspian oil) and its 2003 invasion of Iraq. To be clear, only 
on oil-related explanations of US policy are discussed here. Fouskas and Gökay explain the US’s 
imperial policy in the ‘battle for Caspian oil’ in terms of its attempt to control access to oil, to 
sustain dollar hegemony (via the pricing of oil in dollars), and to secure profits for its energy 
companies (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: pp.147-163). The US has attempted to control access to 
Caspian oil (and gas) both for its own consumption needs as well as to control the access of ‘other 
leading industrial states’ in the West and South-East Asia (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: pp.21,23-24). 
To exercise this control it has sought to break ‘Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas transport routes’ 
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by ‘encouraging the construction of multiple pipelines through U.S.-controlled lands’ (Fouskas & 
Gökay, 2005: pp.21-22). If it secured control of Caspian oil, then the US would strengthen its 
control of oil globally and weaken OPEC’s control: 
Caspian oil thus far is ‘non-OPEC oil,’ meaning that oil supplies from this region are less likely to be affected 
by OPEC price and supply policies. This would allow the flow of large volumes of Caspian oil through non-
OPEC lands to erode the power of OPEC to maintain high oil prices and to use oil as a mode of political 
blackmail. (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.23) 
But the US’s imperial policy has not just been driven by the ‘vast geopolitical and military 
advantages’ from controlling access to Caspian oil (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.149). Huge revenues 
were also at stake for the corporations exploiting these resources. The US state assisted its energy 
companies in the competition for this prize (as did other powerful states) (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: 
p.149). Finally, the fate of ‘the U.S. dollar as the world’s reserve currency hangs in the balance’ 
(Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: p.23). 
 
Consider next the US’s 2003 invasion of Iraq (and subsequent occupation). It is argued that the 
invasion was (in part) about US control of access to oil (Achcar, 2006: pp.243-244,248-249; Ahmad, 
2003: p.88; Beitel, 2005: p.164; Callinicos, 2005: p.593; Harvey, 2003a: p.25). Harvey’s formulation 
of this argument is the best known. He argues that the period from 1970 to 2000 was one of US 
neo-liberal hegemony, based more on consent than coercion, but a mix nonetheless. The period 
since c.2000-2001 he characterises as neo-conservative imperialism, with US domination based on 
coercion, in particular, through ‘military command over global oil resources’ (Harvey, 2003a: p.75). 
The 2003 Iraq war, then, is, in part, about securing US domination. For Harvey, ‘whoever controls 
the Middle East controls the global oil spigot and whoever controls the global oil spigot can control 
the global economy, at least for the near future’ (Harvey, 2003a: p.19). More specifically: 
Europe and Japan, as well as East and South-East Asia (now crucially including China) are heavily dependent 
on Gulf oil, and these are regional configurations of political-economic power that now pose a challenge to 
US global hegemony in the worlds of production and finance. What better way for the United States to ward 
off that competition and secure its own hegemonic position than to control the price, conditions, and 
distribution of the key economic resource upon which those competitors rely? (Harvey, 2003a: p.25) 
Harvey emphasises also the military aspect of the “control of access to oil” argument: 
The military runs on oil… Not only does the US need to ensure its own military supplies, but any future 
military conflict with, say, China will be lopsided if the US has the power to cut off the oil flow to its 
opponent. (Harvey, 2003a: p.25) 
 
It is also argued that the invasion was (in part) about the pricing of Iraqi oil in euros as opposed to 
dollars (Ahmad, 2003: pp.145-147; Beitel, 2005: p.164; Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: pp.230-231; 
Harvey, 2003a: p.82). This is the centrepiece of Fouskas and Gökay’s explanation of the invasion. 
 57 
For them, the war ‘was more a consequence of the euro-dollar competition in oil markets than the 
result of any particular desire by the United States to acquire’ Iraqi oil (Fouskas & Gökay, 2005: 
pp.230-231). Harvey is more cautious: ‘Saddam’s proposal to denominate his oil sales in euros 
rather than dollars may well be another significant reason for the US to insist upon regime change 
rather than disarmament in Iraq’ (Harvey, 2003a: p.82). 
 
A third argument is that the invasion was (in part) about US oil companies’ profits (Ahmad,2003: 
p.144). Ahmad argues that if the US achieves its war aims ‘vast profits shall accrue not just to the 
various US corporations but also personally to Bush, Cheney, and Condoleeza Rice, etc. all of 
whom are deeply involved in the oil and weapon-producing corporations’ (Ahmad, 2003: p115). 
 
Stepping aside from the four oil-related explanations of US imperial policy (and its national logic), 
Achcar, Harvey and Ahmad argue that the invasion was also (in part) about increasing oil 
production in Iraq (and hence globally) and thus lowering world oil prices. Achcar argues that 
‘Bush’s team shared the U.S. ruling class’s general concern about the future of the oil market and 
the prospect that hydrocarbon sources will gradually dry up’ (Achcar, 2006: p.37). Washington’s 
goal, he argues, was ‘to ward off an oil crisis’ by increasing Iraqi oil production (Achcar, 2006: 
p.38). For Harvey, lowering oil prices (via increased Iraqi production) was a solution an 
overaccumulation crisis (Harvey, 2003a: p.180). Finally, Ahmad argues that the US’s invasion      
was targeted not just at its oil-importing allies and rivals (via control of access to oil) but also at its 
oil-exporting friends and enemies. On the one hand, increased Iraqi oil production ‘under US 
control could pave the way for the break-up of OPEC and steep fall for prices of oil from Russia, 
Venezuela or Iran’ (all US enemies) (Ahmad, 2003: p.87). On the other hand, US control of Iraqi 
oil would provide leverage over the Saudi Kingdom (a US friend) in case it had ‘rebellious thoughts’ 
(Ahmad, 2003: p.88). 
 
Consider next Stokes and Raphael’s study of American hegemony and oil. They argue that 
American strategy combines two imperial logics one national the other transnational: 
[T]he national logic of US empire remains at the heart of Washington’s strategic thinking, and the positive-
sum order [- the transnational logic -] has been constructed specifically in order to sustain American 
hegemony over other powers. (Stokes & Raphael, 2010: p.15) 
Stokes and Raphael argue that the US controls vast quantities of oil globally. This control has been 
achieved ‘primarily through coercive intervention into the key oil-rich regions of the global South’ 
(‘most often in the guise of counterinsurgency… training and equipping to friendly security forces’) 
(Stokes & Raphael, 2010: pp.1-2). With the aim of diversifying supplies away from the Persian Gulf, 
Washington has increasingly sought to open up the Caspian basin, West Africa and Latin America 
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(Stokes & Raphael, 2010: p.3). The US’s control of oil has underpinned its hegemony (Stokes & 
Raphael, 2010: p.16). Its hegemony has been underpinned (in part) by controlling its own access to 
oil. In fact, ‘the direct needs of the US economy… goes quite some way to explaining… American 
strategy’ (Stokes & Raphael, 2010: p.16). But American hegemony has been underpinned also by 
controlling the access of other core powers to oil since this ‘gives Washington a significant political 
lever to be operated (or threatened) should the current conditions of intracore peace break down’ 
(Stokes & Raphael, 2010: p.16). However, in current conditions of intra-core peace, US hegemony 
has been underpinned by a positive-sum order (the transnational logic) (Stokes & Raphael, 2010: 
p.15). In particular, the US-controlled international oil market has provided oil to all states within 
the order; oil has flowed from producing to consuming states via the market (Stokes & Raphael, 
2010: pp.2,16).32 And this market has been open to investment by increasingly transnational private 
oil companies (although US oil companies ‘primarily benefit’) (Stokes & Raphael, 2010: pp.2,38). 
 
From studies based on a national logic to Stokes and Raphael’s dual national and transnational 
logics we turn to Bromley (2008). Here we find a transnational but no national logic (at least in his 
account of world oil). Bromley argues that the US has ‘controlled’ world oil in one sense of the 
word but not in another. It has ‘controlled’ world oil in the sense that ‘the military power and 
geopolitical influence of the United States provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the 
stable operation of the international oil market’ (as Stokes and Raphael argue) (Bromley, 2008: 
p.142). But it has not ‘controlled’ it in the sense that ‘neither the agencies of the US state nor its oil 
companies control the world’s oil in the sense of being able to direct the use of it’; instead the 
market (dominated by large multinationals) has allocated oil (and capital) (Bromley, 2008: p.141). 
This has been a positive-sum order (the transnational logic). It has served the US’s interests (its 
consumption needs and the needs of its oil companies). ‘But it has equally served the interests of the 
other leading capitalist powers. And it may yet serve the interests of China, India, Brazil and others 
too’ (Bromley, 2008: p.142, emphasis added). US interventions in the Greater Middle East were 
attempts to integrate reconstituted states into the international oil market; the prize was not to be 
an exclusive one (for the US alone) but one shared with rival core imperialisms (Bromley, 2008: 
pp.134-5). In Central Asia: 
																																																								
32 Those studies - discussed earlier - that argue that US imperial policy has been driven by a national logic of 
seeking to control access to oil agree with Stokes and Raphael that this strategic lever would only be operated 
(or threatened) should current conditions of intra-core peace break down but that in the meantime (i.e. in 
current conditions of intra-core peace) the US-controlled international oil market has provided oil to all states 
within the order (i.e. is positive-sum). The difference between Stokes and Raphael and those studies - 
conceptualising US imperial strategy in terms of two logics (one national, the other transnational) as opposed 
to one national logic - is more presentational than substantial. 
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the aim has been to detach these resources, and the routes by which they reach international markets, from 
Russian monopoly control and to prevent any assertion of Iranian influence that would further increase the 
role of the Gulf as a conduit for the world’s oil. (Bromley, 2008: p.136) 
To be clear, control of others’ access to oil is absent from Bromley’s account, in contrast to other 
studies discussed above and his own previous study “American Hegemony and World Oil”. 
 
We turn at last to Bina (at the other end of our spectrum). The Pax Americana ended in 1979 and 
US control of world oil (however defined) is over. For Bina, the cause of nearly all post-Pax 
Americana conflicts (including the two invasions of Iraq) was the US state’s attempt to reverse its 
lost hegemony (Bina, 2013: p.178). However, the US state has not been seeking to control oil 
through these conflicts. Control of oil was ‘next to impossible’ in the age of globalization (Bina, 
2013: p.143). Nevertheless, oil is part of Bina’s account of these conflicts. In particular, he argues 
that the US state has been trying to claim part of the Arab oil rent to help finance its attempts at 
hegemonic reversal. The 1991 Gulf War he argues ‘has everything to do with milking of certain 
client-states in the region’ (Bina, 1993: p.12). Likewise oil was not the cause of the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq; it was ‘just the gravy’ (according to the original plan) to bankroll the invasion (Bina, 2013: 
p.210). 
 
 
Let me conclude this chapter by outlining my views on the international political economy of oil. 
For the post-WW2 period up until the 1970s, the US controlled world oil outside the Communist 
bloc and this control was a critical basis of its hegemony over the capitalist world. Bromley’s 
account of this period in his American Hegemony and World Oil is convincing. In terms of the 
nationalisations of oil production, Nore’s explanation is unconvincing in its functionalism; Fine and 
Harris’s explanation of the oil price rises in functionalist terms is equally problematic. Achcar’s and 
Hanieh’s explanations of the nationalisations are most convincing. In Achcar’s words, the 
nationalisations were the result of ‘the rise of Third World economic nationalism, a corollary to the 
decline of U.S. hegemony’ (Achcar, 2006: p.24). In terms of my construction of a spectrum of view 
on the post-Cold War era, I align myself with those studies arguing that US imperial policy (and its 
control of world oil) has been driven by national (imperial) logics. In my reading, the difference 
between Stokes and Raphael and those studies - conceptualising US imperial strategy in terms of 
two logics (one national, the other transnational) as opposed to one national logic - is more 
presentational than substantial. 
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3. BP: From colonial origins to the 1970s nationalisations 
 
The thesis turns now to a history of BP and its relation to British imperialism. The chapter is 
divided into two parts. Part I examines the company’s oil production and markets before WWII. Its 
oil concessions were in Britain’s empire in the Middle East. In this “classical” age of imperialism, 
these concessions were the products, not just of inter-imperial rivalries, but also of inter-imperial 
agreements. And it was in the inter-war years that control over Middle Eastern oil started to shift 
from Britain and BP to America and its companies. The company’s markets also exhibited an 
imperial design before WWII. 
 
Part II examines the company’s oil production and markets between 1945 and 1979. Anglo-
American redivision (without war) continued after WWII. For BP, this redivision centred on Iran. 
Britain’s and BP’s imperial grip was slipping outside Iran too. And the company was affected by the 
rise of Third World economic nationalism. This resulted in the loss of the BP’s Middle Eastern and 
African concessions in the 1970s. It also resulted in the loss of the company’s old imperial markets. 
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Part I: Oil production and markets before WWII 
 
3.1 Oil production before WWII: Concessions in Britain’s empire in the Middle East 
 
3.1.1 Iran 
 
Up until 1950, the company’s operations centred on crude oil production in Iran. Iran was the 
company’s first concession. The company’s founder, William Knox D’Arcy, acquired the 
concession for the exploration and production of oil in 1901. It is worth emphasising the vastness 
of this concession in both space and time: 
‘The Persian Government granted to D’Arcy (Article I) “a special and exclusive privilege to search for and 
obtain, exploit, develop, render suitable for trade, carry away and sell natural gas, petroleum, asphalt and 
ozokerite throughout the whole extent of the Persian Empire for a term of sixty years” although D’Arcy had 
excluded the five northern provinces from the actual extent of his concession.’ (Ferrier, 1982: p.42) 
The five northern provinces of Azerbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Astarabad and Khurusan were 
excluded because of possible political objections from Russia (Jones, 1981: p.130). Oil was 
discovered in 1908 and in the following year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed. 
At its formation, APOC was almost wholly owned by the Burmah Oil Company; Burmah owned 
97 per cent of APOC’s ordinary shares (Ferrier, 1982: Table 8.2). The Burmah Oil Company was 
established in 1886 in Scotland to work the Burmese oilfields, after Britain had annexed Burma to 
its Indian colony (Jones, 1981: p.88). APOC changed its name to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 
(AIOC) in 1935 and then to British Petroleum (BP) in 1954. On the eve of World War Two, Iran 
accounted for 88 per cent of the company’s crude oil production with the remainder produced in 
Iraq (own calculations from Bamberg (1994: Table 5.1)). 
 
Peter Sluglett charts the development of Britain’s interest in Iran from the start of the nineteenth 
century: 
‘Britain’s interests in Iran were almost entirely related to her interests in India. From about 1800 onwards, 
London considered that “securing” the territories to the east, west, north-west, and north-east of India was a 
vital precondition for the defence of the Subcontinent. “The Struggle for Asia” (in the words of one title) was 
essentially a struggle for ascendancy between Britain and Russia, in which Iranian (and Afghan) compliance 
was a constant British objective… For most of the nineteenth century the economic stakes were not a high 
priority, although this began to change with the Reuter concession in 1872 and more purposefully after the 
foundation of the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia in 1889.’ (Sluglett, 1999:pp.417-8) 
In his The Struggle for Asia 1828-1914: A study in British and Russian imperialism, David Gillard argues 
that: 
‘British interest in a treaty relationship with Persia dated from 1799, when it was hoped that the Persians 
might divert an impending invasion of India by the shah’s traditional enemies, the Afghans. The Afghan 
threat quickly passed, but the course of the war in Europe suggested that Persia might be the route for an 
attack on India by the French and, perhaps, the Russians. Treaties with the shah in 1801, 1809, 1812 and 
1814 had, therefore, a common theme: British aid to Persian armies resisting a European invader.’ (Gillard, 
1977: p.20) 
 63 
But when war between Russia and Iran came in 1826, Britain refused Iran aid. One year later, Iran 
gave up the struggle, sued for peace and in 1828 signed the treaty of Turkomanchay, strengthening 
Russia’s position in western Asia (Gillard, 1977: pp.20-23). According to Gillard, between 1828 and 
1833 there was, from Britain’s perspective at least, a major shift of power in favour of Russia, in the 
struggle for Asia. This was ‘spectacularly reversed’ by the British by 1860 (Gillard, 1977: p.3). In 
1838, Iran launched an all-out assault on Herat (under Afghan control). Alarmed that Herat under 
Iranian rule would be an advance post for Russia against India (since Iran ‘seemed on the way to 
becoming a Russian satellite’), Britain threatened Iran with retaliation if it did not end the siege 
(Gillard, 1977: pp.47,53). The shah withdrew his forces and signed a commercial treaty with the 
British. Almost twenty years later (1856-57), history came close to repeating itself. Iran again 
advanced on Herat and Britain was again concerned that Herat would become a Russian outpost 
against India. The British declared war on Iran and after ‘an absurdly unequal contest’ the shah 
agreed to withdraw from Herat ‘and the British were granted most favoured nation treatment in 
commercial relations and the stationing of consuls’ (Gillard, 1977: pp.97-98). British ascendance in 
western and central Asia in the three decades up to 1860 was reversed (gradually) by the Russians 
thereafter (Gillard, 1977: pp.3,179; Siegel, 2002: p.9). By the turn of the twentieth century, Russia 
was in a powerful position in Iran; Britain’s position was much weaker by comparison 
(Gillard,1977:pp.165-6; Greaves,1965:pp.288,305; Siegel,2002:p.11). 
 
From the 1860s to the early 1900s, concession hunters from Britain and continental Europe 
descended on Iran in search of bargains (Bostock & Jones, 1989: p.35). George Lenczowski 
describes the race for concessions: 
‘In 1872 a naturalized British subject, Baron Julius de Reuter, obtained a huge concession… The Russians, 
upon learning of Reuter’s concession, did not stand idly by. Their pressure on the Shah prompted him to 
cancel the grant. Thereafter a series of new concessions were given to the British to compensate them for the 
lost advantage, coupled with a series of concessions to the Russians. By the end of the nineteenth century 
most of the country’s resources and technical projects were exploited or directed by foreign interests.’ 
(Lenczowski, 1949: p.4) 
Between 1860 and 1925, ‘British business consisted of trading and shipping houses, and 
investments in the extractive and infrastructure sectors, and in banking. Many of the non-trading 
activities were based on concessions from the Iranian government’ (Bostock & Jones, 1989: pp.33-
34). By 1925, the modern sector of the Iranian economy was dominated by British business 
(Bostock & Jones, 1989: p.45). 
 
According to Frances Bostock and Geoffrey Jones:  
‘A close relationship with the British government was almost a prerequisite for survival in Iran… The 
support of the British Minister in Tehran and of the Foreign Office was essential if concessions were to be 
obtained and sustained.’ (Bostock & Jones, 1989: pp.43-4)  
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D’Arcy’s oil concession was no exception: British officials strongly supported the negotiations 
which led to the concession and, once established, APOC was sustained at crucial moments by 
interventions from the British government (Bostock & Jones, 1989: p.44). For example, in 1904, 
the British government encouraged D’Arcy’s rescue by the Burmah Oil Company. According to 
Bostock and Jones, it did so because the Admiralty were keen to have a source of oil in a region 
under British political influence (Bostock & Jones, 1989: p.44). Jennifer Siegel argues that it did so, 
not just because of the Admiralty’s oil needs, moderate at that time but soon to swell, but also 
because it wanted to keep the concession in British hands as a means to limit the involvement of 
other foreign powers in Persia (Siegel, 2002: p.179). In particular, she contends that D’Arcy 
threatened to sell shares in APOC to foreigners if the British government did not provide a loan, 
and the government urged Burmah Oil to join forces with D’Arcy because of its concern that the 
concession could fall under the control of Russia (Siegel, 2002: p.179). And, in 1907, the British 
government sent a gunboat and Indian troops to protect the company’s drillings in response to a 
request from D’Arcy (Ferrier, 1982: p85; Jones, 1981: p.136). It did so ‘in view of the importance 
attached by His Majesty’s Government to the maintenance of British enterprise in South West 
Persia’ (Foreign Office internal communication cited in Ferrier (1982: pp.85-86)). More generally, 
Lenczowski argues that:  
‘To watch the company’s operations and to maintain friendly relations with the local potentates, a number of 
able public servants had to be employed by Great Britain in these regions. This meant deeper penetration of 
British consular and intelligence authorities into the area, the establishment of certain customs and usages, 
and generally a greater influence.’ (Lenczowski, 1949: p.78)  
In addition to the UK Legation in Tehran, there was a Residency in Bushire and, in the south of 
Iran, a network of consulates and agents (Lenczowski, 1949: p.252). Quite a colonial presence! 
 
In 1907, Britain and Russia signed The Convention of Mutual Cordiality (Siegel, 2002: p.xvi). This 
partitioned Iran into British and Russian “spheres of influence” and a neutral zone. The British 
government undertook to forgo concessions in northern Persia, adjacent to the frontiers of Russia, 
and the Russian government made a similar undertaking in the areas of Persia closest to India 
(Gillard, 1977: p.176). D’Arcy’s concession was outside the Russian sphere but inside the neutral 
zone (Chen, 2015: p.86). A year after the Convention was signed D’Arcy struck oil in the neutral 
zone. The Foreign Office noted that this was ‘excellent news for our interests in south-western 
Persia’ and would ‘greatly increase our interest in south-western Persia’ (Foreign Office internal 
documents cited in Ferrier (1982: p.90)). According to the company’s official history, there was also 
a propensity on the part of some local consular officials to bring attention to the commercial and 
political advantages that would result from this expansion of British interests in their areas (Ferrier, 
1982: p.90). A Foreign Office official also argued ‘that it is most desirable from the point of view of 
British interests, both political and commercial, that’ the subsequent exploitation of the concession 
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should be undertaken by D’Arcy’s Oil Syndicate ‘since if it is not, there is every likelihood that the 
business will be secured and worked by subjects of a foreign Power’ (Foreign Office internal 
documents cited in Ferrier (1982, p.91)). At this point, the Foreign Office was concerned about 
German involvement (Ferrier, 1982: p.91). After 1898, Germany’s persistent efforts at economic 
penetration of the Persian Gulf area, including Iran, aroused considerable alarm in Britain 
(Lenczowski, 1949: pp.145-6). APOC remained in British hands and quickly became the most 
significant manifestation of Britain’s imperial presence in the neutral zone and southern Persia 
(Siegel, 2002: p.179). In particular, APOC was:  
‘financing and controlling their own security forces of Indian sowars [i.e. cavalrymen], advancing loans to the 
Sheik of Mahammareh through the British government, and even offering to underwrite a considerable loan 
to the Persian government in exchange for further concessions.’ (Siegel, 2002: p.179) 
 
On the eve of World War One, APOC and the British state became intimately entwined. Jones 
argues that: ‘A.P.O.C. was in need of all three things an oil company might expect from the British 
Government - a market, money and diplomatic support’ (Jones, 1981: p.150). It needed markets for 
its oil, and Britain’s navy and the railways its controlled in India were two possibilities. It needed a 
large injection of capital, and strong diplomatic support to stop Shell setting itself up in 
Mesopotamia and to allow APOC to establish itself in the country instead (Jones, 1981: p.149). As 
we shall see it secured all three things. A decision was made to switch the Royal Navy from coal to 
oil in 1912 (Jones, 1981: pp.27-8; Yergin, 1991: pp.153-7). The navy was no longer dependent for 
its fuel on the coal miners of South Wales, but on the producers of oil in North America, Rumania 
and Dutch Borneo (Jones, 1981: p.28). Even before 1912, Jones argues, the British government had 
expressed great reservations about being dependent on foreign countries and foreign companies for 
oil (Jones1981p28). APOC and the British government reached an agreement in 1914. The 
government invested in the company. In return, it acquired a majority shareholding and the right to 
appoint two directors to the company’s board with powers of veto.1 The Government was allowed 
to veto (not commercial matters but):  
‘matters affecting foreign naval and military policy; or if a sale of the company’s undertaking were 
contemplated; or if new exploitation plans seemed to it unsuitable, or if contemplated sales of oil to 
foreigners or on long-term contracts seemed likely to endanger naval supply.’ (Monroe, 1981: p.99)  
In addition, APOC would supply fuel oil to the navy for 20 years. On the government’s side this 
was the principal interest in the agreement: the Admiralty wanted a long-term supply of fuel oil (at a 
cheap price) (Jones, 1981: p.174; Kent, 1993: pp.34-35; Sluglett, 1976: p.3). 
 
  																																																								
1 According to BP’s official history, the government invested £2m and gained a 66.67 per cent shareholding 
(Ferrier, 1982: p.324 & Table 8.2; Bamberg, 1994: p5). According to most non-official accounts, the 
government invested £2.2m but only acquired a 51 per cent shareholding (Jones, 1981: p.154; Kent, 1993: 
pp.34,52-3; Monroe, 1981: p.98; Yergin, 1991: p.161). 
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Obviously the government would continue to protect the Persian oilfields. In making the case for 
its shareholding the Foreign Secretary asked: 
“Can anybody point to any other part [of the world] where we might get oil concessions outside the British 
Empire where those risks would be less? Take the difficulty of protecting these wells, and, even at the worst, 
150 miles of pipe-line from the coast of Persia. Would you rather have oil wells in Mexico? Would it be easier 
to send a British force there to protect them? People talk of the danger of the concession being threatened by 
Russia or by Turkey. Would you rather have the oil wells actually in Russia or Turkish territory?” (Cited in 
Siegel, 2002: p.184) 
Soon after WWI begun. According to Peter Avery, one of the first violations of Iran’s neutrality 
was by the Turkish force dispatched to attack the oil pipeline and by the British force sent to meet 
this threat (Avery, 1965: pp.182-3). By the autumn of 1915, the British were practically forced out 
of their spheres of influence in Iran, with the exception of the southwest of the country, where 
APOC continued its operations, protected by British (Indian) force based in Basra, in the Ottoman 
Empire (Avery, 1965: p.191).2 In the same year, Britain recognised Russia’s claim to control of the 
Straits and Constantinople in return for the assignment of the hitherto neutral zone in Iran to itself 
(Kazemzadeh, 2013: p.678; Lenczowski, 1949: p.44). 
 
After the war, Britain’s quest for paramountcy in Iran failed. In 1919, the British government 
signed an agreement with Iran’s Shah - on the back of bribes to a number of leading Iranian 
officials, according to Firuz Kazemzadeh - aimed at turning the country into a British protectorate 
(Kazemzadeh, 2013: p.xiv; Balfour-Paul, 1999: p.498). But the agreement was not ratified by the 
Majlis (the Iranian parliament) and in 1921 Riza Khan seized power and repudiated the agreement 
(Balfour-Paul, 1999: pp.499-500). Between this coup and the British occupation of the country in 
WWII (i.e., during Riza Khan’s rule), Iran successfully resisted Britain’s quest for (political) 
domination (Darwin, 1981: pp.xv,272-3; Monroe, 1981: pp.58-59,118; Sluglett, 1999: p.419). 
According to Kazemzadeh, there was a balance of British and Russian influence in Iran from 1925 
up until WWII (Kazemzadeh, 2013: p.xv). For Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Reza Shah won ‘a large 
measure of political independence for Iran from Great Britain and Russia’ (Ramazani, 2013: p.19). 
 
Nevertheless, APOC/AIOC and its Iranian oilfields were not without protection. Bostock and 
Jones argue that Riza Khan sought to reverse not just foreign political domination but also foreign 
economic domination of Iran (Bostock & Jones, 1989: p.45). British business was ejected: ‘Apart 
from Anglo-Persian Oil and the Imperial Bank, few of the other British ventures which had been 
established in Qajar Iran survived the Reza Shah era… Only the Gulf shipping agencies remained 
relatively unscathed’ (Bostock & Jones, 1989: p.51). In 1932, Riza Khan (now Shah) cancelled 																																																								
2 Similarly, Sluglett argues that when the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the opposite side to the British, 
‘Indian Expeditionary Force “D” was… despatched to Basra’ to guard both ‘trade and communications with 
India, and also… the Persian oilfields’ (Sluglett, 1976: p.3). Darwin (1999: p.162) and Monroe (1981: p.25) 
agree. 
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APOC’s concession. The British government stepped in. It warned its Iranian counterpart that if 
the cancellation of the concession was not retracted, then it would refer the matter to the 
Permanent Court of International Justice of the League of Nations (Bamberg, 1994: p.37). The 
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Anthony Eden) added that it ‘was prepared to take 
“all such measures as the situation may demand”’ (Bamberg, 1994: p.37). Armed measures were not 
ruled out by Eden. According to Lenczowski, the British Legation also threatened to use force and 
this threat was backed up by the appearance of British naval vessels off the coast of Iran 
(Lenczowski, 1949: p.79). The British government lodged an appeal with the Council of the League 
of Nations, the Council’s Rapporteur (the Foreign Secretary of Czechoslovakia) proposed the 
suspension of all proceedings before the Council while APOC and the Iranian government were 
negotiating, and a new concession was agreed in 1933 (Bamberg, 1994: pp.37-41). More generally, 
the British state protected the Iranian oilfields from Iraq in the interwar years (and up until the 
coup d’état in Iraq in 1958) (Fieldhouse, 2006: pp.71,341; Mejcher, 1976: pp.166,172; Sluglett, 1976: 
p.6). In the Second World War, Britain and the Soviet Union (and later the USA) occupied Iran, 
Britain occupying the oil-producing areas in the south-west (Avery, 1965: p.327). According to 
Lenczowski, one feature of British policy in Iran during WWII was: 
‘Since oil supplies for the Royal Navy were vital in the prosecution of the war, the British opposed any radical 
labor tendencies that might have impeded the production of oil in Khuzistan. By the same token the British 
were prepared to establish agreements with the tribes to ensure the security of the wells, pipe lines, and 
refineries.’ (Lenczowski, 1949: p.254) 
 
3.1.2 Iraq 
 
Outside Iran, the company picked up its most important concessions before WWII in other parts 
of Britain’s empire in the Middle East. The first of these was acquired in Iraq. APOC was the sole 
concessionaire of the Naftkhana oilfield in the Transferred Territories (Bamberg, 1994: p.156). 
Naftkhana was 
‘in the border territory transferred from Iran to Turkey (and later by inheritance, Iraq) by the Turco-Persian 
Frontier Commission of 1913. As concessionary rights over the Transferred Territories had already been 
granted to the Company [i.e., APOC] as part of the 1901 D’Arcy concession [in Iran], the Iraqi Government 
accepted the Company’s position as sole concessionaire, which was made explicit in a new concession 
granted in 1925.’ (Bamberg, 1994: p.156). 
Of much greater importance was APOC’s shareholding in the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), 
renamed the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) in 1929. IPC’s shareholders held three concessions 
covering the whole of Iraq except the Transferred Territories: the concessions of the IPC itself 
(east of the Tigris, granted in 1931), of the Mosul Petroleum Company (west of the Tigris, granted 
originally to British Oil Developments Ltd in 1932) and of the Basra Petroleum Company (granted 
in 1938) (Bamberg, 1994: p.171). On the eve of WWII, APOC produced 12 per cent of its crude oil 
in Iraq (own calculations from Bamberg (1994: Table 5.1)). 
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The “Mesopotamian” oil concession was the product of inter-imperial struggle and cooperation 
between Britain, Germany, France and the United States. D’Arcy’s attempts to acquire a concession 
in Mesopotamia started in 1901, the same year he acquired the Persian concession (Ferrier, 1982: 
n.9p.719). Kent argues that the Foreign Office had approved his efforts since 1904 and supported 
him diplomatically since 1908 (Kent, 1993:p.36). In fact, D’Arcy had become the government’s 
protégé with regard to the Mesopotamian concession (Kent, 1976: p.6). D’Arcy’s group faced 
strong competition for the concession from the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) (constituted in 
1912). Deutsche Bank and (Dutch-Anglo) Royal Dutch Shell each owned a quarter of the TPC; the 
other half was owned by the British-controlled Turkish National Bank. Thirty per cent of this bank 
was owned in turn by Calouste Gulbenkian (Yergin, 1991: p.185). Negotiations between the 
governments of Britain and Germany and their protégés resulted in the amalgamation of the two 
groups of concession-hunters into an enlarged TPC in 1914 (Kent, 1993: p.51). At this point, 
APOC owned 47.5 per cent of TPC, Deutsche Bank 25 per cent and Royal Dutch Shell 22.5 per 
cent; the remaining 5 per cent held by Gulbenkian (Yergin, 1991: p.187). The British and German 
governments then pressed the Ottoman government to grant the TPC a concession ‘even to the 
extent of issuing ultimata and taking retaliatory action against’ it (Kent, 1976: p.5). Under pressure 
the Grand Vizir promised (formally) a Mesopotamian concession to the TPC on the 28th June 1914 
(Kent, 1976: p.109; Yergin, 1991: p.188). That was the day Franz Ferdinand was assassinated. 
 
The inter-imperial conflict and cooperation for Mesopotamian oil continued in war. Here France 
entered the scene. In the Sykes-Picot agreement (of 1916) the British and French governments 
agreed an imperial carve-up of the Ottoman Empire. According to the agreement, Britain would 
control southern Mesopotamia and France’s sphere of influence would include the potentially oil-
rich vilayet (i.e., province) of Mosul (Monroe, 1981: pp.33,101). But Britain’s army dashed to 
occupy Mosul at the very end of the war so that by November 1918 it occupied the Baghdad, Basra 
and Mosul vilayets, the area which would form the future Iraqi state (Sluglett, 1976: pp.3,14). The 
years 1918-20 saw Anglo-French attempts to agree a revision to the Sykes-Picot carve-up in which 
Britain would control Mosul but France would obtain a share of its (prospective) oil (Kent, 1976: 
p.157). Agreement was sealed at the San Remo conference (in 1920): Britain secured the League of 
Nations colonial “mandate” for Iraq, the TPC secured the oil concession in the country, and 
Deutsche Bank’s 25 per cent stake in the TPC, confiscated from it by the British government 
during the war, was handed over to France’s Compagnie Française des Petroles (CFP) (Sluglett, 
1976: p.108; Yergin, 1991: pp.189-90). Six years later the League of Nations awarded the Mosul 
vilayet to Iraq (rather than Turkey). Elizabeth Monroe reminds us of British Foreign Secretary 
Curzon’s ‘now-famous lie: “Oil had not the remotest connection with my attitude over Mosul”’ 
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(Monroe, 1976). But it was not just Mosul of course. As Helmut Mejcher concludes in his Imperial 
Quest for Oil: Iraq 1910-1928, the influence of oil ‘ran like a scarlet thread through the decision-
making process in Whitehall’ (Mejcher, 1976: p.165). 
 
A brief comment on Royal Dutch Shell. Royal Dutch Shell was formed in 1907. Sixty per cent of 
this company was owned by Royal Dutch, forty per cent by Shell Transport, a British company. At 
San Remo, Royal Dutch Shell retained its 22.5 per cent share of TPC, and hence of the Iraqi 
concession. This was one side of a prospective deal whereby, in return, the hitherto Dutch-
controlled company would become British-controlled (Kent, 1976: p.157; Ferrier, 1982: p.357). In 
the end, the company retained its Dutch-control as well as its stake in TPC. 
 
The inter-imperial struggle for and cooperation over Iraqi oil did not end with the war and post-war 
San Remo agreement. The United States now entered the fray. As Gilbert Achcar argues the 
agreement ‘was a slap in its face’ (Achcar, 2006: p.9). Achcar continues: 
‘Under pressure from U.S. oil companies, the “internationalist” Wilson administration protested vigorously 
against this violation of the Open Door principle… 
The pressure that Washington exerted on London and Paris was irresistible. In 1928 a new agreement was 
signed, redistributing four equal shares in the TPC to Anglo-Persian, Royal Dutch/Shell, the French CFP, 
and a holding company representing a consortium of U.S. oil companies. At the same time the signatories 
agreed to reserve for joint exploitation under the aegis of the TPC any oil that any of them might discover in 
the vast ex-Ottoman regime including Turkey, the Arab lands east of Suez, and the whole Arabian Peninsula 
except Kuwait (which Britain had already wrested from Ottoman control at the end of the nineteenth 
century).’ (Achcar, 2006: pp.10-11) 
This was the so-called Red Line Agreement (it lasted until 1948). 
 
The British state continued to exercise control over Iraq and its oil, via its “mandate” and then the 
1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, until the nationalist, republican coup d’état in 1958 (Balfour-Paul, 1999: 
pp499-501; Darwin, 1999: pp.159,167; Fieldhouse, 2006: pp.96,112,114; Louis, 2004: p.21; Sluglett, 
2007: pp.xvi,213; Tripp, 2007: p.73). Peter Sluglett argues that as Britain secured its oil and other 
interests in Iraq it could (and did) loosen its control: 
‘After the Mosul wilayet had been awarded to Iraq in 1926, and the first agreements signed with the Turkish 
Petroleum Company, there was a perceptible slackening of British control. Similarly, the terms of the 1930s 
Treaty, and the second round of oil concessions in 1931, all enabled Britain to make her formal departure.’ 
(Sluglett, 1976: p.298) 
Fieldhouse argues that none of the important benefits secured by Britain under of the mandate, in 
particular, its position in the Iraqi oil industry, its RAF bases and its right to transit in war, were lost 
after Iraq gained formal independence in 1932 (Fieldhouse, 2006: p.96). Britain occupied Iraq again 
in the Second World War. 
  
 70 
3.1.3 Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi 
 
Iran and Iraq were the company’s only sources of crude oil production before WWII. But the 
company secured other concessions (jointly with other companies) in the inter-war years that would 
become important sources of its crude oil production after the war. The most important of these 
were in Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi. Kuwait was outside the Red Line Agreement. The 
concession for the country was acquired by the Kuwait Oil Company in 1934 (Bamberg, 1994: 
p.152). This company was owned equally by (and a subsidiary of) APOC and the American, Gulf 
Oil Corporation (Bamberg, 1994: pp.142,150). The concession covered the whole of Kuwait and 
lasted for 75 years (Bamberg, 1994: p.152). Oil was discovered in 1938 but operations were 
interrupted by the Second World War so that the production and export of oil did not begin until 
after the war (Bamberg, 1994: p.155). Qatar and Abu Dhabi were covered by the Red Line 
Agreement. Concessions for both countries were obtained by the Iraq Petroleum Company. The 
company acquired the Qatari concession in 1935, oil was discovered in 1939 but operations were 
suspended for the war’s duration and exports only began in the last week of 1949 (Bamberg, 1994: 
pp.171-2,341). The concession for Abu Dhabi was granted in 1939 and oil was discovered in 
commercial quantities after the war (Bamberg, 1994: p.172). 
 
The Gulf Arab states of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the “Trucial States”, and Muscat/Oman were all 
part of Britain’s empire. In 1820, ‘the British imposed an anti-piracy treaty - known as the General 
Treaty of 1820 - on all the rulers and governors of the Coast of Oman’, the Gulf coast of the 
present-day United Arab Emirates (Onley, 2005: p.30). Bahrain’s rulers joined the General Treaty at 
their own request (Onley, 2005: p.30). From 1835, Maritime Truces were signed with the rulers of 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, ‘Ajman, the al-Qasimi empire (of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah) and Umm al-
Qaiwain, hence the labelling of these states, along with Fujairah, as the “Trucial States” (Onley, 
2005: p.31). Bahrain and Qatar joined this “Trucial System” in 1861 and 1916, respectively (Onley, 
2005: pp.31-32). As James Onley notes: 
‘Later on, the rulers also signed Exclusive Agreements (Bahrain in 1880, the Trucial States in 1892, Kuwait in 
1899, Qatar in 1916) that bound them into exclusive political relations with, and ceded control of their 
external affairs to, the British Government. The Sultan of Muscat and Oman signed a de facto exclusive 
agreement with the British in 1891, except that political relations with America and France were permitted 
because of earlier treaties with those countries.’ (Onley, 2005: p.32) 
The Exclusive Agreement between the British government and the Shaykh of Kuwait (and the 
other agreements were similar in nature) bound the ruler and ‘his heirs and successors’ ‘not to 
receive the agent or representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait… without the previous 
sanction of the British Government’ but also ‘not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for 
occupation or for any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of 
any other power without previous consent of Her Majesty’s Government for these purposes’ 
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(English translation reproduced in Chisholm (1975: p85)). Later agreements made specific reference 
to oil concessions (with Kuwait in 1913, Bahrain in 1914, Qatar in 1916, the “Trucial States” in 
1922, Muscat/Oman in 1923) (Hollis, 2010: pp.161-4). For example, the Shaykh of Kuwait pledged 
not to give an oil concession ‘to anyone except a person appointed from the British Government’ 
(English translation reproduced in Chisholm (1975: p89)). 
 
Monroe argues that ‘Even in places where it [i.e., the British government] was entitled by pledge or 
treaty to approve the nationality of the concessionaire (as it was in Kuwait or Bahrain), it preferred 
to leave British aspirants to fend from themselves’ (Monroe, 1981: p.105). This is not a fair 
characterisation of the British government’s actions. According to BP’s official history, by 1922, 
Britain’s Colonial Office was ready to authorise the Political Resident (that is, its local diplomat) to 
help APOC to negotiate agreements with the Shaykhs of Bahrain and Kuwait (Ferrier, 1982: p.546). 
But the company did not seize this opportunity (Ferrier, 1982: p.564). Thereafter it faced 
competition for both concessions from the Eastern and General Syndicate (EGS), another British 
company (Ferrier, 1982: p.564). The British government sided with APOC (Ferrier, 1982: pp.564-
6). Nevertheless, in 1925, EGS was awarded the concession for Bahrain (Ferrier, 1982: p.566). The 
following year, EGS wanted to get rid of its Bahrain concession, along with its concessions for al-
Hasa and the Neutral Zone (Ferrier, 1982: p.567). It offered to sell them to APOC but APOC 
declined to accept the offer (Ferrier, 1982: p.567). Only then, in 1927, did EGS sell its concessions 
to the Gulf Oil Corporation (Ferrier, 1982: p.567). The game of pass the parcel was not over. The 
next year Gulf Oil joined the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) and signed the Red Line 
Agreement (Ferrier, 1982: p.567). This prevented it from retaining its Bahraini concession. So Gulf 
Oil passed it on to the Standard Oil Company of California (Ferrier, 1982: p.567). This was not 
(quite) the end of the story. In 1928, the British government insisted that any concession granted by 
the Shaykhs of Kuwait or Bahrain include a British nationality clause (Ferrier, 1982: p.568). Two 
years later it caved in under pressure from the US government. The British nationality clause was 
(in effect) waived in the case of Bahrain (but not yet Kuwait); a Canadian registered company, a 
subsidiary of Standard Oil of California, obtained the concession (Ferrier, 1982: p.568). 
 
Back in Kuwait, Gulf Oil was seeking the concession. In view of this, the Petroleum Department 
(part of the British government) asked APOC if it, or the Iraq Petroleum Company, was interested 
in the concession as ‘we do not like to see any area which offers any promise going entirely into 
American hands’ (Petroleum Department cited in Chisholm (1975: p.127)). The company replied 
unenthusiastically: it confirmed its interest but complained about the royalty terms and customs 
duties which the Colonial Office was willing to recommend to Kuwait’s Shaykh Ahmad (Ferrier, 
1982: p.569). Meanwhile, Gulf Oil took up the issue of the British nationality clause with the 
 72 
American State Department who in turn put pressure on the British Foreign Office to concede 
Open Door rights to American companies in Kuwait (Bamberg,1994:p.148). The British 
government, having yielded ground already to US oil companies in Iraq and Bahrain, did so again in 
Kuwait; the nationality clause was now dropped there too (in 1932) (Bamberg, 1994: p.148). Before 
hearing this news, and on the back of a discouraging geological survey, APOC indicated that it was 
not interested in the concession (at that time) (Bamberg, 1994: p.148; Ferrier, 1982: p.569). When it 
heard the news, the company immediately asked to open (concessionary) negotiations; it was 
unenthusiastic about the prospect of having a competitor in its Iranian backyard (Ferrier, 1982: 
pp.568-9). There were now two competitors for the concession, namely APOC and Gulf Oil 
(Bamberg, 1994: p.148). In 1933, after the British government examined the proposals of the two 
companies, the Political Resident approved the reopening of negotiations between the two 
companies and Kuwait’s Shaykh (Bamberg, 1994: pp.149-50). Competition for the concession was 
good for the Shaykh but bad for the companies, so the latter combined, forming a joint company, 
called the Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), to acquire and operate the concession (Bamberg, 1994: 
p.150). The British government was not sitting on the sidelines. In 1934, it signed an agreement 
known as the political agreement with the KOC. This: 
‘stipulated that the KOC was to remain a British company and gave the British Government significant 
powers, most notably that the concession, if obtained by the KOC, was not to be transferred without the 
consent of the British Government, which would also have the rights of pre-emption over Kuwaiti crude oil 
and refined products in event of war.’ (Bamberg, 1994: pp.150-1).  
In 1934, KOC was awarded the concession, and an exchange of letters between the British 
Government and the Shaykh embodied the political agreement (Bamberg, 1994: p.152). 
‘Each oil concession agreement for those Arab Gulf states [in fact, monarchies] under formal British 
protection followed an established procedure. The first document to be signed was usually, though not 
necessarily, a commercial agreement between the company and the Ruler. A second stage usually saw a 
political agreement between the British Government and the oil company. This stage would ideally be 
endorsed by the Ruler through an exchange of letters with the appropriate British authorities in the Gulf.’ 
(Cambridge Archive Editions, 2018). 
 
3.2 Markets before WWII: Selling at home and in the British Empire 
 
APOC started selling refined oil products from 1912. Sales were made to Royal Dutch Shell 
(Ferrier, 1982: pp.150,476,508); the Admiralty (under the 20-year supply agreement signed in 1914); 
local markets in the Gulf (although sales ‘remained generally insignificant’) (Ferrier, 1982: p.471; 
Bamberg, 1994: pp.5-6); local steamers (the beginnings of the Company’s marine bunkering trade) 
(Ferrier, 1982: p.286; Bamberg, 1994: p.6); and to India (both directly and via Burmah Oil and 
Royal Dutch Shell) (Ferrier, 1982: pp.287,471). During WW1, APOC’s largest customers by far 
were the Admiralty and other armed services (Bamberg,1994:p.5; Ferrier,1982:pp.288-90). Then, 
over the period 1917-27, the company developed its own marketing organisation, principally in 
Britain and other Western European countries (Bamberg,2000:p.218; Bamberg,1994:p.6). Its first 
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step was the acquisition of the British Petroleum (BP) Company. The BP Company was a 
subsidiary of a German oil company (Europäische Petroleum Union) with a considerable marketing 
operation in Britain (Bamberg, 1994: p.6). It was requisitioned during the war and APOC 
purchased it from the Public Trustee (Ferrier, 1982: p.291). 
 
Collusion in the markets (between the major oil companies) increased dramatically from 1928. The 
1928 Achnacarry or “As Is” Agreement is well-known. This centred around the fixing of quotas 
and prices in international oil markets. In addition to this overarching agreement, separate 
agreements were reached covering specific markets. In 1927, Burmah Oil and Royal Dutch Shell 
decided to combine their marketing operations in India into a joint company (the so-called 
Burmah-Shell Agreement) (Ferrier, 1982: p.511; Bamberg, 1994: p.107). The next year, APOC, in 
return for the right to supply this joint company with some of its oil needs, agreed that it would not 
enter India’s market (Bamberg, 2000: p.218). In the same year, APOC and Royal Dutch Shell 
agreed to combine their marketing operations in Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Red Sea Ports, East Africa 
and South Africa, Ceylon, Madagascar, Mauritius and Reunion into a joint company called the 
Consolidated Petroleum Company (Ferrier, 1982: p.512). One of BP’s official historians, Jim 
Bamberg, describes well these Burmah-Shell (plus APOC) and Consolidated agreements: 
‘Oil markets in most of the rest of the British Empire [i.e., outside Australia] were shared out in 1928 in an 
imperial carve-up between the three main British or part-British oil companies, the Company, Burmah Oil 
and Royal Dutch-Shell.’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.252) 
The UK market was not immune from this collusion. Already in 1919 there were agreements 
between the UK marketing subsidiaries of APOC, Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil (NJ) to 
schedule prices (Ferrier, 1982: p.505). According to R. W. Ferrier (BP’s other official historian): 
‘These arrangements were the subject of informal meetings between the three main importing and 
distributing companies throughout the 1920s, as well as quota settlements, advertising restrictions and service 
station proposals.’ (Ferrier, 1982: n.74p.754) 
By 1932, APOC and Royal Dutch Shell had combined their UK marketing operations into a joint 
company, called Shell-Mex and BP (Bamberg, 1994: p.119). Standard Oil (NJ) was invited to merge 
their UK marketing operations too but it declined (Bamberg, 1994: p.119). 
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Table 3.1. Geographical distribution of the company’s main refined oil product sales, 1928 & 1930-37 
 
 1928 1930-37 
Europe: 
UK 26 19 
Continental Europe 18 17 
Sub-total 44 36 
Extra-European markets: 
Argentina 2 n/a 
Australia 1 2 
Burmah-Shell area 8 3 
Consolidated area 13 5 
Iran 0.4 1 
Iraq 2 2 
Other 1 1 
Sub-total 26 13 
International oil companies: 
Royal Dutch Shell 8 8 
Burmah Oil 2 1 
Sub-total 11 8 
Marine bunkers 7 30 
Admiralty 10 10 
Other 2 3 
Total 100 100 
Sources: 
1928 data: Own calculations from Ferrier (1982: Appendices 11.1-11.4) 
1930-37 data: Bamberg (1994: Table 4.2)  
 
 
Table 3.1 shows the geographical distribution of the company’s main refined oil product sales in 
1928 and over the years 1930-37. In this decade before the outbreak of WWII, the company’s 
products markets had a double imperial design. Sales to the UK commercial market, the company’s 
largest European market, and to the Admiralty accounted for 36 per cent of all product sales in 
1928 and 29 per cent in 1930-37. This was one side of the imperial nature of the company’s 
markets. The other side was the largely imperial design of the company’s markets outside Western 
Europe: 
‘The Company’s extra-European sales were made not in the industrial economies of Japan and the USA, but 
mainly in the less economically dynamic territories of the vast British Empire and at bunkering ports on the 
sea lanes of the Eastern Hemisphere, where Britain was the supreme maritime power.’ (Bamberg,2000:p.252) 
Sales to these extra-European markets and by the company’s marine bunkering business accounted 
for 33 per cent of all sales in 1928 and 43 per cent in 1930-37. In short, sales at home (including to 
the Admiralty) and in Britain’s empire (including at bunkering ports) constituted the majority of the 
company’s product sales before WWII. 
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Part II: Oil production and markets, 1945-1979 
 
3.3 Oil production, 1945-1979 
 
3.3.1 The pre-WWII Middle East oil concessions 
 
In the post-WWII period, before the nationalisations of the 1970s, the company’s crude oil 
production was concentrated in its pre-WWII Middle East concessions, primarily in Kuwait and 
Iran, and to a lesser extent Iraq. The contributions of Qatar and Abu Dhabi in this postwar period 
were small in comparison (Table 3.2). As we have seen, before WWII, the company produced 
almost all its crude oil in Iran; 88 per cent of it on the eve of war. Iran continued to be the 
company’s dominant source of production in the immediate aftermath of war. Over the period 
1946-50, the company produced 82 per cent of its crude oil in Iran.  
 
But there was increasing hostility to the company and the regime in Iran that sustained it. The 
nationalist movement demanded the oil industry’s nationalisation as well as constitutional checks 
on the Shah’s powers. After the assassination of the pro-British prime minister, the Shah, in 
reaction to popular pressure, appointed the leader of the nationalist movement, Mohammad 
Mussadiq, as prime minister, and he nationalised the country’s oil industry in 1951. The loss of BP’s 
concession would have damaged British imperialism in both economic and political terms: its loss 
would damage its prestige in the Middle East and thus its imperial grip on the region. Britain did 
not have troops to occupy Iran’s oilfields so imposed an economic blockade on the country and 
tried to oust Mussadiq via covert activities. British plans to occupy the country’s oil refinery were 
opposed by the US and the UK government decided it could not defy the Americans on such an 
issue. BP was forced to evacuate Iran. The incoming Conservative government could only resolve 
the matter by relying on the US. In 1953, a CIA-led coup, with Britain’s MI6 in a supporting role, 
ousted Mussadiq (Byrne, 2013; Gasiorowski & Byrne, 2004; Bill & Louis, 1988; Newsinger, 2013).  
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Iran’s oil was re-divided. After the coup, the company’s share of Iran’s crude oil production, 100 
per cent before the nationalization, was cut to just 40 per cent. Five US oil companies gained 40 per 
cent between them (8 per cent each) with the remaining share given to Royal Dutch Shell (14 per 
cent) and France’s CFP (6 per cent). This was part of a wider redistribution of the Middle East’s oil 
reserves over the postwar period: according to Harry Magdoff’s calculation, Britain’s share of these 
reserves slumped from 72 per cent in 1940 to just 29 per cent in 1967, while that of the United 
States jumped from just 10 per cent to 59 per cent over the same period (Magdoff, 2003: Table 2). 
In the period 1952-54, when the company’s production in Iran stopped, it produced approximately 
three-quarters of its crude oil in Kuwait and just under one-quarter in Iraq. Thereafter, until the end 
of the 1960s, Kuwait remained the company’s most important source of crude oil. Taken together, 
the company produced 98-100 per cent of its crude oil in its Middle East concessions of Iran, Iraq, 
Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi up until the first half of the 1960s. In the second half of that decade, 
these countries provided 85 per cent of its crude oil. By then, new post-WWII oil concessions were 
contributing to the company’s supply. 
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Table 3.2. Geographical distribution of the company’s crude oil production or sources*, 1946-79 
Percentage of total 
  Approx. 
Production production Production Production  Sources  Sources  Sources   (Per cent 
1946-50  1952-54  1957-59  1960-64  1965-69  1970-74  1975-79   purchased) 
Iran 82 Kuwait 74 Kuwait 55 Kuwait 52 Kuwait 35 Iran 38 Iran (100) 37 
Kuwait 12 Iraq 22 Iran 27 Iran 29 Iran 32 Kuwait 27 Kuwait (97) 15 
Iraq 5 Qatar 3 Iraq 13 Iraq 14 Iraq 11 Nigeria 12 Nigeria (34) 12 
Other 0 Other 1 Qatar 3 Qatar 2 Abu Dhabi 5 Abu Dhabi 8 UK (0) 9 
    Trinidad 1 Nigeria 2 Nigeria 4 Iraq 7 Abu Dhabi (39) 7 
    Other 1 Abu Dhabi 1 Libya 3 Libya 2 USA (28) 5 
      Other 0 Qatar 1 Qatar 1 Canada (86) 3 
        Other 8 Other 5 France (100) 2 
            Australia (100) 2 
            Iraq (59) 2 
            Other 6 
          1970-72 
      Produced 95 Produced 94 Produced 95 Produced 27 
      Purchased 5 Purchased 6 Purchased 5 Purchased 73 
      Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 Total 100 
Own calculations from:  
1946-50 data: Bamberg (1994: Tables 14.2 & 13.1) 
1952-54 data: Bamberg (2000: Figure 1.1) 
1957-59 data: BP (1959: p.30) & BP (1960: p.32)   
1960-64 data: BP (1970: pp.50-51) 
1965-69 & 1970-74 data: BP (1973: p.36) & BP (1975: p.36)  
1975-79 data: BP (1980a: p.15) & BP (1980b: p.14) 
* Sources: Production plus purchases 
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Ominously for BP, the British state’s imperial grip on these five Middle Eastern states weakened 
over this postwar period. Consider first Iran. Britain, along with the Soviet Union and USA, 
occupied the country in WWII. There are contrasting views of the relative positions of Britain and 
the United States in Iran in the 1940s. For example, Sluglett argues that Britain played ‘second 
fiddle’ to the Americans from the early 1940s onwards (Sluglett, 1999: p.421). In contrast, 
Ramazani contends that the Americans were only the third power in Iran between 1941 and 1951, a 
‘counterweight’ to the rival powers of Britain and the Soviet Union (Ramazani, 1975: pp.70,253-4; 
Stephen McFarland (1980) concurs). Nevertheless, there is broad agreement that by 1954, after the 
coup and Shah’s return, the influence of the USA in Iran had almost wholly superseded that of the 
British (Sluglett, 1999: p.421; Balfour-Paul, 1999: p.508; Louis & Robinson, 2006: p.472; Ramazani, 
1975: p.274). 
 
Consider next Iraq. Like Iran, Britain occupied the country in WWII. After the occupation, it 
continued to exercise control over Iraq and its oil, via the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, up until the 
1958 coup d’état. The coup marked the end of Britain’s political control over Iraq (Sluglett, 2007: 
pp.xvi,213; Fieldhouse, 2006: p.113). Not long after the coup, in 1961, the Iraqi government issued 
Law 80. This expropriated, without compensation, 99.5 per cent of the concession area of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company (IPC). The IPC kept the areas of its producing wells, but lost the prized North 
Rumaila field, which was not yet in production (Bamberg, 2000: p.166). Then, in 1967, the Iraqi 
government issued Law 97. This barred the return to the IPC of North Rumaila, and gave the Iraq 
National Oil Company (INOC) exclusive rights throughout Iraq, with the exception of the areas 
left to the IPC under Law 80 (Bamberg, 2000: p.171). Over the next two years, the INOC signed a 
20-year exploration agreement with France’s state-owned Entreprise de Recherches et d’Activités 
Pétrolières (ERAP) as well as an agreement for assistance from the Soviet Union in developing 
North Rumaila (Bamberg, 2000: p.171). 
 
Finally, consider the Gulf Arab states. Kuwait remained part of the formal British empire until its 
independence in 1961. The Anglo-Kuwaiti Exclusive Agreement of 1899 was terminated and 
replaced by a Treaty of Friendship. The Treaty pledged Britain to protect Kuwait, and when Iraq 
threatened Kuwait in 1961, British troops were deployed in an act of deterrence (Louis, 2004: 
pp.36,52). Then, in 1968, Britain announced that it would withdraw “East of Suez” in 1971. This 
meant that it would abrogate unilaterally its treaty obligations to protect Bahrain, Qatar and the 
“Trucial States” - these would become (formally) independent - as well as Kuwait (Dockrill,2002: 
p.194; Hollis, 2010:p.164; Louis, 2004:p.49). Nevertheless, Wm. Roger Louis argues that informal 
British influence remained in these Gulf Arab states until Iraqi troops invaded Kuwait in 1990 
(Louis, 2004: pp.47-48). 
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3.3.2 New concessions in the British empire 
 
Shaken by the nationalisation of its assets in Iran, BP decided to search energetically for new 
sources of crude oil outside the Middle East (Bamberg, 2000: p.106). This search yielded two 
significant new sources in this post-war period, both in Britain’s empire: in Nigeria and Libya. 
 
Nigeria 
 
Nigeria became a British colony in the late nineteenth century. The colonial Mineral Oil Ordinance 
of 1914 specified that oil licenses and leases could be awarded to British companies only (Bamberg, 
2000: p.109). In 1937, the company, in partnership with Royal Dutch Shell, secured an exploration 
licence covering the whole of Nigeria, around 370,000 square miles. In 1949, the area of the 
exploration licence was reduced to 60,000 square miles (Bamberg,2000:p.109). Shell-BP first struck 
oil (in commercial quantities) in 1956 and started exporting crude oil in 1958. As the exploration 
licences were converted first into five-year prospecting licenses and then, starting in 1960, into 
thirty-year mining licenses, the area covered by the licenses was progressively reduced (Bamberg, 
2000: p110). In the same year, Nigeria became formally independent. While other companies 
picked up the acreage Shell-BP relinquished, the partnership remained the dominant oil producer in 
the country, accounting for three-quarters of the production of crude oil in Nigeria in 1970 
(Bamberg, 2000: p.112). In the first half of the 1960s, Nigeria accounted for two per cent of BP’s 
crude oil production. By the second half, its contribution to the company’s crude oil supply 
doubled to four per cent. According to BP’s official history, 
‘while Nigerian crude was both less plentiful and more expensive to produce, it had important advantages 
over Middle East oil. It was mostly light low-sulphur oil for which there was strong demand in increasingly 
pollution-conscious markets,… and, most importantly, Nigeria seemed in the early 1960s to be political stable 
and moderate.’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.112-3) 
 
Libya 
 
Libya, from its creation in 1951 until the coup d’état in 1969, in other words, Libya under the rule 
of King Idris, was a British client state (Louis, 2006; Louis, 2004: p.45; Pargeter, 2000: p.42; 
Worrall, 2007: p.309). During the Libyan campaign in WWII, the Libyan Arab Force or Sanusi 
Army, led by Sayyid Idris, served with the British (Collins, 1974: p.10). Between the end of the war 
and Libya’s creation, the British military administered the provinces it occupied in 1945, namely 
Cyrenaica and Tripolitania; the province of Fezzan was under French military administration 
(Collins, 1974: p.10-11). In this period, Louis argues that the British government created its Libyan 
client state. Creation took place within the context of collaboration between Britain and America, 
and sponsorship by the United Nations (Louis, 2006:p.503). According to Louis, the primary goal 
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was to secure the province of Cyrenaica as a strategic area that could function as a substitute for the 
military base at Suez (Louis, 2006: p.503). The Libyan state was to be controlled indirectly by 
Britain, subsidised principally by the USA, and held together by the Senusi (Louis, 2006: p.507). 
The Anglo-Libyan “Treaty of Friendship and Alliance” signed in 1953 was the concrete expression 
of this relationship of dependency. The essence of the treaty was Britain’s purchase of military 
rights in Libya (Collins, 1974: p.12; Pargeter, 2000: p.42; Worrall,2007: p.344). In the words of 
Carole Collins: 
‘The only thing that Libya had to sell during this period was its strategic location, excellent airbases which had 
been developed by the British and Americans during World War II, and a conservative, pro-Western and 
seemingly stable government which would not threaten Western imperialist interests or actions in the area. 
Hence, on July 29, 1953, Libya concluded a twenty-year treaty of friendship and alliance with Great Britain. 
Under this treaty Britain secured certain military and base and troop-stationing rights in exchange for 
financial and later military training assistance. This was followed, on September 9, 1954, by the signing of an 
agreement with the United States, in which military base rights - principally at Wheelus Air Base near Tripoli - 
were granted in exchange for financial and economic assistance.’ (Collins, 1974: p.12) 
In 1956, Libya did not allow Britain to use its forces and bases in the country for its attack on 
Egypt (Worrall, 2007: p.309). This revealed a limitation of Britain’s Libyan client state. The British 
government decided at first to withdraw its troops from Libya, formalised in the 1957 Defence 
White Paper, but soon reversed its decision. One reason for the reversal was Libya’s oil prospects 
(Worrall, 2007: p.343). The British Defence Co-ordination Committee on the Middle East noted: 
‘The importance of Libya to the West lies primarily in the political need to retain it as part of the western 
sphere of influence and to deny it to the Soviet Union in order to prevent her influence spreading along the 
Mediterranean coast of North Africa to the Atlantic. Furthermore there are good prospects of oil being 
discovered in Libya in commercial quantities; such revenues would be of particular importance to the west.’ 
(DEFE 7/1013 British Defence Co-ordination Committee Report, 12 November 1957, cited in Pargeter 
(2000:p.47)) 
Another reason was the 1958 Iraqi coup d’état (Pargeter, 2000: p.50; Worrall, 2007: p.343). Libya 
remained a British client state until the end of the 1960s. According to Collins, rather than risk 
losing his relationship with Britain, which had served his interests so well, Idris threatened to 
abdicate when the early evacuation of British and American air bases was urged by the Libyan 
cabinet and lower house. The affair was settled by an increase in military assistance from Britain 
and the USA, and in the suppression of organised political activity (Collins,1974:p.15). Later, after 
the June 1967 War, Idris maintained amicable relations with the West (Collins, 1974: p.15). Oil 
transformed Libya in the 1960s and Britain’s arms manufacturers exploited Libya’s oil wealth by 
selling it weapons. Between 1964 and 1969, Libya was Britain’s third largest export market for 
conventional arms, behind India and the Saudi Kingdom (Phythian, 2000: Table 4). The British 
state lost its imperial grip on Libya in the wake of the nationalist, republican coup d’état in 1969. 
The following year, the junta led by Momar Qaddafi insisted on the evaluation of British forces 
from their principal base at Tobruk and of the Americans from their Wheelus Air Force Base 
(Louis, 2004: p.46; Achcar, 2006: p.21). 
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After the end of World War Two, the British military administration was unwilling to grant oil 
concessions to the company and Shell before Libya became independent, following a joint enquiry 
by the two companies. In 1951, the companies were allowed to carry out surveys in Cyrenaica, and 
they applied for concessions covering vast swathes of both Cyrenaica and Tripolitania. But there 
was no legislation under which licenses for exploration could be granted (Bamberg, 2000: p.114). 
Other companies also conducted surveys on the back of the 1953 Minerals Law. In 1955, the 
Libyan Petroleum Law, drafted with oil companies, was enacted. Before the 1955 Law was passed, 
BP and Shell tried to persuade the Libyan government that their earlier application for concessions 
should be given priority (Bamberg, 2000: p.115). They failed. Instead they would have to enter the 
competitive race for concessions (Bamberg,2000:p.119). Under the 1955 Law, concessions were 
made available on generous terms, but were comparatively small in area. In addition, a maximum 
limit was placed on the acreage which a single company could hold (Bamberg, 2000: p.114). By the 
end of 1960, 22 companies had been granted 89 concessions. BP lagged behind other oil companies 
in the scramble for concessions until, together with US “independent” Nelson Bunker Hunt, it 
struck a giant oilfield in 1961, named Sarir. BP-Hunt started exporting crude oil in 1967. In 1970, 
the field accounted for 12 per cent of Libya’s total production. This was BP’s only producing 
oilfield in Libya (Bamberg, 2000: pp.114-5,118-9). In the second half of the 1960s, it accounted for 
three per cent of BP’s crude oil supply. According to BP’s official history: 
‘Libya’s contribution to BP’s worldwide reserves portfolio and production was quite small… Its value to BP 
should not, however, be judged by volumes alone, for in the 1960s Libyan crude commanded a premium 
rating…, it was low in sulphur, situated close to the oil-hungry markets of Western Europe, and in a country 
which posed few political worries while King Idris remained in power.’ (Bamberg, 2000:p.119) 
 
3.4 Oil production, 1970s: The loss of the company’s Middle Eastern and African 
concessions 
 
One by one, BP’s Middle Eastern and African oil concessions were nationalised in the 1970s. Its 
Libyan concession was the first to fall. A day before the end of Britain’s formal protection of the 
“Trucial States”, on 1st December 1971, Iran seized the islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and 
Lesser Tunbs, claimed by Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, two of the Trucial States. On 7th 
December, Libya nationalised BP’s operations ‘in retaliation against “the plot mechanised by Britain 
with the puppet government of Iran, against the Arab nation”’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.469).3 Next up 
were its Iraqi concessions. The Iraq Petroleum Company’s (IPC) shareholders, of which BP was 
one, held three concessions in Iraq: the concessions of the IPC itself, the Mosul Petroleum 
Company and the Basra Petroleum Company. In 1972, the Iraqi government nationalised the IPC 
concession (Bamberg, 2000: p.470). The next year it reached a final settlement with the IPC and the 																																																								
3 In addition to BP’s official history, see the accounts of the nationalisation and its aftermath by Frank 
Waddams (1980) and Judith Gurney (1996). 
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Mosul Petroleum Company surrendered its concession to the government (Shwadran, 1977: p.70). 
Later, in the context of the October 1973 War, Iraq nationalised the American and Dutch interests 
in the Basra Petroleum Company (Bamberg,2000:pp.478-9). Two years after that, it nationalised the 
remaining private interests in the Basra Petroleum Company, including BP’s stake (Bamberg, 2000: 
pp.485-6). 
 
Back in 1972, Qatar and Abu Dhabi, alongside the Saudi Kingdom, signed the so-called “General 
Agreement on Participation”. Under this agreement, participation would start at 25 per cent on 1st 
January 1973 and rise, in steps, to 51 per cent on 1st January 1982 (Bamberg, 2000: p.471). In 1974, 
the governments of Qatar and Abu Dhabi increased their participation to 60 per cent. One year 
later, Qatar fully nationalised its oil industry (al-Othman, 1984: pp.103-8). Abu Dhabi stopped at 60 
per cent participation (Bamberg, 2000: p.485). In Iran, it was agreed in 1973 that the state-owned 
National Iranian Oil Company  
‘would take over the Consortium’s operations, produce the crude oil, refine and market a portion of it at 
home and abroad, and sell the rest to the Consortium at a price calculated to achieve financial parity with the 
General Agreement on Participation’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.473).  
Kuwait took 60 per cent of the Kuwait Oil Company in 1974 before fully nationalising it the next 
year (Bamberg, 2000: p.485). Last to fall was BP’s Nigerian concession. The Nigerian government 
first took a 35 per cent stake in Shell-BP in 1973, then 55 per cent one year later and 60 per cent in 
July 1979 (Khan, 1994: p.70). In August, it nationalised all BP’s assets in the country, and 
terminated its sales agreement with the company, in retaliation for the company’s suspected breach 
of the oil embargo on South Africa (BP, 1980a: p.16; Khan, 1994: p.70; Yergin,1991: p.696). In 
short, BP’s concessions in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Libya and Nigeria were fully nationalised by 
the end of the 1970s; all that remained was 40 per cent of its stake in its concession in Abu Dhabi. 
 
In 1970, BP’s Middle East concessions in Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi still supplied 78 
per cent of its crude oil. Nigeria and Libya supplied an additional 14 per cent between them. By 
1980, these Middle East countries accounted for just 26 per cent of the company’s supply. Nigeria 
had terminated BP’s supplies by then and Libya (probably) did not supply the company in that year 
either (Table 3.3).4 In terms of volumes, supplies from these Middle East concessions collapsed 
from over 3 million barrels per day (b/d) in 1970 to just half a million b/d in 1980. The biggest 
losses to BP’s supply were from Iran and Kuwait (and to a lesser extent Iraq). But the (immediate) 
context of the company’s lost Iranian supplies was not (de facto) nationalisation but the Islamic 
revolution. In 1970, BP’s Iranian supply was 1.4 million b/d (34 per cent of its total). In 1977, the 
year before revolution started to restrict BP’s supply and four years after (de facto) nationalisation, 
Iran still supplied 1.3 million b/d. In 1979, this was down to 340,000 b/d. In 1980, it was just 																																																								
4 BP has not published data on Libya in 1980. 
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40,000 b/d (or two per cent of BP’s total supply). According to BP, the reduction in its Iranian, and 
Iraqi, oil supplies in 1980 was not (principally) the result of the Iran-Iraq war, which started in that 
year, since before the conflict began the company ‘had only modest availabilities of oil in the 
Middle East’ (BP, 1981a: p.9). Turning to Kuwait, between 1970 and 1980, BP’s supply of crude oil 
from the country fell from 1.1 million b/d to a quarter of a million b/d (from 28 per cent to 13 per 
cent of the company’s total). Over the same period, its Iraqi supply fell from 380,000 b/d to just 
40,000 b/d.5 
 
 
Table 3.3. Geographical distribution of the company’s crude oil sources*, 1970 & 1980 
Volumes in thousand barrels per day & percentage of total 
[Percentage of country total purchased] 
1970 Vol. Per cent 1980 Vol. Per cent 
Iran 1365 34 UK [0] 510 26 
Kuwait 1145 28 US [15] 445 22 
Iraq 382 9 Kuwait [100] 250 13 
Nigeria 382 9 Abu Dhabi [7] 150 8 
Abu Dhabi 241 6 Canada [90] 100 5 
Libya 201 5 France [100] 90 5 
Qatar 40 1 Australia [100] 60 3 
Other 301 7 Iran [100] 40 2 
Total [6] 4056 100 Iraq [100] 40 2 
   Qatar [100] 30 2 
   Nigeria 0 0 
   Libya n/a n/a 
   Other [96] 280 14 
   Total [42] 1995 100 
* Sources: Production plus purchases 
n/a: Not available 
Own calculations from:  
1970 data: BP (1973: p.36) & BP (1975: p.36)   
1980 data: BP (1981b: p.16) 
 
 
The company’s principal sources of crude oil in 1980 were no longer in the Middle East but in 
Britain and the USA. Britain accounted for 26 per cent of BP’s supply in that year (510,000 b/d). 
The USA contributed an additional 22 per cent (445,000 b/d) (Table 3.3). The company’s principal 
source of supply in Britain was its North Sea oilfields. BP first struck oil there in 1970 and 
production commenced in 1975 (Bamberg, 2000: p.203). The company’s primary source of supply 
in the USA was its Prudhoe Bay field in Alaska, the largest oil field ever found in North America 
(Yergin, 1991: p.571). BP struck oil there in 1969 but crude oil only began to be transported via the 
Trans-Alaska Pipeline System in mid-1977 (Ritchie, 1995: p.109). But the company’s crude oil 																																																								
5 BP purchased 50,000b/d from Iran in 1981 but nothing in 1982 and 1983. It purchased 73,000b/d from 
Kuwait in 1981 (down from 245,000b/d in 1980) and nothing in either 1982 or 1983. It made no purchases 
from Nigeria between 1981 and 1983. 
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supplies from Britain and the USA far from fully replaced its lost Middle Eastern and African 
supplies. Between 1970 and 1980, BP’s total supply dropped from 4.1 to 2.0 million b/d. 
 
3.5 Markets, 1945-1969: Selling to Western Europe and other oil companies 
 
Before WWII, the company’s principal products markets were at home (including the Admiralty) 
and in the British Empire (including at bunkering ports). In contrast, in the post-WWII period, up 
until 1969, its primary sales outlets were Western Europe, and other oil companies and distributors. 
The converse of bulging European product sales was the hollowing out of its extra-European 
markets, in particular, as a result of nationalistic oil policies post-decolonisation. 
 
Crude oil sales to other oil companies and distributors increased from just one per cent of total 
(crude oil and refined product) sales volumes in 1946, to 23 per cent in 1951, to 41 per cent in both 
1960 and 1969 (own calculations from Bamberg (1994: Table11.4) & BP (1970: pp.40-41)). What 
was the rationale for these crude oil sales? To safeguard, as best it could, its Middle East 
concessions, the company needed to sustain the growth in production. But without concomitant 
growth in downstream investment, this necessitated crude oil sales (Bamberg, 1994: p.301; 
Bamberg, 2000: p.495). The company’s most significant crude oil contracts (signed in 1947) were 
with two US companies, Standard Oil (NJ) and the Standard Oil Company of New York (Socony) 
(Bamberg, 1994: pp.303,305; Bamberg, 2000: p.306). In 1966, the original 20-year contracts were 
extended for another fifteen years and remained the backbone of the company’s crude oil sales to 
the majors (Bamberg, 2000: pp.306-7). Another large crude oil buyer in this period was Petrofina, a 
Belgian company. Otherwise, the company focused its sales of crude oil on areas where it had no 
downstream operations, most importantly, Japan, but also South America and Eastern Europe 
(Bamberg, 2000: p.307). 
 
The second notable change in the company’s postwar markets was the growth in product sales to 
Europe, especially to the continent. While Europe’s 
‘oil requirements before the war had been met mainly by exports from the USA and the Caribbean… in the 
second half of the 1940s the USA became a net oil importer, absorbing most of the oil which was available 
for export from the Caribbean. Meanwhile, Europe turned increasingly to the Middle East for its oil supplies. 
The Company, with its very large stake in Middle East oil, was well placed in relation to this trend. It also had 
the advantage of being a producer of sterling oil which was in high demand with customers who found it 
difficult to purchase dollar oil from US oil companies because of the widespread shortage of dollars.’ 
(Bamberg, 1994: p.277) 
Product sales to Europe increased from around 17 per cent of total sales volumes in 1946, to 24 
per cent in 1951, to 33 per cent in 1960, to 39 per cent in 1969 (own calculations from Bamberg 
(1994: Table 11.4,Figure 11.3,p.297) and BP (1970: pp.40-41)). Continental Europe surpassed the 
UK and Ireland as the company’s largest inland market in 1949 (Bamberg, 1994: Figure11.4). By 
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1970, sales to each of the French and German markets were not far behind those to the UK market 
(Bamberg, 2000: p.229). 
 
The reverse side of the rising share of European product sales was the falling share of extra-
European sales. Extra-European sales as a proportion of total sales by BP’s marketing subsidiaries 
and associates fell from 31 per cent in 1955 to 17 per cent in 1970. This was in part the result of 
nationalistic oil policies (Bamberg, 2000: pp.220,224,494-5). As we have seen, the company’s pre-
WWII extra-European markets were mainly in the British Empire, in particular India and the 
Consolidated area (which covered Egypt, Syria, Palestine, Red Sea Ports, East Africa and South 
Africa, Ceylon, Madagascar, Mauritius and Reunion). The company was kicked out of these markets 
in this postwar period as post-colonial governments nationalised its downstream outlets. At the 
same time nationalistic oil policies prevented it from entering the markets of both the USA (the 
world’s largest market) and Japan (the world’s fastest-growing market in the 1950s and 1960s) 
(Bamberg, 2000: p.271). Whilst nationalist oil policies were pursued in continental Europe too - 
ranging from ‘comprehensive state controls in France, state backing for [state-owned] ENI in Italy, 
to milder forms of intervention in West Germany’ - the company was neither kicked out of nor 
prevented entry into these markets (Bamberg,2000:p.495). 
 
Consider first the Indian market. Recall that in 1928 the company agreed not to enter this market in 
return for the right to supply Burmah-Shell with some of its oil needs (Bamberg, 2000: p.218). At 
first, state intervention in the post-independence Indian oil industry was comparatively limited, and 
the three dominant foreign companies of Burmah-Shell, Stanvac, an American alliance of Standard 
Oil (NJ) and Socony-Vacuum, and Caltex, another American alliance of Socal and the Texas 
Company, continued to dominate the market (Bamberg, 2000: p.257). But from the late 1950s, the 
state’s role in the Indian oil industry was greatly extended (Bamberg,2000: pp.257-8). At the end of 
1975, Burmah-Shell was nationalised by the Indian government. 
 
Consider next the area, taking in a great swathe of British imperial territory, covered by the 
Consolidated Petroleum Company, a joint marketing arm of BP and Royal Dutch Shell (Bamberg, 
2000: p.253). 
‘As the Consolidated area fractured into… new nations, a growing number of independent governments 
nationalised or participated in Consolidated’s subsidiaries. By mid-1970 Egypt, Syria, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), 
South Yemen and Somalia had all nationalised Consolidated’s local marketing operations, while Tanzania 
(formerly Tanganyika and Zanzibar), Uganda and Zambia had acquired shareholdings of 50 per cent or 
more.’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.264) 
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In Japan, the company had excluded itself from the market by signing the Far Eastern Agreement 
with Royal Dutch Shell. Under this agreement, in effect from 1948: 
‘For a period of at least twenty years, the Company was to supply Shell with products from the Abadan 
refinery equal to 50 per cent of Shell’s sales in the Far Eastern markets of Malaya, Indo-China, Siam, China, 
Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. In return for its supply rights, the Company 
undertook not to establish its own outlets in these markets, except in Australia and New Zealand, where it 
was already established.’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.269) 
The agreement stopped the company entering the Japanese market when the door was open in the 
early 1950s. When the agreement was terminated prematurely in 1955, because BP had lost 
exclusive control of oil production and refining in Iran, the door was closed 
(Bamberg,2000:pp.268-70). Although the company did not sell refined products in Japan it did 
make very large crude oil sales to independent refiner/marketers in the country 
(Bamberg,2000:p.270).6 
 
Consider finally the USA. To protect its domestic oil producers, the US government imposed 
mandatory oil import quotas in 1959 (Bamberg, 2000: p.224; Yergin, 1991: p.512). The year before, 
BP had entered into an alliance with the American Sinclair Oil Corporation. BP had surplus 
(Middle East) crude but no sales outlets in the USA. Sinclair was in the opposite position: it had a 
large network of sales outlets in the US but was short of crude. The arrangement was for BP to 
supply Sinclair with crude oil from the Middle East (Bamberg, 2000: p.122). The US’s protective 
wall, which restricted oil imports from the Middle East, frustrated this arrangement (Bamberg, 
2000: p.122). BP was left outside the US market until it jumped the wall in 1969. 
 
3.6 Markets, 1970s: Entry into America 
 
As we have seen, BP struck oil in Alaska in 1969. Instead of simply selling crude oil into the US 
market, or setting up its own integrated (i.e. upstream and downstream) American operation, BP 
partnered with Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio). In essence, and in its core oil business, Sohio was a 
downstream company operating in just one state, albeit Ohio being the USA’s fourth-largest 
gasoline market (Bamberg, 2000: p.275). In 1970, BP exchanged its upstream Alaskan assets 
(amongst other American assets) for an (escalating) equity stake in Sohio. Outside the US market 
until 1969, BP sold 294,000 barrels per day (b/d) of refined products in the country in 1979, 
predominantly via this stake in Sohio. This constituted 12 per cent of the company’s total product 
sales.7  																																																								
6 In keeping with the imperial tradition of the company’s extra-European markets, the only Far Eastern 
countries where it had its own market outlets by the mid-1970s were Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and 
Singapore (Bamberg, 2000: pp.270-1). 
7 Own calculations from BP (1980b) and BP (1982). These numbers allocate 53 per cent of Sohio’s product 
sales to BP since BP’s equity stake in Sohio averaged 53 per cent over the course of 1979 (BP, 1980a). In 
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Soon after entering the US market, BP withdrew from the Italian one. According to the company’s 
official history: 
‘BP’s withdrawal from Italy [in 1973] was a turning point in its approach to refining and marketing. By 1973 BP’s strategy 
of trying to protect its concessions by raising crude oil production and seeking outlets merely to dispose of the increase 
was manifestly obsolete. The concessionary system was collapsing, and the OPEC countries were taking control of crude 
oil production and prices. It would not be long before the dramatic rise in crude oil prices in the last quarter of 1973 
would precipitate a world economic recession and… a downturn in oil demand. But before that happened it was already 
becoming painfully clear that BP’s earlier volume-driven growth in refining and marketing had saddled it with a vast 
investment in unprofitable downstream assets. BP urgently needed to stem the losses and to focus not on sales volume, 
but on the profitability of its refining and marketing operations. In this new situation, BP Italiana was an easy first choice 
for divestment. Its sale was the first major move in a campaign of downstream rationalisation and restructuring which 
would prove to be a very long-term undertaking as BP tried to shed the legacy of its great push for outlets.’ (Bamberg, 
2000: p.251) 
BP’s product sales volumes in Europe more-or-less stagnated over the course of the 1970s as a 
whole. Sales volumes fell in 1973 and again in both 1974 and 1975, before rising in 1976 (BP,1975; 
BP,1977; BP,1979b; BP,1980b). Oil product sales in Europe were still less in 1978 than they had 
been in 1973 (Ritchie, 1995: p.111). In 1979, BP sold 1.7 million b/d to Europe or 68 per cent of 
its total product sales.8 This 1970s shift in the geographical distribution of the company’s product 
sales volumes, from Europe to the USA, was the start of a long-term trend, as we shall see in the 
next chapter. 
 
  
																																																																																																																																																																		
contrast, BP’s own accounts (from 1978) include 100 per cent of Sohio’s product sales in its sales. On this 
basis, BP sold 494,000 b/d of products in the USA, 19 per cent of its total sales. 
8 Own calculations from BP (1980b) and BP (1982). If we include 100 per cent of Sohio’s sales in BP’s sales, 
then product sales to Europe constituted 63 per cent of the total in 1979. 
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4. Americanisation of BP and its limits 
 
 
This chapter discusses the Americanisation of BP. It is again in two parts. Part I covers the period 
from BP’s discovery of oil in Alaska in 1969 and the merger of its American interests with those of 
Standard Oil of Ohio in 1970, via the British state’s sales of its shareholding in the company in the 
1970s and 1980s, up until 1997. The thesis addresses two questions. First, how did BP attempt to 
protect its US assets in the light of its fears of US state hostility towards prize parts of the American 
oil industry being controlled by a company owned by non-Americans and, worse still, part-owned 
by a foreign state? Second, why did BP want ‘to Americanize’ itself at the end of the 1980s? Part II 
covers the years from the company’s takeovers of American oil companies Amoco and ARCO, at 
the turn of the millennium, up until 2016. This period raises two related questions: First, was BP 
now “British” or “Anglo-American” capital? Second, what has been the relationship between BP 
and the British and American states? 
 
These four questions addressed in the specific case of BP talk to a much bigger picture. It is 
common to consider a hegemonic state protecting the assets of another imperial power in third 
countries. The first question asked here examines the protection of the assets of a foreign company 
inside the hegemon’s social formation. The second question asks why foreign companies might 
want to sell part of themselves to (to be part-owned by) hegemonic capital (i.e., “national” capital 
of the hegemonic power). This chapter also explores a related issue: why foreign companies might 
want to merge with, or acquire, hegemonic capital. A key feature of the post-WW2 era is the 
internationalisation of productive capital. A central issue for Marxist theories of imperialism 
concerns the “nationality” of capital in this era. Is capital still national or, for example, transnational 
or global? This is the bigger picture raised by the third question. The fourth question looks at this 
issue from another angle: What is the relationship between a company and multiple nation states? 
The answer to the fourth question also talks to theories of the internationalisation (or 
transnationalisation) of the state. 
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Part I. 1969-1997 
 
4.1 Incremental acquisition of Standard Oil of Ohio 
BP struck oil at Prudhoe Bay in Alaska in March 1969. The company was against just selling its 
Alaskan crude in the (American) market. It was also against setting up an integrated American 
operation on its own. The political reason for this ‘was the danger of arousing American 
antagonism toward BP on the grounds that US oil reserves were falling into the hands of a foreign 
company which, worse still for the Americans, was majority-owned by a foreign government’ 
(Bamberg, 2000: p.272). Instead of going it alone, BP decided ‘that it should seek a US partner 
which possessed efficient downstream operations, financial strength, good management and 
widespread American shareholding which would afford some political protection in the USA’ 
(Bamberg, 2000: p.272). After first acquiring downstream assets from Sinclair Oil, it found such a 
partner in Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio) (Bamberg, 2000: pp.273,275). Under the terms of a 
Memorandum of Intent signed in June 1969, ‘BP was to transfer to Sohio its acreage at Prudhoe 
Bay, partial interests in other BP leases in Alaska, its minor production interests in the lower forty-
eight states and the ex-Sinclair downstream assets’ (Bamberg, 2000: p.276). In return, BP would 
acquire an equity stake in Sohio, starting at 25 per cent but escalating - in line with crude oil 
production growth at Prudhoe Bay - to a maximum stake of 54 per cent (Bamberg, 2000: p.276). 
 
The Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and head of the antitrust subcommittee of the 
judiciary panel (Mr Celler) urged the Justice Department to block the BP-Sohio deal, challenging it 
on antitrust and on foreign-policy grounds, namely that BP was controlled by the British 
government (Wall Street Journal, 1969a; Washington Post, 1969).1 In October, the Justice 
Department did just that (Samuelson, 1969). The Washington Post reported reaction to the anti-trust 
suit across the Atlantic: 
‘Leading European papers, probably reflecting official sentiment, charged dollar imperialism. They contended 
that American firms purchase European companies at will, while refusing to allow similar incursions into the 
U.S. market by foreign corporations.’ (Nugent, 1969a; see also Wall Street Journal, 1969b)2 
According to the Financial Times (FT), the concern in official circles in Britain was that the suit, if 
successful, would deprive the British economy of a major source of dollars and thus deal a serious 
blow to its future prospects (Martin, 1969).3 The British Foreign Secretary sent a letter to the US 
Secretary of State expressing the concern of the British government and appealing to the US 
administration ‘to adopt a “helpful attitude”’ towards the planned deal (Wall Street Journal, 1969b; 
																																																								
1 At this point, the British government’s BP shareholding was 49 per cent (Bamberg, 2000: pp.312-3). 
2 The Economist argued that the anti-trust suit was not American protectionism. The FT had mixed views on 
the topic (The Economist, 1969a; The Economist, 1969b; Tugendhat, 1969; Palmer, 1969a). 
3 Cf. structuralist conceptualisations of the state (see below). 
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see also Palmer, 1969a; Palmer, 1969b; Nugent, 1969a). In addition, the British Foreign Office 
‘hinted of possible repercussion on American investments abroad’ (The Economist, 1969a). 
 
According to the FT and The Economist, (big) American oil opposed the anti-trust suit. The Economist 
argued that big American oil companies hoped that BP’s deal with Sohio would go ahead since 
otherwise its huge Alaskan oil surplus could ‘overhang’ the US market (The Economist, 1969a). The 
FT argued that the American oil industry is:  
‘scared stiff that BP’s expulsion may cause retaliation by foreign governments against American foreign oil 
interests. More or less the same argument is being advanced by the State Department, which has been 
lobbying the Justice Department consistently over the last few months.’ (Martin, 1969) 
The Secretary of State replied to the Foreign Secretary’s letter ‘“that the interest of the British 
government has been and will be given full consideration by the Department of Justice”’ (Horne, 
1969). The State Department claimed BP had been treated equitably. In November, BP and Sohio 
reached a negotiated settlement with the Justice Department. Under the settlement, the two 
companies had to sell or exchange some of their assets but the terms of their Memorandum of 
Intent (and subsequent Principal Agreement) were unchanged (Bamberg, 2000: p.277; Wall Street 
Journal, 1969c; Palmer, 1969b). The Washington Post concluded: ‘There were indications that the issue 
was finally settled after consideration of the wider, international implications of the case’ (Nugent, 
1969b). On 1 January 1970, the merger of BP’s and Sohio’s interests was consummated. 
 
BP’s equity stake in Sohio started at 25 per cent and escalated in line with its Alaska crude oil 
production growth. With the first oil flowing through the Trans-Alaska pipeline in 1977, the 
company’s stake jumped from 26 per cent at the end of 1976 to 40 per cent at the end of 1977. By 
the end of 1978, it had a majority stake of 52 per cent (BP, 1977; BP, 1978; BP, 1979a). In the same 
year, BP’s articles of association were changed so that its directors were no longer restricted to 
British citizens. Two years later, the American chairman of Sohio became BP’s first non-British 
director (Dickson, 1980). By the end of 1986, BP’s equity stake in Sohio had risen to 55 per cent. In 
1987, it acquired Sohio outright, buying the 45 per cent of Sohio’s shares it did not already own for 
£4.7 billion (BP, 1987a; BP, 1988a). 
 
4.2 Americanisation of operations 
 
As BP discovered and pumped oil from Alaska, and its equity stake in Sohio increased, its 
operations Americanised. Its crude oil production came to be centred, not in its old Middle Eastern 
and African concessions, but in America and Britain. Its refined product sales came to be centred, 
not just on the European market (as in the 1960s), but on the American market too. And, much 
like its crude oil production, BP’s fixed assets were concentrated in America and Britain. 
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This section charts BP’s operations between 1970 and 1997 (the year before its de facto acquisition 
of America’s Amoco). Before presenting data on these operations, a quick note on BP’s statistics is 
required. UK accounting procedures called for the full consolidation of Sohio’s results into BP’s 
accounts once BP’s equity stake in Sohio exceeded 50 per cent in 1978 (Wall Street Journal, 1978). As 
a result, from 1978, BP’s own statistics on its operations, as presented in its annual reports, include 
100 per cent of Sohio’s operations, despite the fact that BP did not own the whole of Sohio until 
mid-1987. The statistics presented below adjust BP’s own statistics, including as BP’s operations in 
a given year only that part of Sohio’s operations equal to BP’s (average) equity stake in Sohio in that 
year. 
 
Consider first BP’s crude oil production.4 As stated this shifted from its old Middle Eastern and 
African concessions to its new areas of America and Britain. In the first half of the 1970s, BP 
produced almost all its oil in its old concessions. The second half of the decade was a 
transition/midway point between the old and the new. Half of BP’s production was still in the 
remnants of its old concessions, mainly Nigeria and Abu Dhabi. The other half was in the emerging 
areas of Britain and America, principally Britain (see Table 4.1). But by the first half of the 1980s, 
nine out of every ten barrels were produced in Britain and America. UK production (51 per cent) 
exceeded BP’s half of Sohio’s US production (36 per cent). The second half of the 1980s was a 
mirror image of the first: BP gobbled up the rest of Sohio in 1987 and American production (52 
per cent) now exceeded British production (36 per cent). American production continued to exceed 
British production into the nineties, but the US share of production fell from a peak of 55-56 per 
cent in 1988-90 to 44 per cent in 1997. 
 
 
Table 4.1 Crude oil production 1975-97 
Per cent of total 
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-97 
UK 35 UK 51 USA 52 USA 50 
Nigeria 28 USA-Sohio 36 UK 36 UK 31 
Abu Dhabi 17 Abu Dhabi 9 Abu Dhabi 6 Abu Dhabi 10 
USA 13 North America (ex. Sohio) 3 Europe (ex. UK) 3 Norway 6 
Iraq 3 Other 1 Canada 1 PNG 1 
Kuwait 2   Egypt 1 Other 3 
Canada 1   Other 1 
Other 2    
Own calculations from: 
1975-79 data: BP (1980b: p.14) 
1980-84 data: BP (1985: p.30) 
1985-89 data: BP (1990: p.62) 
1990-97 data: BP (1995: p.34) & BP (1998b: p.40) 
 																																																								
4 But note that the company’s purchases of crude oil exceeded its crude oil production in the period 1970-97. 
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Consider next BP’s refined product sales. The company only entered the US market in 1969. At 
that time, its product sales were concentrated heavily in Europe. But as BP’s stake in Sohio 
increased, its sales came to be centred on the American as well as the European market. BP’s 
product sales volumes on the US market increased from just 4 per cent of all sales in 1970-74 to 20 
per cent in 1980-86 to 33 per cent in 1989-97 (see Table 4.2). Europe remained BP’s largest market, 
but its share of the company’s sales volumes declined from 76 per cent to 65 per cent to 50 per 
cent over the same years.5 
 
 
Table 4.2 Refined products sales volumes 1970-97 
Per cent of total     
 1970-74* 1975-79 1980-86 1989-92 1989-92* 1993-97* 
USA 4 8 20 34 32 33 
Europe 76 69 65 51 51 49 
UK 17 14 20 17 12 12 
EC n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
West Germany 16 17 16 n/a n/a n/a 
France 14 14 9 n/a n/a n/a 
Rest of World 20 23 16 15 17 18 
Americas 6 6 2 n/a n/a n/a 
Africa & Middle East 5 8 5 n/a n/a n/a 
Rest of Asia & Australasia 9 9 8 n/a n/a n/a 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*Marketing sales only: 1970-74: All product sales except international bulk trade & bunkers; 1989-97: Sales to 
service stations, end-consumers, bulk buyers and jobbers. 
Own calculations from:  
1970-74 data: BP (1975) & Standard Oil Company (Ohio) (1980)  
1975-79 data: BP (1980b), BP (1982) & Standard Oil Company (Ohio) (1980) 
1980-86 data: BP (1985) & BP (1987b)  
1989-92 data: BP (1993) & BP (1994) 
1993-97 data: BP (1998b)  
 
 
  
																																																								
5 Data on BP’s crude oil (as opposed to refined product) sales are more limited. But in the period 1989-97, 
crude oil sales volumes were concentrated in the UK (69 per cent) and the USA (26 per cent), and crude oil 
constituted 44 per cent of total (crude and refined product) sales volumes. 
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Consider finally BP’s fixed assets (i.e., the net book value of its property, plant and equipment). In 
tune with the rest of the thesis, only the company’s upstream (exploration and production) and 
downstream (refining and marketing) assets are considered here, not those in other businesses (e.g. 
chemicals, minerals and coal) and corporate. In the period 1983-97, around three-quarters of these 
assets were upstream; one-quarter were downstream. Much like BP’s crude oil production, these 
assets were concentrated in America and Britain. In the 1980s (from 1983), US assets were close to 
50 per cent (peaking at 58 per cent in 1987) and UK assets around 30 per cent of the total. In the 
1990s (up until 1997), US assets decreased first to 40 per cent and then to 35 per cent, whilst UK 
assets increased to just under 40 per cent of the total (see Table 4.3). 
 
 
Table 4.3 Fixed assets: Property, plant and equipment: Net book value 1983-97 
Per cent of total 
 1983-86 1987-89 1990-94 1995-97 
UK 30 32 37 39 
Europe (excl. UK) 12 9 11 9 
USA 47 50 39 35 
Rest of World 11 10 12 17 
Total 100 100 100 100 
1983-89: Includes: Exploration & Production; Refining & Marketing. Excludes: Chemicals; Minerals; 
Nutrition; Coal; Other Businesses & Corporate. 
1990-97: Includes: Exploration & Production; Refining & Marketing. Excludes: Chemicals; Other Businesses 
& Corporate. 
Own calculations from: 
1983-86 & 1987-89 data: BP (1990), BP (1988b), Sohio (1985) & Standard Oil (1987)  
1990-94 & 1995-97 data: BP (1995) & BP (1998b) 
 
 
4.3 Privatisations and Kuwait’s shareholding 
 
When BP paid for the chemicals and plastics interests of the Distillers Company in 1967 mainly by 
the issue of new shares to the company, the British government’s BP stake was reduced to less than 
50 per cent for the first time since 1914 (Bamberg, 2000: p.312). But in January 1975, the Bank of 
England rescued Burmah Oil from bankruptcy by handing it a cheque for £179 million in exchange 
for its unpledged 20 per cent shareholding in BP (Ritchie, 1995: p.99; Fleming, 1975). As a result, 
the British state now held a total of 68 per cent of BP’s equity. 
 
The opposition Conservative Party spokesperson on Energy expressed immediate concern: 
‘“I am thinking here mainly of the Sohio company and BP’s Alaskan assets in the U.S.. I anticipate trouble. 
There have already been mutterings in the State of Ohio and in the U.S. Senate about the degree of foreign 
ownership of energy assets and concern is bound to be greater if control is by a foreign government”’ 
(Fleming, 1975) 
Three options emerged - as well as compromises between these options. The first option was for 
the state to retain the Bank of England’s BP shares. This was the alternative preferred by the left 
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wing of the (governing) Labour Party and was official party policy at least in May 1975 (Hamilton, 
1975; Dafter, 1975).6 The second option was for the Bank’s BP shares to be sold off in the open 
market. This was BP’s preferred option. Backed to a certain extent by the Bank of England and the 
Treasury, the company argued that the first option ‘could upset its position as an international 
major abroad, particularly so far as its U.S. interests are concerned’ (Hamilton, 1975). The company 
wanted the state’s shareholding kept below 50 per cent and for the Bank’s shares to be sold in the 
open market, but not to overseas governments (Ritchie, 1995: p.99). The third option was to sell 
the Bank’s shares to a big overseas interest. The Iranian state, West Germany’s government-backed 
national oil exploration consortium Deminex, and American companies were all thought to be 
options. The assumption, the FT reported, was ‘that American public opinion is unlikely to 
welcome the shares passing into the hands of an OPEC member such as Iran’ (Lewis, 1975). While 
Denis Healey the Chancellor of the Exchequer denied pressing Iran to buy the Bank’s BP stake, the 
Iranian government was told that it would have the first option, should the British government 
decide to allow outside shareholders (Graham, 1975).7 
 
It was the second option that won out: the British government sold part of its BP shareholding on 
the open market. The sale of the state’s shares in the company was part of Britain’s IMF loan 
negotiations in 1976 (Dafter, 1977a; Brett, 1985: p.164). To comply with the terms of its IMF loan, 
the British state put 66 million of its shares in BP up for sale in 1977, reducing its equity in the 
company from 68 per cent to 51 per cent (Ritchie, 1995: p.101; Financial Times, 1977; Wall Street 
Journal, 1977; Egan, 1977). Share offerings took place in both Britain and America. With its 
significant and growing stake in Sohio, BP was particularly keen to increase the number of its 
American shareholders (The Economist, 1979; Dafter, 1977b). The Economist argued that a successful 
American sales campaign ‘would be foreign exchange icing on the cake only’ from the Treasury’s 
perspective (The Economist, 1977a). Originally, 25 per cent of the 66 million shares were earmarked 
for the US market. But the ‘American allocation was scaled down [to 20 per cent] after pressure 
from the left wing of the Labour party, which wanted applications from the small British 
investor… to be met in full’ (The Economist, 1977b; see also Reid, 1977). In fact, Tony Benn, 
Labour’s Energy Secretary - the main opponent in Cabinet of selling BP shares in the first place - 
‘raised a row in cabinet about’ American investors ‘being allowed to buy any’ BP shares at all (The 
Economist, 1978; see also Financial Times, 1977). 
 
																																																								
6 Tony Benn was Labour’s Secretary of State for Energy from June 1975 to May 1979. 
7 According to Berry Ritchie, Healey ‘was the most powerful voice against’ nationalising the oil industry in the 
Labour cabinet (Ritchie, 1995: p.100). 
 96 
The privatisation baton was passed from Labour to Thatcher’s Conservative administrations. In 
1979, the new government sold 5 per cent of BP’s shares, reducing the state’s stake in the company 
from 51 per cent to 46 per cent. This time: 
‘American investors (big or small) who want a slice of British Pete will have to scramble alongside British 
institutions and other big buyers. Last time [in 1977], the Americans were offered a block of shares… The 
American allocation was snapped up but since then Americans have been net sellers… In recent weeks, in 
expectation of the new offer, American interest in BP has perked up but there is little time for Americans to 
weigh up the latest offer.’ (The Economist, 1979) 
In 1981, BP itself issued shares, common shareholders in America and Canada were eligible for the 
offering, and, since the British state declined to take up its rights, its shareholding was diluted again, 
falling to 39 per cent (Muller, 1981; Ritchie, 1995: p.122). Two years after that came the 
government’s third sale of BP shares - following the 1977 and 1979 sales. This time it sold 7 per 
cent of its shareholding in the company, reducing its stake to 32 per cent (The Economist, 1983). 
 
In 1987 the sell-off was completed. The government put its remaining 32 per cent BP’s 
shareholding up for sale. The company wanted again (as in 1977) to take the opportunity of the sale 
to expand its base of American shareholders. The FT advanced two motivations for this desire. 
First, BP now owned all of Sohio and half its assets were in the United States. Second, the company 
‘will spend large capital sums in that country’ (Wilkinson, 1987; see also The Economist (1987)). But 
the interests of BP and the state were in conflict the paper contended: 
‘The Government… remains wedded to the concept of expanding share ownership in the UK and sees the 
sale of its holding in BP as an ideal way of advancing mass capitalism. Some senior politicians may also be 
reluctant to loosen historic ties with the UK’s largest company by letting it float too far from British 
ownership. To shift such a huge block of shares the Government will have to sell at a discount to give a fair 
prospect of quick profits to potential investors. Not surprisingly, ministers want as much as possible of this 
gravy to be served on to the plates of British private investors.’ (Wilkinson, 1987) 
 
The sale did not go to plan. Between the opening and closing of the offer, the world’s stock 
markets collapsed. BP’s shareholdings in America increased from just 4.5 per cent at the end of 
1986 to 6 per cent at the end of 1987, before falling back to 5 per cent at the end of 1988 (BP, 
1987b; BP, 1989). But there was a much bigger problem: 
‘The Kuwait Investment Office [KIO] bought a third of the shares on offer, giving it 10 per cent of BP’s 
equity. The British government advised the KIO that this was enough. Two days later the Kuwaiti stake was 
up to 15 per cent. Next day the total was 18 per cent.’ 
The British government told its Kuwaiti counterpart ‘that no further investment was acceptable. Two more 
days passed and the Kuwaiti stake reached 22 per cent.’ (Ritchie, 1995: p.126) 
BP strongly objected. Its concerns were threefold. First, the company was concerned that if the 
KIO disposed of its (large) stake then this could fall into the hands of a predator (Tomkins, 1987b). 
Second, BP was concerned that if Kuwait retained its shareholding, then it could influence or even 
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control the company (Ritchie, 1995: p.126; Peston & Bruce, 1993).8 The British government was 
ambivalent at first. The Kuwaiti purchases relieved ‘the Bank of England of its obligation to buy 
back unwanted BP partly-paid stock’ (Tomkins, 1987a; see also Peston & Bruce, 1993). But as 
KIO’s shareholding moved towards 15 per cent, the government became increasingly uneasy about 
Kuwait’s potential to influence or control BP (Peston & Bruce, 1993; Gowers & Wilkinson, 1988; 
Financial Times, 1988b). Returning to BP, its third concern was that its ‘prospects might be injured in 
the US and elsewhere if it were seen to be partly owned by an Arab oil producer which was part of 
the’ OPEC cartel (Wilkinson, 1988a; see also Wilkinson, 1988b; The Economist, 1988a). According to 
The Economist, the US government had already shown some discomfort at the KIO’s stake (The 
Economist, 1988b). 
 
Following strong representations from BP, the Trade and Industry Secretary referred the Kuwaiti 
stake to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (Wilkinson, 1988c). The Commission’s 
recommendations were accepted. The KIO was given 12 months to sell half its stake - to reduce it 
from 21.6 per cent to 9.9 per cent. BP’s chairman ‘welcomed the decision and said it was in line 
with the company’s proposals to the monopolies commission’ (Wilkinson, 1988d). KIO’s general 
manager ‘went to the US to hawk the stake to any oil company which might be interested in it. He 
persuaded Pennzoil, the US company, to buy it’ but BP was prepared to pay more (Peston & Bruce, 
1993). BP bought back 11.7 per cent of its own shares from KIO for £2.4 billion (cancelling them 
afterwards) (Butler, 1989). 
 
4.4 Horton’s Americanisation 
 
In 1989, Robert Horton was Deputy Chairman-Designate of BP and expected to succeed (Sir) 
Peter Walters as chairman early the next year. A series of articles in the Wall Street Journal reported 
that: ‘The heir apparent of British Petroleum Co. wants to Americanize Britain’s biggest company’ 
(Lublin, 1989). Americanisation would take several forms: 
‘BP recently started paying dividends quarterly, as many U.S. firms do, instead of twice a year, as is common 
in Britain. Mr. Horton is trying to find a way to declare dividends in dollars without upsetting institutional 
holders in Britain. He also wants to release BP results under both U.K. and U.S. accounting rules. Mr. 
Horton also has tried, unsuccessfully so far, to get BP added to the S&P 500 Index - a sore point because the 
blue-chip indicator includes Shell… BP even announced new executive [job] titles in an apparent effort to 
look more American.’ (Sullivan & Lublin, 1990) 
Clearly Americanisation was about courting US investors. Alongside Americanisation, there was an 
image-building campaign designed to raise the company’s visibility amongst American investors (as 
																																																								
8 Doubts arose as to who was really behind the investment: KIO itself or KIO as an agent for the Kuwait 
Petroleum Company (Kuwait’s national oil company)? A subsequent FT investigation concluded that the real 
buyer was the Kuwait Petroleum Company (Peston & Bruce, 1993). 
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well as consumers) (Lublin, 1989; Sullivan & Lublin, 1990).9 Why was BP wooing US investors? 
For two reasons - reasons we’ve encountered already. The company continued to want an increased 
proportion of its existing stock to be held in American hands. Again this begs the question: Why? 
The Wall Street Journal’s answer was: ‘BP wants to increase U.S. shareholdings to reflect its 
American business interests. Only about 6% of BP’s 5.3 billion shares are currently in U.S. hands, 
but 40% of its fixed assets are in the U.S.’ (Wall Street Journal, 1989). BP might also have been 
courting American investors (and this is the second reason) because it planned - or imagined the 
possibility of - raising new capital. The articles talk of BP’s plans to expand in the United States via 
the acquisition of a big American oil company. 
 
4.5 Americanisation of ownership 
 
At the end of 1984, the first time data are available, the British state still owned 32 per cent of BP 
and a total of 98 per cent of the company’s shares were in British hands. Just one per cent of BP’s 
shareholders were American (see Table 4.4).10 At the end of 1987, after the government had just 
sold its last shares in the company, around 70 per cent of BP’s shareholders were British and almost 
20 per cent of the company was owned by the state of Kuwait. American ownership had increased 
only a little, to six per cent. But Horton’s short tenure as chairman and chief executive officer 
(CEO), from 1990 to 1992, and his courtship of US investors, coincided with a sharp rise in BP’s 
American shareholders. By the end of 1992, US ownership had risen to just over 20 per cent. Two-
thirds of the company was still in British hands and Kuwait’s shareholding had been cut back to 10 
per cent. There was little further change over the years 1993-97. One event stands out. In 1997, the 
Kuwait Investment Office disposed of a three per cent stake in BP in New York and London. The 
company was still trying to expand its American shareholder base and was ‘thought to be satisfied 
that a number of key US institutions which it wanted on its share register took part in the 
placement’ of shares (Corzine, 1997a; see also Corzine, 1997b). 
 
 
  
																																																								
9 Horton and a few allies also wanted to change the company’s official name: from British Petroleum to BP. 
‘That would make the company less provincial-sounding, or so their reasoning went. Yet that idea… sounded 
adventurous to most board members, many of whom are knighted members of British society. No, they 
decided, British Petroleum would remain British Petroleum’ (Sullivan & Lublin, 1990). 
10 The data presented in this chapter on the nationality of BP’s shareholders have been taken from the 
company’s own reports. For the period 1987-2010 at least, ‘This represents BP’s best efforts to determine the 
domicile of the beneficial [i.e., underlying] owners of the group’s shares’ (BP, 1989: p.35). 
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Table 4.4 Domicile of (beneficial) shareholders 1984-97 
Per cent of total 
 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
UK 98 98 95 71 68 75 82 80 66 61 70 70 69 70 
USA 1 2 5 6 5 8 4 6 21 26 17 17 19 19 
Japan n/a n/a n/a 3 3 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
State of Kuwait n/a n/a n/a 18 22 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 9 6 
Rest of World* 1 1 1 2 2 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 
*Rest of World includes Japan and State of Kuwait in 1984-86. 
Sources:  
BP (1985, p.19), BP (1987b, p.18), BP (1989, p.35), BP (1991, p.38), BP (1996, p.19) & BP (1998b, p.23)  
 
 
4.6 Summary and conclusions 
 
As BP’s assets Americanised, it constantly feared, rightly or wrongly, US state hostility towards 
(prize) parts of the American oil industry being controlled by a company owned by non-Americans 
and, worse still, part-owned by a foreign state. To minimise the political risks to its US assets, or, to 
put it the other way around, to maximise the political protection of its US assets, BP sought to limit 
its ownership by such states (in particular, Britain and Kuwait) and to expand its ownership by 
Americans. 
 
In 1969, BP was afraid of American antagonism towards a company owned by Britons and part-
owned by the British state, not just controlling Prudhoe Bay (the largest field ever found on the 
North American continent), but also establishing its own downstream operation in America to sell 
its Alaskan oil. Instead, BP exchanged a minority stake in its (predominantly upstream) US 
interests, for a majority stake in Sohio’s (predominantly downstream) interests, in part so that 
Sohio’s American shareholders would guard BP’s US assets. Yet there was still hostility from the 
Chair of the House Judiciary Committee to BP gaining a majority stake in Sohio, on the grounds 
that it was (allegedly) controlled by the British state.  
 
In 1975, the Bank of England rescued Burmah Oil from bankruptcy by buying a 20 per cent stake 
in BP from the company. As a result, the British state owned over two-thirds of BP. BP feared 
American opposition to its being (majority) owned by a foreign state put its US assets at risk. The 
company therefore wanted the British state to sell part of its shareholding, but not to another 
government. The FT judged American public opinion hostile to BP shares ‘passing into the hands 
of an OPEC member such as Iran’ (Lewis, 1975). The state of Kuwait’s 22 per cent shareholding in 
1987 raised the same BP fears and the company (successfully) sought to restrict Kuwait’s stake. 
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BP sought to politically protect its Americanising assets by Americanising its shareholders, e.g. on 
the occasion of the 1977 and 1987 government share sales. And Robert Horton (BP’s chairman and 
CEO) sought to Americanise its shareholders by Americanising its annual reports job titles etc.. 
The need to Americanise BP’s shareholding was particularly urgent when Horton took over in 
1990. When BP co-owned its US assets with Sohio’s American stockholders, these stockholders 
guarded the assets. So when BP bought out Sohio’s shareholders in 1987, it needed to replace these 
guards with guards of its own, i.e. with American holders of BP shares. But Horton’s 
Americanisation also coincided with a new exploration and production strategy. BP began 
exploring outside its OECD stronghold, specifically in countries where ‘political change opened up 
the opportunity to get licences in a new area’ e.g. Algeria, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Kazakhstan, 
Venezuela and Vietnam (Browne, 2010: pp.60,66,91).11 Could the British state guard BP assets in 
these countries? Perhaps BP needed American shareholders at this time, not just to guard its US 
assets, but also to guard its prospective assets outside America. 
 
  
																																																								
11 The company also started to explore in places where the ‘application of technology allowed us to identify 
new prospects in an old area’, e.g. in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico and waters to the west of 
Shetland (Browne, 2010: p.60). 
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Part II. 1998-2016 
 
4.7 Takeovers of two more American companies: Amoco and ARCO 
 
In 1996, BP decided to pursue a merger or acquisition strategy. According to the company’s CEO 
at the time: 
‘BP needed both physical and technological economies of scale…  
But there was more. We believed governments of oil-producing nations would increasingly prefer to work 
with very big and influential companies… They wanted to see a big balance sheet, global political clout and 
technological prowess, and they wanted to be sure that you would be around for a long time.’ (Browne, 2010: 
pp.68-69) 
All of BP’s targets were American: ‘First choice was Mobil. Second choice was Amoco. And third 
choice was ARCO.’ (Browne, 2010: p.69) BP missed its first target but hit its second. 
 
‘In the universe of integrated oil companies,’ the Wall Street Journal noted, Amoco was ‘indisputably 
the most American’ (Bahree, Cooper & Liesman, 1998). Certainly Amoco was more American than 
BP. As a result, BP’s combination with Amoco would again Americanise the company. Table 4.5 
compares the operations of the two companies in 1997, the year before they combined. Just over 
half (52 per cent) of Amoco’s oil and natural gas production was in the USA, compared to 37 per 
cent of BP’s production. Similarly, in exploration and production, 54 per cent of Amoco’s fixed 
assets were in America compared to 39 per cent of BP’s assets.12 But the contrast between the two 
companies’ operations was most stark downstream. Whilst Amoco sold eight out of every ten 
barrels of its refined products in the US market, BP sold only three in ten barrels there. 
Unsurprisingly, Amoco’s shareholders and directors were also more American than BP’s. 
Immediately before the marriage of the two companies, almost all (96 per cent) of Amoco’s 
stockholders were domiciled in the US, compared to just one in seven of BP’s shareholders (BP 
Amoco, 1999: pp.10-11). And whereas all but two of Amoco’s thirteen board members were 
American in early 1998, all but three of BP’s fifteen-strong board were British. 
 
 
Table 4.5 BP and Amoco operations in 1997 
Per cent of total in USA Amoco  BP 
Oil & natural gas production 52 37 
Fixed assets: Property, plant & equipment* (Exploration & production only) 54 39 
Refined products sales volumes 82 30 
*Net book value 
Own calculations from: BP (1998b), BP Amoco (1999), BP Amoco (2000) & Amoco Corporation (1998) 
 
 																																																								
12 I could not construct a consistent measure of fixed assets in both upstream and downstream segments for 
the two companies unfortunately. 
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The BP-Amoco transaction was reported as a merger under UK accounting rules. But it looked 
more like a takeover of Amoco by BP than a merger. Former BP shareholders would own 60 per 
cent of the combined company; former Amoco stockholders the remaining 40 per cent. There were 
tax advantages to this all-stock transaction (Financial Times, 1988a). By paying in shares (rather than 
cash), BP also gained the American guards it wanted: nearly half of the combined group’s 
shareholders were domiciled in the US (BP Amoco, 1999: p.10).13 In initial discussions between the 
two companies, the combined group was to be two-headed. It would have been headquartered in 
both London and Chicago, and dual-listed on the London and New York stock exchanges 
(Browne, 2010: p.71; Corzine, 1998). According to the FT, ‘The dual listing structure has been seen 
as one way of overcoming any political sensitivities about an outright takeover of a leading US 
company by a foreign group’ (Corzine, 1998). There would also have been an equal number of 
directors from each company on the combined board of directors. But in the course of the 
negotiations, BP realised that it did not need to concede this dual-headed structure (Browne, 2010: 
p.71). Amoco agreed to the combined company being headquartered in London and to London 
being the primary stock exchange listing (with a secondary listing in New York). BP would have 
more directors than Amoco on the combined board and BP’s CEO would be the CEO of the 
combined group; Amoco’s Chairman and CEO would only co-chair the new company, alongside 
BP’s Chairman. Little more than eighteen months after BP Amoco was formed on the last day of 
1998, Amoco was dropped from the company’s name; it was now just BP. 
 
Just months after BP bagged Amoco, ARCO’s chairman and CEO called his counterpart at BP 
Amoco and said: ‘“We would like BP to buy ARCO”’ (Browne, 2010: p.72). Remember, ARCO 
was BP’s third American target. The companies announced the acquisition in April 1999. As BP 
Amoco’s CEO noted:  
‘ARCO and BP each had sizeable positions on the North Slope of Alaska, and one of the main attractions of 
the deal was the opportunity for synergies [i.e., cost-cutting] from combining North Slope production.’ 
(Browne, 2010: p.73) 
US regulators cleared BP’s acquisition of Amoco with few conditions, but BP Amoco’s takeover of 
ARCO ran into trouble. The state of Alaska ‘demanded that BP Amoco sell some of its North 
Slope oil assets and exploration acreage in a move to limit the company’s domination of the state’s 
oil industry after its planned merger with Arco’ (Corzine & Durgin, 1999; see also Wall Street Journal 
(1999)). The company agreed (Liesman & Wilke, 1999). But the sale of Alaskan assets agreed did 
not satisfy American anti-trust officials. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) decided to seek an 
injunction to block the takeover. Officially, the FTC’s concerns were threefold: 
																																																								
13 To be clear, I am not seeking here to explain the all-stock form of the transaction only to note its 
consequences in terms of the nationality of the combined group’s shareholders. 
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‘the merger would reduce competition in Alaska and could result in the manipulation of the price of crude oil 
sold to West Coast refiners; the combined company - the largest holder of Alaskan reserves and lease rights - 
would eliminate competition on the North Slope; and its control of storage and pipeline facilities in 
Oklahoma could enable it to manipulate the futures market.’ (Durgin, 2000; see also Wilke & Liesman, 2000) 
The view of The Economist and the FT, perhaps reflecting BP Amoco’s own view, was that broader 
forces were at work. The Economist argued: 
‘The real reason for the [FTC’s] decision may have more to do with shifting attitudes at the FTC than with 
Alaskan oil. The commission thought that the merger of Exxon and Mobil raised doubts about further 
consolidation in the oil industry. Sir John [Browne] [BP Amoco’s CEO] may be suffering because his firm is 
not American, perhaps because it had already gobbled up Amoco, perhaps, even, because oil prices are so 
high.’ (The Economist, 2000) 
The FT and BP Amoco’s CEO John Browne expressed similar views (Durgin, 2000; Browne, 2010: 
pp.73-74).14 In the end, a negotiated settlement was reached: The FTC approved the takeover 
conditional on BP Amoco selling off all of ARCO’s Alaskan assets - which it did to Phillips 
Petroleum. The acquisition was completed in April 2000. 
 
Even shorn of its Alaskan assets, ARCO was more American than BP Amoco. As a result, the 
takeover of the ARCO - just like the takeover of Amoco before it - further Americanised BP. Table 
4.6 compares the combined operations of BP and Amoco with those of ARCO outside Alaska, 
before the takeovers.15 Excluding its Alaskan operations, ARCO’s crude oil production was more 
concentrated in the US than the future BP-Amoco combine’s was. So was its natural gas 
production. And whilst half of BP-Amoco’s refined product sales volumes were in the US market, 
all of ARCO’s were.16 The takeover was again an all-stock transaction: ARCO stockholders 
received BP Amoco shares for their ARCO stock. The takeover thus almost certainly Americanised 
BP Amoco’s shareholding. For sure, the company had a greater density of American shareholders 
at the end of 2000 (after the acquisition) than at the end of 1999 (before it). But BP Amoco’s board 
was unchanged: none of ARCO’s directors joined it. 
 
 
Table 4.6 ARCO’s operations outside Alaska compared to those of BP and Amoco combined in 1998 
Per cent of total in USA ARCO excl. Alaska BP & Amoco combined 
Production: Crude oil (1) 58 41 
Production: Natural gas min. 52 max. 56 40 
Refined products sales volumes 100 49  
(1) Crude oil includes natural gas liquids and condensate. 
Own calculations from: ARCO (1999: pp.53,54) & BP (2003: pp.42,43,54) 
 
 																																																								
14 On the American side of the Atlantic, at the time the acquisition was announced, the Wall Street Journal 
argued: ‘From a political standpoint, BP Amoco may run into a nationalistic sentiment in Washington’ 
(Cooper & Liesman, 1999). 
15 The table examines operations in 1998 in the absence of information on ARCO for 1999. 
16 Or, to be precise, all but 0.3 per cent of ARCO’s sales were. 
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4.8 De-Americanisation of production, Americanisation of fixed assets and sales 
 
The acquisitions of Amoco and ARCO Americanised BP’s operations. But its operations de-
Americanised after that. The net effect of these opposing tendencies was the de-Americanisation of 
the company’s crude oil and natural gas production, but the Americanisation of its fixed assets and 
refined product sales. 
 
The Americanisation of BP’s crude oil and natural gas production peaked after it acquired Sohio 
outright in mid-1987. In 1988, over a half (52 per cent) of the company’s production was in the US. 
Thereafter its production de-Americanised (see Table 4.7). By 1997, the US share of production 
had fallen to 37 per cent. This was the result of both declining US production, from 0.9m barrels of 
oil equivalent per day (boe/d) in 1988 to under 0.6m boe/d in 1997, and rising production outside 
the US. The takeovers of Amoco in 1998 and ARCO in 2000 reversed momentarily this de-
Americanisation trend. US production more than doubled between 1997 and 2001, and the US 
share of production increased from 37 per cent to 40 per cent. But the trend continued after the 
acquisitions. By 2007, the US share of production had slumped to just 23 per cent. This was the 
result of falling US production, from 1.4m boe/d to 0.9m boe/d, combined with rising production 
outside the US, most importantly as a result of BP’s entry into Russia in 1997. Again, the de-
Americanisation trend reversed momentarily in 2008 and 2009. But it resumed after 2010 due to 
the impact of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill. This not only lowered US (especially Gulf of Mexico) 
production directly, but also indirectly as BP disproportionately sold off its hydrocarbon reserves in 
the United States to meet the costs of the spill. Since the spill, the US share of production has been 
close to 20 per cent; Russia’s share has been 30 per cent. 
 
  
 105 
Table 4.7 Crude oil and natural gas production 1990-2016 
Per cent of total 
1990-97  2000-04  2005-09  2010-14  2015-16 
USA 44 USA 36 USA 25 Russia (*) 29 Russia (*) 32 
UK 36 UK 20 Russia 24 USA 22 USA 20 
Abu Dhabi 8 T&T 8 T&T 11 T&T 12 T&T 10 
Norway 5 Russia 7 UK 9 Abu Dhabi 6 Angola 7 
Australia 2 Abu Dhabi 4 Abu Dhabi 5 Angola 5 Azerbaijan 5 
PNG 1 Egypt 3 Angola 4 UK 4 Argentina 4 
Other 4 Canada 3 Azerbaijan 4 Argentina 4 UK 3 
  Norway 3 Argentina 3 Azerbaijan 4 Egypt 3 
  Argentina 3 Egypt 3 Egypt 4 Abu Dhabi 3 
  Australia 2 Australia 3 Australia 3 Australia 3 
  Indonesia 2 Norway 1 Indonesia 2 Iraq 3 
  Venezuela 1 Canada 1 Norway 1 E. Indonesia 2 
  Columbia 1 Columbia 1 Other 5 Norway 2 
  Azerbaijan 1 Indonesia 1   Algeria 1 
  Other 6 Algeria 1   Other 2 
    Other 4 
T&T: Trinidad & Tobago 
E. Indonesian: Eastern Indonesia 
(*) TNK-BP 2010-13/Rosneft 2013-16. Some of this production is in Canada, Venezuela & Vietnam 
Own calculations from:  
1990-97 data: BP (1995) & BP (1998b)  
2000-04 data: BP (2002b) & BP (2007b)  
2005-09 data: BP (2010b) 
2010-14 data: BP (2015b)  
2015-16 data: BP (2017c) 
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The Americanisation of BP’s refined product sales peaked, not after its acquisition of all of Sohio, 
but after its acquisitions of Amoco and ARCO. The company’s sales volumes in the US market 
jumped from 30 per cent before the takeovers in 1997 to 52 per cent after them in 2000. 
Thereafter, its sales de-Americanised - but only slightly (see Table 4.8). By 2002, the US share of 
sales had dropped to 45 per cent. This was not the result of falling US sales volumes, in contrast, 
these rose slightly. Instead, it was because of a sharp rise in BP’s sales outside the US, especially in 
Europe. Six years after that, in 2008, the US sales share had fallen again to 39 per cent. The 
explanation was not rising sales volumes outside America this time, these fell slightly, but declining 
sales in the US market, from almost 2m barrels per day (b/d) in 2002 to under 1.5m b/d in 2008. 
Since 2009, the US share of sales has hovered just above 40 per cent; US sales have continued to 
fall (to just 1.1m b/d in 2016) but BP’s sales outside America have decreased at a similar rate. 
 
 
Table 4.8 Refined products sales volumes 1993-2016 
Per cent of total 
 1993-97 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2015-16 
USA  33 46 40 42 40 
Europe  49 39 43 40 42 
Rest of World  18 15 17 18 18 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 
Marketing sales: Sales to service stations, end-consumers, bulk buyers and jobbers. 
Own calculations from:   
1993-97 data: BP (1998b) 
2000-04 data: BP (2005b) 
2005-09 data: BP (2010b) 
2010-14 data: BP (2015b) 
2015-16 data: BP (2017c) 
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The share of BP’s fixed assets in America peaked twice: first after the acquisition of Sohio outright, 
at 58 per cent in 1987, and then after the acquisitions of the Amoco and ARCO, at 53 per cent in 
2001. By 2007, the US share had fallen to 43 per cent. Like BP’s production, this de-
Americanisation trend reversed between 2008 and 2010, but resumed in the wake of the Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill: the US share of BP’s fixed assets increased to 48 per cent in 2010, before falling 
back again to 43 per cent in 2016 (see Table 4.9). 
 
 
Table 4.9 Fixed assets: Property, plant and equipment: Net book value 1995-2016 
Per cent of total 
 1995-97 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2015-16 
USA  35 48 45 45 44 
Non-USA 65 52 55 55 56 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 
1995-97: Includes: Exploration & Production; Refining & Marketing. Excludes: Chemicals; Other Businesses 
& Corporate. 
2000-04: Includes: Exploration & Production; Refining & Marketing; Gas, Power & Renewables. Excludes: 
Other Businesses & Corporate. 
2005-16: Includes: Upstream; Downstream. Excludes: Other Businesses & Corporate. 
Own calculations from: 
1995-97 data: BP (1998b: p.16) 
2000-04 data: BP (2005b: p.18) 
2005-09, 2010-14 & 2015-16 data: BP (2010b: p.21), BP (2012b: p.26) & BP (2017c: p.23) 
 
 
4.9 The company’s nationality (if any) 
 
If firms have a nationality, what has been BP’s? Geoffrey Jones describes various legal tests of 
corporate nationality: 
‘In national legal systems derived from Anglo-American common law, the state of incorporation is the main 
test of nationality. However in most civil law systems in Continental Europe and other countries influenced 
by them, the test is that of the company’s “seat” (siège social) defined as the place where the central 
administration and direction is located… 
However there are also other legal tests of nationality. Lawyers have sometimes used the nationality of the 
shareholders who “control” the operation as a test… The nationality of the senior management or the 
country where most of the business is done are other possible legal tests.’ (Jones, 2005: p.8) 
The “Fortune 500” ranking of American companies includes in its survey ‘companies that are 
incorporated in the U.S. and operate in the U.S. and file financial statements with a government 
agency’ (Fortune, 2018). A company’s country allocation in the “FT 500” ranking of companies ‘is 
based on incorporation and stock market listing, along with market perception, largely following 
the FTSE guidelines’ (Dullforce, 2015). In addition to country of incorporation, stock market 
listing and perception of investors, FTSE considers: The country in which the company is 
domiciled for tax purposes; The location of its factors of production; The location of its 
headquarters; The location of company meetings; The composition of its shareholder base; The 
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membership of its board of directors; The currency denomination of the company’s shares (FTSE 
Russell, 2017). 
 
On the basis of incorporation, the company’s “seat” and primary stock market listing, BP has 
always been British. In 2016, at least, BP p.l.c. (the parent company) was also domiciled in England 
and Wales.17 Two other tests of the company’s nationality are considered. First, the domiciles of the 
(beneficial, i.e., underlying) owners of the company’s shares. Second, the nationalities of its board 
of directors. 
 
Before the acquisitions of Amoco and ARCO, UK domiciles owned the vast majority of BP’s 
shares. But the all-stock form of the buyouts Americanised BP’s shareholding; former Amoco and 
ARCO stockholders became BP Amoco shareholders. When BP Amoco was formed on the last 
day of 1998 the company’s shares were owned in equal proportions by UK and US domiciles. But 
this was a fleeting moment of equality. In the decade after the takeovers, from 2000 to 2010, the 
proportion of BP’s shares owned by British domiciles exceeded that owned by American domiciles 
(see Table 4.10). But the weight of UK domiciles on the company’s share register was decreasing 
year-on-year and, from 2011 to 2015, its stock was held in equal proportions by British and 
American domiciles. In short, on this test of nationality, BP has been basically bi-national since the 
takeovers: more British than American from 2000 to 2010, equally British and American from 2011 
to 2015, and in 2016 (the latest year of data) more American than British. 
 
 
Table 4.10 Domicile of (beneficial) shareholders 1997-2016 
Per cent of total 
 1997 1998 1999 2000-04 2005-10 2011-15 2016 
UK 70 45 58 50 43 37 31 
USA 19 46 31 36 38 38 41 
Rest of Europe n/a n/a 7 9 10 12 12 
Rest of World* 11 9 5 5 5 9 12 
Miscellaneous n/a n/a n/a n/a 4 3 4 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
*Rest of World includes Europe (excl. UK) in 1997 and 1998 
Sources: BP Financial and Operating Information. All years 1993-1997 to 2012-2016. 
 
 
  
																																																								
17 Unsurprisingly, in Fortune’s “Global 500” ranking of the world’s 500 largest companies and the “FT 500” 
ranking of companies, BP has always been British. 
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Consider next the nationalities of BP’s board of directors. Before the acquisition of Amoco, British 
nationals dominated the board (see Table 4.11). But the purchase Americanised the board. At its 
formation, the BP Amoco board consisted of thirteen former BP directors (all but two of whom 
were British) and nine former Amoco directors (all but two of whom were American). British 
directors outnumbered American ones up until the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010. But then the 
composition of the board changed: BP swapped its British chief executive for an American one 
(the first non-Briton to run BP) and the overall balance of British and American directors has been 
more-or-less even since the spill. In short, on this test of nationality - much like the test based on 
shareholders’ domiciles - BP has been basically bi-national since the takeover of Amoco: more 
British than American up until 2010, but more-or-less equally British and American thereafter. 
 
 
Table 4.11 Nationalities of board of directors 1995-2017 
 1995 2000 2005 2010 2011 2015 2017 
British  13 11 11½ 7½ 6½ 5 6½ 
American  2 8 4½ 5½ 5½ 6 5½ 
Other 1  3 3 2 3 3 2 
Total 16 22 19 15 15 14 14 
No nationality classified as ‘Other’ has more than one director in a given year 
Sources: BP Annual Reports, Companies House, Who’s Who & Who Was Who, Nexis Biographies, Personal 
communication with directors. 
 
 
It is productive to reframe the question of the company’s nationality as follows: What has been the 
relationship between BP and the British and American states?  
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4.10 Relationships between BP and the British and American states I 
 
This section examines the relationships between BP and the British and American states by 
operationalizing the structuralist mechanisms and the instrumentalist colonisation process 
discussed in Chapter 2.18 
 
4.10.1 An instrumentalist mechanism: Colonisation 
 
To repeat, the colonisation process refers to the occupation of positions in the state apparatus by 
members of the capitalist class. I investigate BP directors contemporaneously occupying positions 
within the state apparatus, BP directors having occupied positions within the state apparatus in the 
past, and ex-BP directors occupying positions within the state apparatus. The justification for 
considering non-contemporaneity is based on two assumptions. First, those who occupied a 
position within the state apparatus in the past retain residual control of the state apparatus. Second, 
ex-BP directors with positions in the state apparatus continue to act in part in the company’s 
interests. 
 
The discussion that follows is based on biographies of those holding BP directorships from 1995 to 
the present.19 The biographical information collected is incomplete (inevitably); some BP directors 
are excluded from collated biographies like “Who’s Who” and the biographies of those included are 
themselves incomplete. Appendix 1 presents biographies of all 59 company directors since 1995. 
The analysis here considers colonisation at regular snapshots between 1995 and 2015. 
 
Consider first the British state (see Table 4.12).20 In 1995, six of the sixteen directors were 
occupying state positions. BP’s chairman Lord Ashburton - John Francis Harcourt Baring - was a 
member of the House of Lords. As the Independent newspaper noted:  
																																																								
18 Recall that the colonization process is just one of Barrow’s five instrumentalist mechanisms. The other four 
are: the special-interest process, the policy-planning process, the candidate-selection process, and the 
ideological process. I focus on the colonization process because it is the only one of the five mechanisms I 
was able to investigate empirically, in both the UK and US contexts, in the time available. It is not obvious 
how to investigate the link between BP and ideological processes. Nor is it straightforward to investigate the 
link between BP and the selection of political candidates. 
19 The analysis starts in 1995 just before BP’s acquisitions of Amoco and ARCO. It is only after these 
acquisitions that the issue arises as to the relative strength of BP relationships to the British and American 
states. 
20 Like me, Naná de Graaff (2012) looks at the state affiliations of oil elites. Her data and method are identical 
to mine. In terms of method, her approach is simply to count the number of states positions of members of 
the oil elite (i.e., the directors of oil companies) (de Graaff 2012: Table 2 p.288). Her use of social network 
analysis, in this and other publications, is reserved for visualizing and analyzing more complex social 
structures (de Graaff 2012; van Apeldoorn & de Graaff 2016). 
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‘The Baring family could comfortably fill its own special supplement of Debrett’s Illustrated Peerage, 
reflecting its position within the British establishment for over two centuries.’ (Independent, 1995) 
In the 1980s, Lord Ashburton had been one of the Bank of England’s Court of Directors as well as 
Chairman of the National Economic Development Council’s Committee on Finance for Industry. 
He was not the only board member in the House of Lords. So was Patrick Wright. He was also a 
member of the Standing Security Commission. Immediately before joining the board, Lord Wright 
was Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Head of Diplomatic Service at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office. The company’s chief executive, David Simon, following in the footsteps of 
its chairman, was a member of the Court of the Bank of England. The three other directors 
occupying state positions in 1995 were members of the Advisory Committee on Business and the 
Environment, the Council for Science and Technology and the Restrictive Practices Court. In 
addition to these six contemporaneous colonisations, two other board members had occupied 
positions in the state apparatus in the past: Sir James Glover had been Commander-in-Chief United 
Kingdom Land Forces and Sir Patrick Sheehy (British American Tobacco’s chairman) had led the 
Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards. 
 
Between the years 1995 and 2000, the number of contemporaneous colonisations fell from six to 
four directors and the number of board members either currently occupying or having previously 
occupied state positions dropped from eight to five. Yet the closeness of BP to Tony Blair’s Labour 
administration was such that the company was dubbed “Blair Petroleum”. The most striking link 
was David Simon’s move from BP chairman to Minister of State in the Treasury and Department 
of Trade and Industry - alongside a seat in the Lords - within days of Labour’s 1997 election 
victory. But the ties between BP and the government went beyond the company’s boardroom. A 
2001 FT article titled “How BP oils the working of British Politics” documented other links. Anji 
Hunter quit her role as Blair’s “gatekeeper” (director of government relations) to become BP’s 
director of communications. 
‘Nick Butler, the [BP] group vice-president, is a close friend of Peter Mandelson and Jonathan Powell, Mr 
Blair’s chief of staff, and a long-standing Labour trusty briefly tipped to head the prime minister’s new 
delivery unit. Another link is John Kingman, a former Treasury official, who worked for BP... before 
returning to the Treasury. Jill Rutter, one of his predecessors as the chancellor’s press secretary, travelled the 
other way, moving to BP after falling out with [chancellor] Mr Brown. Charlie Leadbeater, a prime ministerial 
policy adviser... has worked as a consultant to Lord Browne, BP’s chief executive. But BP’s links are not only 
Labour. David Lidington, a Conservative Treasury spokesman worked in the company press office before 
becoming a special Home Office advisor to Lord Hurd.’ (Shrimsley, 2001)21 
  
																																																								
21 In the 1980s, Nick Butler served ‘as an adviser to Neil Kinnock, the former Labour leader. He also helped 
to found the British American Project for the Successor Generation, which aimed to counter traditional 
Labour leftwing suspicion of the US on foreign policy and security issues’ (Blitz, 2006). From 2009 to 2010, 
he worked for Labour Prime Minister Gordon Brown as Senior Policy Adviser. 
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Table 4.12 BP-British state colonisations 
1995 
Current directors-Current state positions (6/16) 
Lord Ashburton (John Francis Harcourt Baring): Member, House of Lords 
David Simon: Member, Court of Directors, Bank of England 
Stephen Ahearne: Member, Restrictive Practices Court 
Rodney Chase: Member, Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment 
Sir Robin Nicholson: Member, Council for Science and Technology 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Member, House of Lords; Member, Standing Security Commission, Cabinet Office 
Current directors-Past state positions (5/16) 
Lord Ashburton: Member, Court of Directors, Bank of England; Chairman, Committee on Finance for Industry, 
National Economic Development Council 
Sir James Glover: Commander-in-Chief, UK Land Forces 
Sir Robin Nicholson: Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office 
Sir Patrick Sheehy: Chairman, Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Head of Diplomatic Service, FCO 
2000 
Current directors-Current state positions (4/22) 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Member, House of Lords; Member, Standing Security Commission, Cabinet Office 
Bryan Sanderson: Member, Company Law Review Steering Group, Department of Trade and Industry; Chairman, 
Learning and Skills Council 
Rodney Chase: Member, Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment 
Sir Robin Nicholson: Member, Council for Science and Technology 
Current directors-Past state positions (3/22) 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Head of Diplomatic Service, FCO 
John Buchanan: Central Policy Review Staff, Cabinet Office 
Sir Robin Nicholson: Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office 
Past directors-Current state positions (1/10) 
Lord Simon of Highbury: Member, House of Lords; Advisor, Cabinet Office 
2005 
Current directors-Current state positions (1/19) 
Lord Browne of Madingley: Member, House of Lords 
Current directors-Past state positions (3/19) 
Byron Grote: Vice-chairman, Public Services Productivity Panel; Chairman, Chemicals and Innovation Growth Team 
Dame DeAnne (Shirley) Julius: Member, Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England; Member, Court of Directors, 
Bank of England; Chairman, Banking Code Review Group 
Sir Robin Nicholson: Member, Council for Science and Technology; Chief Scientific Adviser, Cabinet Office 
Past directors-Current state positions (2/22) 
Lord Simon of Highbury: Member, House of Lords 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Member, House of Lords; Chairman, House of Lords Sub-Committee on Home Affairs; 
Member, EU Select Committee 
2010 
Current directors-Current state positions (1/15) 
Douglas Flint: Member, Consultative Committee of the Large Business Advisory Board, HM Revenue & Customs; 
Member, Business Government Forum on Tax and Globalisation 
Current directors-Past state positions (2/15) 
Dame DeAnne (Shirley) Julius: Member, Monetary Policy Committee, Bank of England; Member, Court of Directors, 
Bank of England; Chairman, Banking Code Review Group; Chairman, Public Services Industry Review, Department for 
Business Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
Byron Grote: Vice-chairman, Public Services Productivity Panel; Chairman, Chemicals and Innovation Growth Team 
Past directors-Current state positions (4/33) 
Lord Simon of Highbury: Member, House of Lords 
Lord Browne of Madingley: Member, House of Lords; Lead Non-Executive Director, Cabinet Office; Lead Non-
Executive Board Member, UK Government; Chairman, Independent Review of Higher Education Funding 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Member, House of Lords; Member, House of Lords Sub-Committee on Law and Institutions 
Sir Richard (Lake) Olver: UK Business Ambassador; Member, Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Group 
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Table 4.12 BP-British state colonisations (continued) 
 
2015 
Current directors-Current state positions (3/14) 
Ian Davis: Lead Non-Executive Board Member, Cabinet Office 
Dame Ann Dowling: Non-executive director, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills; Member, Prime Minister’s 
Council for Science and Technology 
Brian Gilvary: External advisor to Director General, HM Treasury Financial Management Review Board 
Current directors-Past state positions (1/14) 
Dame Ann Dowling: Member, Defence and Aerospace Technology Foresight Panel; Non-executive Director, Defence 
Research Agency, Ministry of Defence; Member, Scientific Advisory Board, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, 
Ministry of Defence; Member, Defence Science Advisory Council, Ministry of Defence 
Past directors-Current state positions (6/42) 
Lord Simon of Highbury: Member, House of Lords 
Lord Browne of Madingley: Member, House of Lords 
Lord Wright of Richmond: Member, House of Lords 
Sir Richard (Lake) Olver: UK Business Ambassador; Member, Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Group 
John Manzoni: Chief Executive, Civil Service; Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office 
Douglas Flint: Member, Financial Services Trade and Investment Board, HM Treasury; UK Business Ambassador 
Notes: FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
 
 
 
The company’s CEO from 1995 to 2007, John Browne, ‘developed personal ties and regular 
exchanges of ideas between BP and the government’ (Guha & McNulty, 2002). Browne himself 
visited Blair regularly and ‘Senior executives are encouraged to take time out to sit on government 
task forces’ (Guha & McNulty, 2002). Lower down the company, ‘Browne has encouraged BP 
managers to make use of secondment programmes to ministries, mostly the Department of Trade 
and Industry, but also the Foreign Office and Treasury’ (Guha & McNulty, 2002). The company’s 
CEO ‘acknowledges that the geopolitical complexity of the oil industry makes it important for BP 
to get political support wherever it can. “We’ve always got to be in a position to turn to the 
government in power,” he says’ (Guha & McNulty, 2002). 
 
BP’s ties with the British government remained close, but the number of colonisations fell (again) 
in the 2000s. Only one of nineteen board members in 2005 occupied a position within the state 
apparatus - Browne had joined the House of Lords in 2001 - and just three others had held state 
positions in the past. By 2010, there was one tie fewer still between BP’s boardroom and the British 
state. In part, this reduction in the number of colonisations since 1995 was a product of the drop in 
the number of British board members, since only BP’s British directors occupied positions within 
the state apparatus. 
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BP’s ties to the British government then strengthened between 2010 and 2015. Three of the 
fourteen board members were occupying state positions in 2015. Ian Davis replaced Lord Browne 
as the Cabinet Office’s Lead Non-Executive Director. Dame Ann Dowling was a member of the 
Prime Minister’s Council for Science and Technology and Non-Executive Director at the 
Department for Business Innovation and Skills. In the 1990s, she had held positions within the 
Ministry of Defence. And Brian Gilvary was external advisor to the Treasury’s Director General 
(Spending and Finance) on its Financial Management Review Board. In addition, six ex-directors, 
counting only those on the board since 1995, occupied state positions in 2015. Wright, Simon and 
Browne sat in the House of Lords. Alongside Davis in the Cabinet Office was ex-director John 
Manzoni. He was its Permanent Secretary as well as Chief Executive of the Civil Service. Two ex-
directors, Douglas Flint (HSBC’s Chairman) and Sir Richard Olver were UK Business 
Ambassadors. Flint was also on H.M. Treasury’s Financial Services Trade and Investment Board. 
Olver was a member of the Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Group. A notable addition to BP’s 
board in 2015 was Sir John Sawers. Sawers had been a diplomat most of his career with ‘periods as 
ambassador to the UN, Britain’s special representative in Iraq following the 2003 US-led invasion, 
and as Tony Blair’s foreign policy adviser’ but had just stepped down as head of the UK’s foreign 
secret service MI6 (Adams & Jones, 2015). According to the FT, BP hoped to use his experience in 
the Middle East to guide its return to Iran (Adams & Jones, 2015). 
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Ties of colonisation between BP’s board of directors and the American state have been extremely 
limited. At each of the five snapshots taken between 1995 and 2015, the typical pattern of 
colonisations was as follows: no directors or ex-directors occupied positions in the state apparatus 
and just a single director had occupied such a position in the past (see Table 4.13). There were two 
exceptions to this. In 2005, two directors occupied state positions: Walter Massey was on the 
President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology and Erroll Davis Jr. was on the Federal 
Reserve Bank of Chicago’s Advisory Board. The other exception was in 2015 when two directors - 
not just one - had occupied state positions in the past: Admiral Frank Bowman had been Chief of 
naval personnel (amongst other state positions) and Alan Boeckmann had been a member of the 
Board of the National Petroleum Council. 
 
 
Table 4.13 BP-American state colonisations 
1995 
Current directors-Past state positions (1/16) 
Karen Horn: President, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
2000 
Current directors-Past state positions (1/22) 
Walter Massey: Member, National Science Board; Member, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and  
Technology; Director, National Science Foundation; Chair, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board 
2005 
Current directors-Current state positions (2/19) 
Erroll Davis Jr.: Member, Advisory board, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
Walter Massey: Member, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology 
Current directors-Past state positions (1/19) 
Walter Massey: Member, National Science Board; Director, National Science Foundation; Chair, Secretary of Energy  
Advisory Board 
2010 
Current directors-Past state positions (1/15) 
Erroll Davis Jr.: Member, Advisory board, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
2015 
Current directors-Past state positions (2/14) 
Admiral Frank Bowman: Director of political-military affairs, Joint staff; Chief of naval personnel; Director, Naval 
nuclear propulsion programme, Department of Navy and Department of Energy 
Alan Boeckmann: Member, Board of the National Petroleum Council 
 
 
4.10.2 Structural mechanisms 
 
Consider next the structural mechanisms. Recall that the argument here is that the state is capitalist 
since its capacity to finance itself through taxation or borrowing and its legitimacy are dependent on 
the domestic economy. Hence a state is dependent on BP to the extent that the company 
contributes to the national economy. To operationalize these mechanisms, information is needed 
on BP’s operations disaggregated by country. It is possible to examine the (direct) impact of the 
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company’s domestic operations on the domestic economies of the two countries in terms of crude 
oil and natural gas production, gross fixed capital formation and employment, using BP’s annual 
reports.21 But there is insufficient information in these reports to assess the impact of BP’s global 
operations on the domestic economies of the two countries. For example, it is not possible to 
consider the impact of those operations on the balance of payments positions of the two 
countries.22 This is a limitation.  
 
Consider first the impact of BP’s domestic operations on the two economies starting with its crude 
oil and natural gas production (see Table 4.14). In the first half of the 1980s, BP’s share of UK oil 
production was more than 5 times its share of US production. But this gap narrowed as the 
company’s share of UK production decreased and its share of US production increased, thanks to 
its acquisitions of the whole of Sohio and of Amoco and ARCO. Since 2000, BP’s share of UK oil 
and gas production has been more-or-less double its share of US production. BP produced 30 per 
cent of the UK’s oil in 1980. Ten years on, its share of the country’s oil and gas production had 
fallen to 20 per cent. The company’s share continued to fall in the 1990s, but rose to close to 20 per 
cent again in 2000, following the takeovers of Amoco and ARCO. After that, BP’s share of UK 
production slipped to just under 10 per cent in 2010 and then to 7 per cent in 2016. When BP 
owned close to half of Sohio in the first half of the 1980s, it produced just 3-4 per cent of 
America’s oil. After it acquired all of Sohio in 1987, but before its buyout of Amoco in 1998, its 
share of the country’s production doubled to 7-9 per cent. When the company bought Amoco and 
ARCO, its share of US oil and gas production roughly doubled from 3-5 per cent in the first part of 
the 1990s to 6-8 per cent in the 2000s. But in the wake of the Gulf of Mexico oil spill in 2010, BP’s 
share of US production halved to 3-4 per cent. 
 
 
Table 4.14 Contribution of BP to crude oil and natural gas production in UK and US 
Per cent 
Oil 1980-86 1988-89 1990-97 2000-04 2005-09 2010-14 2015-16 
UK 21 21 16 
USA 4 9 7 
Oil & natural gas 
UK   16 17 12 8 7 
USA   4 8 6 4 3 
Own calculations from: BP (1985), BP (1990), BP (1995), BP (1998b), BP (2002b), BP (2007b), BP (2010b), 
BP (2015b), BP (2016b), BP (2017b) & BP (2017c) 
 
																																																								
21 It is not possible to examine BP’s tax payments to the British and American states. 
22 Obviously the balance of payments constrains Britain’s political economy much more than it constrains 
America’s given the dollar’s role. 
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Consider next the impact of BP’s domestic operations on gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) in 
the two countries.23 Averaging over the years 1983-1997 (ignoring some ups and downs), BP 
accounted for 1/100th of UK GFCF but just 1/1000th of US GFCF (see Table 4.15). Again this gap 
narrowed after the takeovers of Amoco and ARCO. BP’s share of UK GFCF more than halved to 
4/1000th in 2001-2007, whilst its share of US GFCF doubled to 2/1000th. The company ceased 
publishing this information for the UK in 2007. In the US, BP’s share of GFCF doubled again to 
4/1000th in 2008-09. But by 2014, it had fallen back to 2/1000th. Information is available on the 
UK in this year: BP’s share of UK GFCF was 4/1000th. As in the period 2001-2007 then, the 
company was twice as important to GFCF in Britain than in America.  
 
 
Table 4.15 Contribution of BP’s domestic operations to GFCF and employment in UK and US 
Per cent 
  1983-86 1988-92 1993-97 2001-04 2005-07 2008-09 2010-13 2014 2015 
GFCF (1) 
UK 0.86 1.44 0.69 0.51 0.33   0.44  
USA 0.14 0.14 0.08 0.24 0.21 0.45 0.33 0.21 0.15 
Employment (2) 
UK 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.06   0.06  
USA 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 
(1) 1983-97: BP capital expenditure & acquisitions/UK or US gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) 
 2001-15: BP capital expenditure, acquisitions & disposals/UK or US gross fixed capital formation 
(2) BP employee numbers/UK or US total employment 
Own calculations from: BP (1987b), BP (1988b), BP (1993), BP (1998b), BP (2006), BP (2008b), BP 
(2013b), BP (2016c), BP (2017c), Oxford Economics (2015), ILO (2018) & World Bank (2018) 
 
 
Unsurprisingly, BP contributed much less to employment than to GFCF. At the end of the 1980s, 
BP swallowed up not only Sohio but also Britoil. Britoil was the UK’s largest independent oil 
company having been formed out of the old British National Oil Corporation. After the 
acquisitions, BP had 30,000 employees in the UK and 45,000 in the US. This was only 12 in every 
10,000 UK jobs and 4 in every 10,000 US jobs. In both countries, job losses followed the 
acquisitions. BP’s UK workforce was cut in half to 16,000 employees by 1996. In the US, seven out 
of ten jobs were lost, cutting the number of workers to 13,000 in 1997. The company was now 
creating just 7 in every 10,000 jobs in the UK, but this was seven times its contribution to US 
employment. Whilst BP’s UK workforce has changed little since then, its US workforce again 
expanded with the takeovers of Amoco and ARCO, and then contracted with the layoffs that 
followed. In 2001, before the cuts, BP employed 43,000 US workers, 3 in every 10,000 workers in 
the country, half the company’s share of UK employment. But by 2014, it hired just 19,000 US 
																																																								
23 GFCF ‘refers to the net increase in physical assets (investment minus disposals) within the measurement 
period. It does not account for the consumption (depreciation) of fixed capital, and also does not include 
land purchases’ (Financial Times, 2018). 
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workers, the same number as in the UK. At this point, BP contributed five times more to Britain’s 
than to America’s workforce. 
 
In short, since the takeovers of Amoco in 1998 and ARCO in 2000, BP’s domestic operations have 
been roughly twice as important to the UK than to the US economy in terms of oil and gas 
production and gross fixed capital formation, and at least twice as important in terms of 
employment. According to the structuralist mechanisms, a national state is dependent on BP to the 
extent that the company contributes to the national economy. This analysis suggests that the UK 
state is more dependent on BP than the US state. 
 
4.11 Relationships between BP and the British and American states II 
What has been considered thus far is the relationships between BP and the British and American 
states in terms of ties of colonisation and the dependence of both states on the company’s 
operations. What is examined next is whether or not BP has gained concrete advantages and 
protections in the international arena from these states. The focus is on answering two 
complementary comparative questions. First, has BP received more support from the British than 
the American state? Second, has ExxonMobil (America’s largest oil company) received more 
support than BP from the American state? The expectation is that the answer to both questions is 
“yes” given, on the one hand, the greater ties and dependencies between BP and the British as 
opposed to American state, and, on the other, an assumption of greater ties and dependencies 
between the American state and ExxonMobil in comparison to BP.24 The focus is on the period 
after the Amoco and ARCO acquisitions, but before the Gulf of Mexico oil spill - which damaged 
BP’s relations with the American state. 
 
BP’s CEO felt that the company’s ‘power and reach’ increased after the acquisition of Amoco 
(Browne, 2010: p.141). Within a year of the takeover, the US state did assist BP in its battle for 
Sidanco, a battle to protect its Russian assets from TNK, an “oligarch”-controlled oil company, by 
threatening to withdraw TNK’s loan from the Export-Import Bank of the United States (the 
country’s official export credit agency).25 But this seems to be the only episode in the public domain 
in which the American state supported BP in the period under consideration. As we shall see, 
American state support for ExxonMobil was much more substantial than this; as was British state 
support for BP. In short, the answer to both questions is indeed “yes”.   																																																								
24 This comparative method is needed to distinguish, on the one hand, the relative “closeness” of BP to the 
British and American states, and, on the other, the relative propensity of the two states, in general, to 
intervene in the international arena. For example, a finding that the American state intervened to support BP 
more than the British state could be because the American state is more interventionist than the British state 
(e.g., because more powerful), rather than because BP is closer to the American than the British state. 
25 See section 5.3.2, The battle for Sidanco. 
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4.11.1 ExxonMobil and the American state 
 
In Russia itself, American state assistance for ExxonMobil was much more considerable than its 
assistance to BP in its battle for Sidanco.26 According to Steve Coll, ‘There was no other place on 
Earth where the [American] corporation enjoyed such full and explicit partnership with the White 
House in the pursuit of such large oil holdings’ than Russia (Coll, 2012: p.258). The first Bush Jr. 
administration was pushing for a strategic oil partnership with Russia and, more specifically, was 
aiming to deepen commercial ties between US oil companies and Russia (Coll, 2012: pp.252-253). 
While the administration ‘encouraged the Russian government to deal directly with the American 
corporations, particularly ExxonMobil and Chevron’ (America’s two largest global hydrocarbon 
producers and the heirs to the American members of the “Seven Sisters”), ExxonMobil itself 
thought it was better off dealing with things in Russia on its own (Coll, 2012: p.255). Occasionally, 
Lee Raymond, ExxonMobil’s boss, might turn to his old friend Vice-President Cheney or ‘another 
very senior official’ to talk to the Russians ‘about a specific tax or policy stalemate in Moscow. 
Otherwise, the corporation negotiated in private’ (Coll, 2012: p.255). Raymond was in negotiations 
with Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the owner of Yukos, about taking a majority stake in what was then 
Russia’s largest oil company. The American ambassador in Russia, Vice-President Cheney and 
others in the Bush Jr. administration realised that Yukos ‘might be in a position to make a 
transformational deal’ (Coll, 2012: p.267). But negotiations ended when Khodorkovsky was 
arrested in 2003. When a Russian commission denied certain licences to ExxonMobil and Chevron 
the next year, the administration was still fighting on their behalf - the US Secretary of State met his 
Russian counterpart to protest - ‘but its campaign looked increasingly like a rearguard action, 
fought while in retreat’ (Coll, 2012: pp.276-277). 
 
It appeared to ExxonMobil in 2001 that G.A.M. - Gerakan Aceh Movement or “Free Aceh 
Movement” - ‘had changed its targeting policy to go after the company directly’ (Coll, 2012: p.99). 
As a result, the corporation decided to shut down its operations in Aceh. The Bush Jr. 
administration then found itself under pressure, both from ExxonMobil to protect its operations, 
and from the Indonesian government to address the corporation’s unwillingness to operate. In 
response, it sought ‘to restore ExxonMobil’s Aceh operations, and by doing so relieve pressure on 
Indonesia’s… president’ (Coll, 2012: p.101). As a means to this end, the American state threatened 
G.A.M.: attacks on ExxonMobil it told the movement ‘“risked turning the U.S. into G.A.M.’s 
enemy”’ (Coll, 2012: p.117). 
 
																																																								
26 This section relies on Steve Coll’s (2012) Private Empire: ExxonMobil and American Power. 
 120 
ExxonMobil also turned to the American state for protection in Nigeria. Its supply boats were 
under attack from M.E.N.D. - Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta - and similar 
groups. As the attacks worsened, the oil companies kept telling the State Department that they 
wanted the C.I.A. and the navy to solve the problem (Coll, 2012: p.470). The US state’s response 
was ‘a program of periodic U.S. Navy patrols in the Gulf of Guinea, coupled with exercises and 
shore visits, that were designed to build up the Nigerian navy’ and other regional navies alongside 
other measures to build local capacity (Coll, 2012: p.472). 
 
4.11.2 BP and the British state 
 
In short, in the period under consideration, American state support for ExxonMobil in the 
international arena was much more significant than its support for BP - the only example of this, in 
the public domain, being its assistance to the company in the battle for Sidanco. But BP received 
much more assistance from the British state. This is clear from a consideration of the company’s 
operations in Russia, Iraq and Libya. 
 
In its operations in Russia, the British state supported the company more consistently than the 
American state did. In 1997, when BP and Russian company Sidanco were considering a joint bid 
for Rosneft, Russia’s last big state-owned oil company, Prime Minister Blair was expected to seek 
assurances on the prospective investment during his visit to Moscow. Two years later, BP was 
battling to protect its investment in Sidanco from TNK, another Russian oil company. While the 
American state was the company’s most important weapon against TNK, Blair also dispatched a 
warning to the Kremlin on its behalf. Afterwards, BP and TNK’s owners AAR combined assets to 
form TNK-BP. One of TNK-BP’s main assets was the Kovykta gas field. When Russian authorities 
threatened to suspend its licence for the field in 2006-2007, Blair was expected to raise the issue 
with President Putin. In 2008, AAR attacked BP. The FT concluded that the attack ‘appears to have 
been Kremlin-facilitated’ and Prime Minister Gordon Brown took up the case with President 
Dmitry Medvedev (Financial Times, 2008b). 
 
Consider next Iraq.27 BP and Shell had meetings with the UK government about Iraq before the 
2003 invasion. In a meeting in October 2002, Shell’s Senior Vice President for New Business in the 
Middle East, Tony Wildig, told Edward Chaplin, the Foreign Office’s Middle East director, that 
both his company and BP were concerned by stories that the Russians, French and Chinese “would 																																																								
27 This is not the place for an exhaustive account of the issue of oil in the invasion and occupation of Iraq. 
An enlightening account of this question with regards to BP, Shell and the British state can be found in Greg 
Muttitt’s (2012) Fuel on the Fire. 
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sell their support for US policy for a guarantee that their deals with the regime would be honoured 
after Iraq’s liberation” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2002). Chaplin replied that the UK 
government was “seized of the issue” and stressed that “the commercial element of a post Saddam 
strategy” was part of its contingency planning (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2002). He added 
that the government was “determined to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a post 
Saddam Iraq” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2002). BP, Shell and BG (a British oil and gas 
company) repeated their concern in a meeting with the Minister of Trade, Baroness Symons, later 
the same month. In response, “Baroness Symons agreed that it would be difficult to justify British 
companies losing out in Iraq in that way if the UK had itself been a conspicuous supporter of the 
US government throughout the crisis” and told the companies that the UK government would 
address their concerns with the US government (Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, 
2002). 
 
BP also had a series of meetings on the subject of Iraq with the American State Department and 
the Department of Defense before the invasion. Discussing its dealings with the US government, 
the company told Baroness Symons in December 2002 that “Some consideration seemed to be 
being given to looking to a number of key oil companies, BP included, to sort out any initial 
problems with oil installations” (Trade Partners UK, 2002). The company stated that the 
Department of Defense appeared to be “looking to largely involve non-US oil companies” in this 
regard perhaps “to avoid any political fall-out in the US from allegations that the issue with Iraq 
was all about oil in the first place” but that “American companies would follow soon thereafter” 
(Trade Partners UK, 2002). BP was concerned that being involved in this way “might partially 
exclude them from future work in Iraq” (Trade Partners UK, 2002). Nevertheless, on the eve of the 
invasion, the company’s CEO told the Foreign Office’s Permanent Under-Secretary of State that 
“BP had been asked to help with the renovation of Iraq’s oil facilities after military action” and 
“had a team ready to go” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2003a). 
 
A few months after the invasion in May 2003, a draft report titled “Iraqi Oil and British Interests” 
circulated in the Foreign Office. The opening section of the document, titled “Our interest”, noted 
that “Iraq will (or should) make a significant contribution to Britain’s energy security in the medium 
and longer term” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2003b). The next section posed three 
questions: 
(i) Iraq’s future: how do we ensure that the best outcomes are achieved for Iraq and its people, with 
decisions being taken appropriately on their behalf where necessary? 
(ii) Energy security: what courses of action maximise Britain’s long-term energy security? 
(iii) Commercial: how do we maximise benefit to British industry, and thus British employment/economy? 
(Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2003b, emphasis in original) 
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By September 2004, a “UK Energy Strategy for Iraq” had been developed. According to Greg 
Muttitt, this was the country’s ‘first formally articulated strategy on the subject’ (Muttitt, 2012: 
p.117). The strategy began as follows: 
1.  Our mutually enforcing objectives are: 
i)  The development of an efficient, outward-looking and transparent oil and energy industry, capable of 
delivering both sustainable export revenues to meet Iraq’s development needs and meeting domestic 
needs for energy in an efficient, equitable and secure manner. 
ii) Iraq’s energy sector development to be complemented by the increasing involvement of UK firms, 
leading to sustained investment over the next 5 to 10 years and substantial business for the UK. 
(Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2004) 
These were the first and third questions asked in the May 2003 report. The second question was a 
key consideration of the strategy: “Iraq is extremely important to the UK’s objectives on energy 
security” (Foreign & Commonwealth Office, 2004). 
 
Around the same time as the strategy was being drafted, BP submitted a bid to the Iraqi Oil 
Ministry to conduct a study of the Rumaila field (the second largest in the world). The company 
told Edward Chaplin, now Britain’s ambassador to Iraq, that it considered the bid was “very 
important” and asked him “to nudge our proposal forward with” Iraq’s Oil Minister and Prime 
Minister (BP, 2004b). Four days later, Chaplin met the Oil Minister and lobbied for BP’s bid. In 
January 2005, it was announced that the company had won the tender for the Rumaila study 
(Muttitt, 2012: pp.129-130).28 In June 2009, the Oil Ministry held an auction for 20-year contracts 
to manage two gasfields and six of the country’s largest oilfields. Muttitt describes the outcome: 
‘The Rumaila field - BP’s target - was first on the block. The company had been providing technical advice on 
the field since 2005 and now knew it well. Only an ExxonMobil-led consortium was bullish enough to put in 
a challenge. But then came a surprise: neither company’s bid was accepted by the Oil Ministry. The ministry 
would pay remuneration - the profits companies would receive - of no more than $2 per barrel, well below 
BP’s bid of $3.99 - in partnership with the China National Petroleum Corporation [CNPC] - and 
ExxonMobil’s $4.80. The minister asked the companies if they would accept the $2 per barrel offer…: 
ExxonMobil said no, BP said yes.’ (Muttitt, 2012: p.301) 
BP/CNPC was willing to accept a remuneration fee half its bid because it planned to bargain hard 
on the terms of the actual contract. In the months after the auction, the companies secretly 
renegotiated the contract with the Iraqi government. In comparison to the model contract on 
which the auction was based, the terms of the actual contract changed significantly. According to 
Muttitt, ‘The effect of these changes is to transfer the most significant risks from BP/CNPC to the 
Iraqi government, making the contracts considerably more attractive to the companies’ (Muttitt, 
2011).29 
 
																																																								
28 See Muttitt (2012, pp.129-130) for a fuller account of the exchange between BP and the British ambassador 
at this time. 
29 In 2014, the technical service contract for Rumaila was extended from 20 to 25 years (to 2034) (BP, 2018). 
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In Libya, the British state more-or-less created BP’s Exploration and Production Sharing 
Agreement (EPSA). The company’s ex-CEO concurs: 
‘Rebuilding the relationship with Qadhafi was a rare modern example of where political diplomacy opened up 
trade. Without Tony Blair’s intervention, I doubt BP would ever have been as significant a player as it turned 
out to be in the re-opening of the oil and gas industry of Libya.’ (Browne, 2010: p.129) 
The climax of the Prime Minister’s intervention was the so-called “deal in the desert”. After the 
United Nations Security Council lifted sanctions against Libya, imposed after the Lockerbie 
bombing, ‘Blair travelled to Libya in 2004 to meet Muammar Gaddafi and to negotiate agreements 
on trade and on oil exploration’ (House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016: p.5). These 
negotiations included BP’s EPSA with the Libyan National Oil Company (House of Commons 
Foreign Affairs Committee, 2016: p.5). Blair said that ‘“the prize for us”’ from bringing Libya ‘“in 
from the cold”’ was ‘“enormous”’ and included ‘the benefits to UK companies such as BP’ 
(McDermott, 2015). Writing in 2010, Gideon Rachman, the chief foreign affairs columnist for the 
Financial Times, argued that energy was at the heart of the relationship between Britain and Libya: 
‘It is true that oil is not the only interest Britain has at stake in Libya. But the search for more secure and 
diverse energy supplies is increasingly important to UK foreign policy. Britain’s North Sea reserves are 
running down and the country is worrying about a looming energy crisis. Libya looks like a promising 
possible supplier of both oil and natural gas that is unusually open to foreign oil companies. BP and Royal 
Dutch Shell are the second and third biggest companies on the London stock exchange, and they have both 
signed exploration deals in Libya.’ (Rachman, 2009) 
In fact, a surge in UK imports of Libyan oil followed the 2004 deal and Libya became ‘one of 
Britain’s most important sources of oil imports’ (Crooks, 2009). Another FT article argued that the 
other Libyan prize for British business, in addition to the profits from oil and gas, was the country’s 
sovereign wealth fund, in other words its revenues from oil and gas (Blitz & Saigol, 2011). 
 
BP’s CEO Browne only met Gaddafi ‘to agree some broad principles of’ BP’s re-entry into Libya 
one year after Blair’s 2004 deal (Browne, 2010: p.128). Browne was accompanied by Mark Allen. 
Allen was a colonisation: a ‘former senior counterterrorism official in Britain’s MI6 intelligence 
service’ he ‘played a prominent role as a chief U.K. negotiator in talks that led to Libya’s 
renunciation of its nuclear weapons program in 2003’ and joined BP as a special advisor in 2005 
(Swartz & MacDonald, 2009). In addition to Allen, the company hired ‘other former British 
government experts to help talks with Libya’ (Mufson, 2010). 
 
The British state not only conceived BP’s Libyan EPSA but was also its midwife. Central to the 
story here is Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, the Libyan convicted of the Lockerbie bombing. In 2007, Blair 
visited Libya, simultaneously signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the Libyan state 
‘which included a commitment to negotiate a Prisoner Transfer Agreement’ (PTA) and witnessing 
the signing of BP’s EPSA (Cabinet Office, 2011: pp.4-5). A key issue in the PTA negotiations was 
whether or not it would exclude al-Megrahi. According to a Cabinet Office review of al-Megrahi’s 
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later release, it became clear in late 2007 that the Libyan government ‘now explicitly linked removal 
of Mr Megrahi’s exclusion clause in the PTA to their ratification of BP’s’ EPSA - as well as other 
contracts. At this juncture, the company lobbied the British government on the PTA. A 
spokesperson for BP admitted that  
‘it told the British government that “we were concerned about the slow progress that was being made in 
concluding a Prisoner Transfer Agreement with Libya. We were aware that this could have a negative impact 
on UK commercial interests, including the ratification by the Libyan Government of BP’s exploration 
agreement.”’ (Wall Street Journal, 2010)30 
 
In this context, the UK government reversed its position and decided not to exclude al-Megrahi 
from the PTA. When asked in an interview whether trade and BP had been factors in this decision, 
the Justice Secretary Jack Straw replied: 
‘“Yes, [it was] a very big part of that. I’m unapologetic about that... Libya was a rogue state. We wanted to 
bring it back into the fold. And yes, that included trade because trade is an essential part of it and 
subsequently there was the BP deal.”’ (Riddell, Johnson & Porter, 2009) 
Subsequently, Straw said: 
“Libya has oil and so do other countries whose regimes we would not voluntarily choose… The world needs 
energy and the simple truth is that if we had been more fastidious in our approach, then other countries - 
notably China - would have moved in to take our place.” (Blitz & Saigol, 2011) 
As soon as the British government agreed not to exclude al-Megrahi from the draft PTA, Libya 
ratified the EPSA with BP (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.7; Bolger & Mahtani, 2008). Then, in 
September 2008, al-Megrahi was diagnosed with terminal cancer. At this point, the Libyan 
government ‘made clear that they would regard his death in Scottish custody as a death sentence 
and by actual and implicit threats made of severe ramifications for UK interests if Mr Megrahi were 
to die in prison in Scotland’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.14). As a result, Ministers now agreed that 
concluding swiftly the PTA negotiations ‘was of pressing interest to the UK’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: 
p.9).31 In addition, the UK government decided to ‘do all it could, whilst respecting devolved 
competences, to facilitate an appeal by the Libyans to the Scottish Government for Mr Megrahi’s 
transfer under the PTA or release on compassionate grounds as the best outcome for managing the 
risks faced by the UK’ including risks to British commercial interests (Cabinet Office, 2011: pp.14-
																																																								
30 Admitting that ‘Government records of the contacts with BP are limited’, the Cabinet Office review noted 
that ‘Limited and intermittent contacts… took place… between BP and Jack Straw from September 2007 
onwards. BP also spoke on at least two occasions in the same period to Simon McDonald, the then Prime 
Minister’s Foreign Policy Advisor. During these and other discussions, the progress of negotiations on the 
UK-Libya PTA and likely timing of the Agreement being signed were discussed. Furthermore BP was 
suffering significant financial loss while the EPSA agreement remained unsigned. Gordon Brown wrote to 
Colonel Qadhafi on 26 September with the intention of reassuring Qadhafi of the UK’s high level interest in 
the bilateral relationship, and taking the opportunity to highlight the BP agreement, but making no mention 
of Mr Megrahi despite Libyan linkage of the issues. Overall, it is clear that BP was seeking the Government’s 
help to unblock the EPSA agreement.’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.6) 
31 Up until then the ‘UK Government… held up final signature [on the PTA] until progress on commercial 
deals had been achieved.’ (Cabinet Office, 2011: p.13) 
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15). Despite Libyan ratification of the EPSA, ‘BP continued to run into bureaucratic hurdles until 
Megrahi was finally released by the Scottish government’ in August 2009 (Wall Street Journal, 2010). 
 
4.12 Summary and conclusions 
 
Part I concluded that BP wanted American shareholders to protect its US assets. In addition, with 
the company starting to explore out outside its OECD stronghold, it conjectured that BP might 
also want American shareholders to guard its prospective assets outside America. Then BP decided 
to pursue a merger or acquisition strategy. According to its CEO, one reason for this was to give 
BP ‘global political clout’ (Browne 2010: p.69). All of BP’s targets were American companies. As a 
result of the all-stock form of the acquisitions of Amoco and ARCO, BP gained the American 
shareholder-guards it wanted. The Amoco takeover also Americanised BP’s board of directors. 
BP’s CEO felt that its ‘power and reach’ increased after the acquisition (Browne 2010: p.141). In 
particular, he seemed to think that the company’s ability to call on the American state for support 
had increased. 
 
In terms of the nationalities of its owners/shareholders and its board of directors, BP has been 
basically bi-national since the acquisitions: more British than American up until 2010, but equally 
British and American thereafter. But BP was still incorporated in Britain and in Anglo-American 
law the state of incorporation is the main test of corporate nationality. The company’s “seat” and 
primary stock market listing were still in London. In addition, in terms of an instrumentalist 
conceptualisation of the state, BP had greater ties of colonisation to the British than to the 
American state. Likewise, in terms of a structuralist conceptualisation of the state, the British state 
was more dependent on BP’s operations than the American state was. The US state did protect 
BP’s Russian assets on one occasion, but perhaps it is not surprising that BP received more support 
from the British than the American state in the international arena - and less support from the 
American state than ExxonMobil. 
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5. BP in post-Soviet Russia 
 
 
From BP in America to BP in Russia. After describing the post-Soviet Russian oil industry, this 
chapter presents a short history of foreign energy companies in the country. The aim is to 
contextualise BP’s position in Russia. Since 2003, Russia has been BP’s largest source of 
hydrocarbons and BP has been Russia’s largest foreign producer. The focus then shifts to analyse 
the threats to BP’s Russian assets - from its “oligarch” partners and rivals, and from state-
controlled companies - and the efforts of the British and American states to protect the company’s 
assets from these threats. Then, in 2013, BP jettisoned its “oligarch” partners for an equity stake 
and positions on the board of state-controlled Rosneft. This is how things stood when the US and 
EU imposed sanctions against Russia over Ukraine in 2014.1 
 
 
 
 
   
																																																								
1 The main (academic) contribution in this chapter is the history of BP itself. Almost all the sources for this 
history are primary ones. 
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5.1 The Russian oil industry 
 
The Soviet oil industry disintegrated.2 Consider the West Siberian industry, which produced two-
thirds of Soviet oil in the late 1980s. In the Soviet era: 
‘There was a vertical chain of command, running from the headquarters of the USSR Ministry of Oil in 
Moscow… down through a hierarchy of divisions and subdivisions to the working level in West Siberia, the 
“production associations”… that controlled the operating units in the field, the so-called NGDUs’ (or oil and 
gas production administrations). (Gustafson, 2012: p.32) 
This unravelled. The seven West Siberian production associations broke free from the abolished 
“Glavk” (Glavtiumenneftegaz), the main administration for the West Siberian oil industry, into a 
voluntary “association of enterprises”. In turn, NGDUs broke free from their parent production 
associations. 
 
Privatisation was spreading like the plague. Thane Gustafson argues that: 
‘The challenge for the reformers was to create a framework for privatization, so as to bring the process under 
some measure of legal control and give it legitimacy… 
But there was widespread resistance to privatizing the oil industry. What the reformers needed was a plan that 
would reorganize the industry and stave off further disintegration, while temporarily postponing the 
privatization issue.’ (Gustafson, 2012: pp.71-72) 
In terms of reorganisation, the reformers’ plan was to amalgamate production associations into 
vertically-integrated holding companies, with the largest upstream “oil generals” in charge.3 Their 
plan was enacted by presidential decree in 1992. This created the first three vertically-integrated 
holding companies: LUKoil, Yukos and Surgutneftegaz (the “majors”). Other production 
associations were collected together in a temporary state company called Rosneft. By the end of 
1995, six “mini-majors” had been spun off from Rosneft: Sidanco, Eastern Oil Company (or 
Tomskneft), Slavneft, Onako, Sibneft, and TNK (Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: pp.14-15).4 
 
Partial privatisation of these companies started in 1993/94. Under the approach used to privatise 
most of the oil companies: 
‘employees got 25 percent of oil company shares in the form of nonvoting (‘preferred’) shares and a further 
10 percent of voting (‘ordinary’) shares in a closed distribution at a deep discount. Company managers had 
the right to buy 5 percent for cash. Some 22 percent of shares were to be offered in public auctions, in 
exchange for vouchers. This left a controlling block of voting shares in the hands of the state, for later cash 
sales.’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.114) 
Nevertheless, the oil generals used a variety of methods to ensure that they stayed in charge. 
 
																																																								
2 The best text on the post-Soviet Russian oil industry and a key reference for this section is Thane 
Gustafson’s Wheel of Fortune: The Battle for Oil and Power in Russia. 
3 “Oil generals”: A commonplace term for those who ran the oil industry in the Soviet era. 
4 There were also ‘three companies owned by republics (Tatneft, Bashneft, and Komitek), and a handful of 
companies owned or sponsored by regional governments’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.100). 
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While central government had created a new legal framework, it was weak and divided. On the 
ground, battles to control oil assets continued. A key battle was over control of exports. This was 
the big prize. The outcome of these battles was a series of fusions of oil companies, led by the 
upstream oil generals, and export traders. 
‘In some cases [- including all three majors -] the oil company was the dominant partner… But more often it 
was the trader that turned out to be dominant, and in those cases the fusion proved to be the prelude to 
takeover’ (e.g. Tiumen Oil Company (or TNK) and Sidanco). (Gustafson, 2012: p.93) 
This was the first act in the penetration of the oil industry by the financial-industrial giants5 via their 
oil-trading arms. 
 
If the battle for access to exports was the first act in the oligarch’s (partial) takeover of the oil 
industry, the second act was full privatisation, i.e., the sale by the state of its controlling stakes in 
the oil companies. In the middle of 1995, the state still owned majority shareholdings in all the oil 
companies. By the end of 1998, the oil industry was largely private. The “loans-for-shares” scheme 
of 1995/96 was an important part of this privatisation process. Under the scheme, the Russian 
government pledged stakes: 
‘in 12 large, state-owned corporations [including five oil companies] to certain businessmen to manage in 
trust, in return for loans… If the government did not repay the loans by September 1996, the creditors were 
then allowed to auction off the tranches and keep 30 percent of any profit. In the event [and as expected], the 
government did not repay the loans, and the creditors sold the stakes, usually to themselves’ (through 
carefully rigged auctions). (Treisman, 2010: p.208) 
Oligarchs obtained the state’s controlling stakes in Yukos (a 45 per cent stake), Sidanco (51 per 
cent) and Sibneft (51 per cent) via the scheme. Two oil generals consolidated their control via the 
scheme: Surgutneftegaz acquired the government’s 40 per cent stake, while LUKoil picked up an 
extra 5 per cent stake (Gustafson, 2012: pp.101,102; Treisman, 2010: p.213; Henderson & 
Ferguson, 2014: p.17). But the loans-for-shares scheme was just one part of the privatisation 
process. Later on, the oligarch-owned AAR group acquired the government’s stake in TNK via a 
money tender (Gustafson, 2012: p.102; Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: p.18). Later still, in the early 
2000s, TNK and Sibneft picked up at auction Onako and Slavneft, two of the last state-owned 
companies.6 By the end of 2002, at the peak of their power, the oligarchs controlled one major 
(Yukos) and all six mini-majors, and half of the oil produced in the private sector.7 Soviet-era oil 
generals controlled the other two majors (LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz). ‘Then the pendulum began 
to swing back toward state ownership’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.101). 
 
																																																								
5 The financial-industrial giants formed in the course of privatisation. Many emerged around 1993-94. 
6 TNK won the auction for the government’s 85 per cent stake in Onako, while TNK and Sibneft (bidding 
cooperatively) picked up its 75 per cent stake in Slavneft (Henderson & Ferguson, 2014, pp.18-19). 
7 Private production was 80 per cent of total production in 2002. 
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The Russian oil industry was partially (re-)nationalised from 2004. In addition, those oil companies 
that were not nationalised were forced back under the state’s control. At the end of 2002, the oil 
industry was dominated by just five privately-owned companies: LUKoil and Surgutneftegaz 
controlled by oil generals, Yukos, Sibneft and TNK controlled by oligarchs.8 By 2013, all three 
oligarch-owned companies (along with their mini-major subsidiaries) had been nationalised. In 
2003, Yukos’ owner, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, was arrested, over the next four years the company 
(then Russia’s largest oil company) was broken up, and its major assets transferred to state-owned 
Rosneft.9 In 2005, Gazprom (which returned to majority state ownership that year) acquired Sibneft 
(renamed Gazprom Neft in 2006).10 Then, in 2013, Rosneft acquired TNK-BP (Belton & Chazan, 
2012f). Largely as a result of these nationalisations, the proportion of Russian oil produced by state-
owned companies increased from just 20 per cent in 2002 to 42 per cent in 2008 to 50 per cent in 
2013 (Gustafson, 2012: Figure 3.1; Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: p.26). 
 
A brief note before proceeding on the ownership of Rosneft and Gazprom. Rosneft was 100 per 
cent state-owned before an initial public offering in 2006 (Rosneft, 2007: p.78). This flotation sold 
off 14.8 per cent of the company (Chung & Tait, 2006; Rosneft, 2007: p.8). According to the 
Financial Times (FT): ‘About 50 per cent of Rosneft’s shares went to just four accounts. This 
includes three oil companies: BP…; Petronas, Malaysia’s state oil company; and China National 
Petroleum Corp’ (Chung & Ostrovsky, 2006). The (floated) shares were listed on the London Stock 
Exchange and the Russian stock market (Rosneft, 2007: p.8). An additional 18.5 per cent of 
Rosneft was sold to BP in 2013. This reduced the stake of the Russian state to 69.5 per cent. Then, 
at the end of 2016, the Russian government sold another 19.5 per cent of its shares in Rosneft to 
Qatar Investment Authority (Qatar’s sovereign wealth fund) and Glencore (an integrated producer 
and marketer of commodities) reducing its shareholding to a smidgen over 50 per cent (Rosneft, 
2017: pp.214-215). Turning to Gazprom briefly, the state owned 38 per cent of the company from 
2000 to 2004. Thereafter, from 2005 until the end of 2016, it owned a whisker over 50 per cent 
(Gazprom, 2005; Gazprom, 2010b; Gazprom, 2015; Gazprom, 2017). 
 
																																																								
8 At this point, Yukos controlled Eastern Oil (or Tomskneft), TNK controlled Onako and Sidanco, and TNK 
and Sibneft controlled jointly Slavneft (Buchan, 2002; Gustafson, 2012: pp.279,290; Henderson & Ferguson, 
2014: pp.18-19,26). 
9 Yuganskneftegaz was Yukos’ prime asset. Rosneft assembled the ‘bulk of the cash’ to buy Yuganskneftegaz 
‘from the Chinese oil company CNPC, in the form of a prepayment against future oil exports by Rosneft to 
China. (Rosneft took over the bulk of Yukos’s existing exports by rail to China.)’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.348). 
10 Gazprom paid ‘just over $13 billion for a 73% stake [in Sibneft] before buying a further 3% in the 
market… Gazprom then purchased a further 20% of Sibneft for $4.2 billion from [Italian energy company] 
ENI in 2009 (who had acquired it on Gazprom’s behalf at an auction of Yukos’ assets in 2007)’ (Henderson 
& Ferguson, 2014, pp.25-26; see also Gazprom, 2006: p.7). 
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To recap, the Russian oil industry changed first ‘from the horizontally compartmentalized structure 
of Soviet ministries to a new generation of mostly private vertically integrated companies’ before 
partial re-nationalisation under Vladimir Putin (Gustafson, 2012: pp.62,97). Consider next the 
position of foreign energy companies in the upstream Russian oil industry.11 
 
5.2 Foreign energy companies in the upstream Russian oil industry 
 
American and European companies are examined first. Before focusing on the largest companies, a 
short pre-history on the smaller ones. In the 1990s, smaller Western companies formed joint 
ventures with Russian companies. Joint ventures between Russian and non-Russian companies 
were one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s experiments. They were first authorised by the Soviet 
government in 1987, but the oil and gas sector was off limits initially. This changed in 1988 and: 
‘by the end of the Soviet Union in December 1991, over 100 joint ventures were being negotiated in the area 
of oil, of which some seventy were eventually registered, and about forty actually became active. It was a 
broad effort all across the Russian upstream: the joint ventures represented over sixty foreign companies 
from seventeen countries (although U.S. and Canadian companies were the most numerous), located at fifty 
fields with total reserves of around 960 million tons (7 billion barrels).’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.155) 
The average investment by the Western partner in these early joint ventures was about $35 million 
only. American Conoco’s “Polar Lights” project was the exception. Between 1992 and 1995, it 
invested more than $400 million, the largest foreign investment in the oil industry at the time. By 
2000-01, the joint ventures were being taken over by the newly powerful Russian companies, and 
had all but disappeared within a few more years (Gustafson, 2012: pp.155,161,166).12 
 
The largest companies took to the stage in the mid-1990s via either Production Sharing Agreements 
(PSAs) or partnerships with privately-owned Russian companies.13 Foreign companies started 
pushing the Russian government to adopt PSAs for large projects as early as 1991. Three PSAs 
involving foreign energy companies were signed in 1994/95, under Boris Yeltsin’s administration 
(Krysiek, 2007: pp.2-3). Two covered Sakhalin Island in Russia’s Far East. The Sakhalin-1 PSA 
consortium has consisted throughout of American Exxon(Mobil), Rosneft, Indian ONGC (Oil and 
Natural Gas Corporation) and Japanese consortium SODECO (Krysiek, 2007: p.13). The Sakhalin-																																																								
11 International service companies (such as Schlumberger, Halliburton, and Baker-Hughes) are not discussed. 
12 For another account of these early joint ventures, see James Henderson and Alastair Ferguson (2014, 
pp.36-37). 
13 Under PSAs: ‘the state retains ownership and therefore ultimate control of the country’s oil resources. The 
foreign company (or a consortium of companies) provides the capital investment… and in return receives the 
right to extract and process oil under contract… A PSA is a kind of legal contract which defines the relations 
between the oil-producing state and a contractor… [A]ccording to a typical PSA, the investor is supposed to 
recover all or most of the initial investment costs from the sales of the first proportion of oil [called ‘cost 
oil’]… The contracts generally specify what proportion of oil extracted in any year can be considered as ‘cost 
oil’… Once the initial costs have been recovered, the remainder of the oil produced [called ‘profit oil’] is 
divided between the state and the foreign investor in agreed proportions.’ (Gökay, 2006: pp.180-181) 
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2 PSA consortium consisted originally of two American companies (Marathon and McDermott), 
Anglo-Dutch Shell and two Japanese companies (Mitsui and Mitsubishi), but, by the end of 2000, 
the American companies had sold up to the other members of the consortium. The third PSA 
covered the northern section of the Kharyaga field. Its consortium consisted originally of French 
Total, Norwegian Norsk Hydro and Russian Nenets Oil Company (Krysiek, 2007: p.5).14 Around 
the same time the PSAs were signed, American ARCO and BP bought small stakes (10 per cent or 
less) in privately-owned Russian companies. BP also formed an alliance with state-owned Rosneft 
to develop Sakhalin-5 hydrocarbons. BP’s partnerships are discussed below. ARCO was the first 
major foreign company to take a stake in a Russian oil company. In 1995, it bought a shareholding 
in LUKoil for $250m (Gorst, 2007: p.14).15 Two years later, the two companies formed a joint 
venture called LukArco. LukArco acquired a 5 per cent interest in Tengizchevroil in Kazakhstan 
and a 12.5 per cent interest in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (which carries oil between 
Kazakhstan and Russia), but no assets in Russia itself (Gorst, 2007: pp.14-15; Watkins, 2009). 
When BP acquired ARCO in the year 2000 it sold its inherited stake in LUKoil ‘because it had no 
representation on the board of directors of Lukoil and no control over its assets’ (Jones, 2001), but 
retained its stake in LukArco until 2009 (Oil & Gas Financial Journal, 2009). 
 
By 2003, a decade of effort by foreign energy companies to adopt PSAs as the preferred investment 
vehicle was defeated by Russia’s private oil companies and government. 
‘Thus by 2003-2004 the only vehicle left for foreign companies wishing to invest in Russian oil projects was 
the joint venture. BP… had been the first to reach this conclusion, when it negotiated TNK-BP [in 2003]…  
Several other foreign companies, having concluded that PSA would never happen, also fell back on the joint 
venture as the only way to hold on to their positions in Russia. Shell held out for a decade for a PSA for its 
project at Salym in West Siberia, but when threatened with the loss of its license it decided [in 2003] to take a 
chance on a joint venture with its partner Evikhon, a small independent with connections to various second-
tier oligarchs and the city government of Moscow. It was that or nothing, and Salym was too attractive to 
pass up…Conoco (by this time ConocoPhillips), which had waited an equally long time for a PSA for its 
Northern Territory project, entered into a strategic alliance with LUKoil [in 2004].’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.432) 
The decisions of BP, Shell and ConocoPhillips to form new partnerships with privately-owned 
Russian companies at this time were made in the context, not just of the death of PSAs, but also of 
a sharp rise in oil prices since the late 1990s, which increased the potential upside of the joint 
ventures. 
 
 
																																																								
14 These have been the only PSAs involving foreign energy companies in Russia. 
15 ARCO reported that the stake was 8 per cent but LUKoil reports that it was 6.3 per cent (ARCO, 1997; 
LUKoil, 2017). Henderson and Ferguson note that the ‘stake was specifically determined to be below the 
level at which ARCO could gain an automatic seat on the LUKOIL Board’ (Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: 
p.45; David Lane and Iskander Seifulmulukov (1999: p.30) agree). 
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Soon after the new partnerships were formed, the partial re-nationalisation of the Russian oil 
industry began and, in parallel with this, the wind shifted against foreign oil companies. In March 
2005, a draft revised mineral resources law was approved by the Russian government: 
‘In this draft, the restrictions on foreign investment were relatively mild: foreign participation in ‘strategic’ 
projects was limited to companies registered in Russia and at least 51 percent owned by Russian entities. At 
this early stage, the government was still vague about its definition of ‘strategic.’ The general impression was 
that [minister of natural resources] Trutnev intended to keep the list [of ‘strategic’ projects] short and that the 
new rules being proposed by Trutnev’s ministry would have relatively little impact on foreign investors.’ 
(Gustafson, 2012: pp.433-434) 
Yet the Russian government’s position hardened and by the time Putin stepped down as president 
in 2008 its 
‘policies on foreign investment had become so restrictive that they practically shut off any possibility of 
meaningful foreign participation in new oil and gas projects, except in the lesser role of service providers… 
The Russian government appeared determined to reserve all future oil and gas of any significance to domestic 
companies, and especially to its ‘national champions,’ Gazprom and Rosneft.’ (Gustafson, 2012: pp.434-435) 
 
At the end of the 2000s/start of the 2010s, state-owned companies were muscling into existing 
projects involving Western oil companies. In 2007, the three remaining companies in the Sakhalin-2 
PSA - Shell, Mitsui and Mitsubishi - sold half their stakes to Gazprom, under pressure from the 
Russian state (Krysiek, 2007: p.19).16 The Kharyaga PSA had required Total and Norsk Hydro to 
each sell ten per cent stakes to a Russian company (Krysiek, 2007: p.5). This happened in 2010; the 
buyer was state-owned Zarubezhneft (Total, 2009b).17 In addition to taking positions in these two 
PSAs - the third PSA included Rosneft from the start - state-owned companies replaced the 
privately-owned Russian partners of BP and of Shell in its Salym project. Between 2009 and 2011, 
Gazprom’s oil division acquired Shell’s partner in Salym Petroleum Development.18 Then, two 
years after Gazprom took over the Kovykta gas field from TNK-BP in 2011, Rosneft bought out 
BP’s oligarch partners and formed an alliance with the company.19 
 
Around the same time that the national champions were getting their claws into existing projects, 
Rosneft formed new partnerships with ExxonMobil, Norwegian Statoil and Italian Eni. All three 
alliances - signed between 2011 and 2013 - involved the development of blocks in the Arctic 
Ocean. The agreements with ExxonMobil and Eni included blocks in the Black Sea, while those 																																																								
16 For accounts of this episode, see Gustafson (2012, pp.436-7), Krysiek (2007) and Rutledge (2004). 
17 In 2016, Total transferred a further 20 per cent stake to Zarubezhneft (Oil & Gas Journal, 2016). 
18 In 2009, Gazprom Neft acquired a 55 per cent shareholding in Sibir Energy. Two years later, it became 
Sibir’s sole shareholder (Gazprom, 2010a: p.37; Gazprom Neft, 2011). 
19 At the same time, the third major partnership with a privately-owned Russian company, between 
ConocoPhillips and LUKoil, broke-up. Between 2004 and 2006, ConocoPhillips had acquired a 20 per cent 
stake in LUKoil and the two companies had formed an upstream joint venture - called Naryanmarneftegaz - 
to develop resources in Russia’s Timan-Pechora oil and gas province. Over the course of 2010 and 2012, the 
American company sold its shareholding in LUKoil for $9.5 billion (a profit of $2 billion) as well as its 
interest in Naryanmarneftegaz (and certain related assets) for $450 million (ConocoPhillips, 2006; 
ConocoPhillips, 2007; ConocoPhillips, 2011; ConocoPhillips, 2013). 
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with ExxonMobil and Statoil included onshore Russian projects. In addition, all three partnerships 
envisaged Rosneft’s participation in projects with its partners outside Russia.20 James Henderson 
and Alastair Ferguson considered these alliances - alongside Rosneft’s with BP - as a new ‘stage in 
the development of the Russian oil and gas industry, with the return of international partnership to 
encourage transfer of technology and investment dollars but under the direct control of state 
companies rather than the private sector’ (Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: p.53).21 
 
Consider next Asian companies. As we have seen, one of the Sakhalin PSAs has included Indian 
ONGC and Japanese consortium SODECO, and the other has included Japanese conglomerates 
Mitsui and Mitsubishi, since the agreements were signed in 1994-95. Then, between 2005 and 2007, 
one South Korean and two Chinese national oil companies established partnerships with Rosneft. 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Rosneft signed three long-term crude oil 
supply contracts in 2005, 2009 and 2013, and established a joint venture (called Vostok Energy) in 
2006, which acquired exploration and production licences to two blocks in Eastern Siberia 
(Rosneft, 2008).22 CNPC also acquired a small shareholding (less than one per cent) in Rosneft 
itself in 2006. China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation (Sinopec) and Rosneft established two 
joint ventures: Taihu and Venin Holding. Taihu acquired Udmurtneft, a medium-sized Russian oil 
company, in 2006 (Rosneft, 2007: pp.8,41,108-9,138-9). Venin Holding is a Sakhalin-3 exploration 
and development project (Rosneft, 2006: p.11; Rosneft, 2008: p.34). Korea National Oil Company 
(and its partners) started cooperation on an exploration project on the West Kamchatka shelf with 
Rosneft in 2005, but lost its investment when Rosneft’s exploration licence was revoked 
(Greenpeace, Platform & ShareAction, 2013: p.10). 
 
 
 
																																																								
20 See Rosneft (2012: p.15; 2013: pp.10,50; 2014: p.38), Statoil (2013: p.14; 2014: p.34) and Eni (2014: p.58). 
21 Likewise, Gustafson saw these partnerships (as well as other new initiatives) as signs that ‘a new chapter 
may be opening in the relationship of the Russian oil industry to the global mainstream of the hydrocarbons 
industry’ (Gustafson, 2012: pp.447-8). 
22 The 2005 contract was for a total of 48.4 million tonnes of crude oil over the years 2005-10 (an average of 
8.1 million tonnes per year). The 2009 contract was for a total of 180 million tonnes of crude oil over the 
years 2011-30 (an average of 9 million tonnes per year). The 2013 contract was for a total of 325 millions 
tonnes of crude oil over the years 2013-37 (an average of 13 million tonnes per year) (Rosneft, 2006; Rosneft, 
2010; Rosneft, 2014). To convert crude oil from metric tonnes to barrels (based on worldwide average 
gravity) multiply these numbers by 7.33 (BP, 2017b: p.48). CNPC/China was Rosneft’s largest crude oil 
export market in each of the years 2006-10 and most likely beyond. Between 2006 and 2010 (under the first 
contract), 15-16 per cent of Rosneft’s exports headed to China. Between 2011 and 2014 (under the second 
and third contracts), 16-24 per cent of its exports went there (own calculations from Rosneft Annual Reports 
2006-2014). Each oil supply contract involved a loan/prepayment to Rosneft. 
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Table 5.1 compares foreign energy companies in Russia’s oil and natural gas industries over the 
period 2000-2014 in terms of production volumes.23 For Norsk Hydro/Statoil, Eni, ExxonMobil, 
ONGC and Sinopec, annual production was less than 100,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day 
(boe/d).24 For Shell, Total, and German energy companies E.ON and Wintershall, annual 
production was in the range 100,000-250,000 boe/d, for part, but not all, of the period.25 E.ON’s 
producing asset was its stake in the Yuzhno Russkoye natural gas field, alongside Wintershall and 
Gazprom. Wintershall’s production came from Yuzhno Russkoye but also its Achimgaz joint 
venture with Gazprom and a small joint venture with LUKoil called Volgodeminoil. Shell’s 
producing assets were the Sakhalin-2 PSA and its Salym project. Total’s production came 
principally from its equity stake in Novatek, a Russian natural gas production company, but also 
from the Kharyaga PSA. Over the period 2005 to 2010, ConocoPhillips owned as much as 20 per 
cent of LUKoil, the largest or second largest oil producer in Russia in those years. Reporting its 
share of LUKoil’s production in its accounts, the American company was producing between 
250,000 and 500,000 boe/d in the country. But by far the largest foreign energy company in terms 
of production volumes was BP. In 2003, the company formed a 50:50 joint venture called TNK-
BP. Between 2004 and 2012, TNK-BP was the second or third largest Russian oil producer 
(Gustafson, 2012: Table 5.1). BP’s share of its production ranged between 910,000 and 1 million 
boe/d. In 2013, the company sold its stake in TNK-BP and acquired almost 20 per cent of Rosneft. 
In 2013 and 2014, its Russian production was close to 1 million boe/d. BP’s position in post-Soviet 
Russia is examined more closely next. 
 
																																																								
23 Appendix 2 documents the position of foreign energy companies in the natural gas sector. 
24 Norsk Hydro/Statoil’s producing asset was the Kharyaga PSA. Eni’s producing asset in 2012 and 2013 was 
SeverEnergia. SeverEnergia was an Eni and Italian utility group Enel (predominantly natural gas) partnership 
first with Gazprom, and later with Gazprom’s oil division and Novatek (a Russian natural gas production 
company). ExxonMobil’s producing asset was the Sakhalin-1 PSA. ONGC’s producing assets were the 
Sakhalin-1 PSA and Imperial Energy Corporation (ONGC, 2009: p.40). Sinopec’s producing asset was Taihu, 
its joint venture with Rosneft. 
25 Wintershall is a fully owned subsidiary of German chemicals group BASF. 
 136 
Table 5.1 Production of hydrocarbons in Russia by foreign energy companies, 2000-14 
 
Production volume in Russia in thousands barrels oil equivalent per day (Percentage contribution to company’s worldwide production) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) Vol.(%) 
Norsk Hydro/Statoil 3(1) 5(1) 3(1) 5(1) 7(1) 6(1) 5(1) 8(<0.5) 8 (<0.5) 9(<0.5) 9(<0.5) 9(<0.5) 10(<0.5) 10(1) 9(<0.5) 
Eni   - - - - - - - 2(<0.5) - - - - 11(1) 31(2) - 
ExxonMobil  - - - - - - 44(1) 44(1) 44(1) 44(1) 44(1) n/a n/a 46(1) 42(1) 
ONGC   - - - - - - 25(2) 52(4) 46(4) 49(4) 55(5) 55(5) 53(5) 50(4) 49(4) 
Sinopec   - - - - - - - 59(n/a) 60(6) 60(6) 61(5) 62(5) 62(5) n/a n/a 
E.ON Ruhrgas  - - - - - - - - - - 103(80) 110(84) 108(91) 107(81) 101(76) 
Royal Dutch Shell  9(<0.5) 23(1) 33(1) 30(1) 32(1) 35(1) 52(2) 51(2) 70(2) 139(5) 179(6) 183(6) 168(5) 160(5) 156(5) 
BASF Wintershall  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 5(2) 13(4) 90(24) 137(36) 152(41) 153(48) 168(42) 188(53) 199(54) 
TotalFinaElf/Total 6(<0.5) 6(<0.5) 5(<0.5) 8(<0.5) 9(<0.5) 9(<0.5) 8(<0.5) 8(<0.5) 8(<0.5) 12(1) 10(<0.5) 105(4) 178(8) 208(9) 236(11) 
Conoco/ConocoPhillips n/a n/a n/a n/a 40(2) 246(14) 401(17) 444(19) 445(20) 490(21) 379(18) 32(2) 13(1) 4(<0.5) 4(<0.5) 
BP   11(<0.5) 20(1) 74(2) 318(9) 910(23) 994(25) 970(25) 910(24) 923(24) 944(24) 966(25) 993(29) 1012(30) 975(30) 1008(32) 
 
-  zero 
n/a  not available/not known to author 
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Sources 
Norsk Hydro/Statoil:  Norsk Hydro (2001); Norsk Hydro (2002); Norsk Hydro (2003); Hydro (2004); Hydro (2006); Hydro (2007); StatoilHydro (2008);  
 StatoilHydro (2009); Statoil (2010); Statoil (2011); Statoil (2012); Statoil (2013); Statoil (2014); Statoil (2015)  
Eni:  Eni (2010); Eni (2013); Eni (2015)  
ExxonMobil:  ExxonMobil (2010); ExxonMobil (2011); ExxonMobil (2015); Rosneft (2014); Rosneft (2015)  
ONGC:  ONGC (2007); ONGC (2009); ONGC (2011); ONGC (2013); ONGC (2015)  
Sinopec:  Sinopec (2010); Sinopec (2011); Sinopec (2013) 
Royal Dutch Shell:  Royal Dutch Shell (2005); Royal Dutch Shell (2010); Royal Dutch Shell (2011); Royal Dutch Shell (2016) 
TotalFinaElf/Total:  TotalFinaElf (2003); Total (2006); Total (2009a); Total (2012); Total (2015)  
E.ON Ruhrgas:  E.ON (2011); E.ON (2012); E.ON (2013); E.ON (2014); E.ON (2015)  
BASF:  BASF (2008); BASF (2009); BASF (2011); BASF (2012); BASF (2013); BASF (2015)  
Conoco/ConocoPhillips:  ConocoPhillips (2006); ConocoPhillips (2008); ConocoPhillips (2010); ConocoPhillips (2011);  
 ConocoPhillips (2012); ConocoPhillips (2013); ConocoPhillips (2014); ConocoPhillips (2015) 
BP:  BP (2002b); BP (2007b); BP (2010b); BP (2015b) 
 
Conversion factors 
BP (2017b: p.48)  
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5.3 BP in post-Soviet Russia 
 
5.3.1 BP acquires stakes in Sidanco and Rusia Petroleum 
 
Sidanco was one of the ‘mini-majors’ spun off from (100 per cent state-owned) Rosneft in 1994. 
The company was privatised in parts. According to Valery Kryukov and Arild Moe, 11 per cent was 
‘sold at special auctions’ and 4 per cent was ‘given by [the] government to [Mikhail 
Khodorkovsky’s] Menatap [bank group] in exchange for shares in the bank’ (Kryukov & Moe, 
1999: Table 2.4). These sales appear to have taken place in 1995 (Khartukov, 1997: Table3; 
International Energy Agency, 2002: Table 4.3). In the same year, the government pledged 51 per 
cent of Sidanco at a loans-for-shares auction. This stake was picked up by Vladimir Potanin’s 
MFK-Oneksimbank and its industrial arm Interros (Khartukov, 1997: p.37; Lane & Seifulmulukov, 
1999: p.34; Kryukov & Moe, 1999: pp.66-67; Interros, 2017). Interros also collected the 
government’s remaining 34 per cent of Sidanco via an investment tender in September 1996 
(Khartukov, 1997; Lane & Seifulmulukov, 1999: p.34; Kryukov & Moe, 1999: pp.66-67). At a 
minimum then, Potanin and his partners owned 85 per cent of Sidanco. According to Interros, it 
owned 91 per cent of Sidanco: 51 per cent acquired via the loans-for-shares scheme plus 40 per 
cent obtained at investment tenders (Interros, 2017). Others studies claim that Potanin and his 
partners owned as much as 96 per cent of Sidanco at one point (Kranz, 1999: p.45; Black, 
Kraakman & Tarassova, 2006: p.148).26 In 1997, Interros sold around 35 per cent of its interest in 
Sidanco to Kantupan, an investment group based in Cyprus (Interros, 2017).27 It is unclear who the 
principle investors in Kantupan were, but ‘Cyprus is a well-known base for “foreign” Russian 
capital’ (Kryukov & Moe, 1999: p.67). It is even possible that Potanin and his partners were among 
Kantupan’s investors (Kryukov & Moe, 1999: pp.67-68).28 
 
BP saw an opportunity to sell natural gas to China from Russia’s Kovykta field. Rusia Petroleum 
held the licence to the field and Sidanco owned 60 per cent of Rusia. In November 1997, BP 
purchased a 10 per cent stake in Sidanco for $571 million (Gustafson, 2012: pp.419-420; Ostrovsky, 
1997; Corzine & Freeland, 1997). In addition to its stake in Sidanco, BP announced that it would 
acquire 45 per cent of Sidanco’s 60 per cent interest in Rusia Petroleum (Brice & Kibazo, 1997; 																																																								
26 This could suggest that Potanin and his partners also acquired the 11 per cent of Sidanco sold at special 
auctions in 1995. 
27 The size of the shareholding acquired by Kantupan is not entirely clear. Kryukov and Moe (1999: p.67) cite 
a newspaper article (from March 1997) reporting that Interros transferred a 34 per cent stake in Sidanco to 
Kantupan. An article in The Moscow Times (from October 1997) reported Kantupan’s stake at 35 per cent 
(Whalen, 1997). 
28 The Moscow Times reported that Kantupan was ‘associated with tycoon Vladimir Potanin’, but I cannot 
confirm this (Gismatullin, 1999). 
 139 
Ostrovsky, 1997; Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: p.207; BP, 1998a: p.14).29 BP’s stake in Rusia 
increased from 20 per cent at the end of 1997 to 25 per cent at the end of 2000 (BP, 1998a: p.49; 
BP, 2001a: p.61). Both the British and Russian states were involved in the deal. The FT reported 
that ‘Anatoly Chubais, the reformist first deputy prime minister, held talks in London with BP… to 
help clear the way for a collaborative venture with Sidanco’ (Thornhill, 1997). In addition, it noted 
that: 
‘Mr Blair [the British Prime Minister] is expected to discuss investment prospects for Britain’s largest 
companies during his visit [to Moscow]. British Petroleum is believed to be in negotiation with Sidanco… to 
launch a joint bid for Rosneft, Russia’s last big state-owned oil company. John Browne, BP chief executive, 
was last week reported to have asked the [British] prime minister to seek assurances that the tender process 
[for Rosneft] would be open and competitive and that the proper legal and fiscal guarantees would be in 
place.’ (Jonquiéres, 1997) 
Browne and Potanin signed the agreement in 10 Downing Street, watched by Tony Blair and 
Russia’s First Deputy Energy Minister (Browne, 2010: p.138). 
 
5.3.2 The battle for Sidanco 
 
Soon BP was caught in the crossfire of a battle for Sidanco. The battle pitted Potanin against TNK, 
another oligarch-controlled oil company. Sidanco’s biggest asset was its oil and gas producing 
subsidiary Chernogorneft. According to an article in the FT, ‘TNK’s principal (and struggling) asset 
[was] an oil producing company called Nizhnevartovskneftegas (NVN)’ and NVN and 
Chernogorneft ‘share[d] the rights to the vast Samotlar oil field, which has one of the biggest 
deposits in the world’ (Jack, 1999b). The article continues: 
‘As communism was crumbling in 1990, the managers of the then Chernogorneft ‘production association’ - 
which had the rights to exploit the newer, more attractive parts of the oil field - spun themselves off from 
NVN. While NVN was lumbered with the wages and social costs of a huge workforce, Chernogorneft began 
largely from scratch, keeping costs down by signing up foreign partners and sub-contractors. That made 
Chernogorneft an attractive target for Sidanco, which gained control in the mid-1990s. But it was equally 
tempting for [TNK chairman] Mr Kukes. If he could take it over, he could combine it with NVN… That 
would help resolve the financial difficulties of NVN, and turn around TNK itself.’ (Jack, 1999b) 
There was, perhaps, another dimension to the battle for Sidanco. TNK’s largest shareholder was 
Mikhail Fridman. BP’s CEO at the time, Browne, recounts Fridman’s version of events: 
‘There had been a private arrangement between Fridman and Potanin… Fridman had put up $40 million 
towards the purchase of Sidanco and had got one-third of the company in return’ (Browne,2010:pp.141-142). 
Subsequently, Potanin bought Fridman’s stake in Sidanco by illegitimate means, a legal loophole, 
for $100 million. When, shortly after, Potanin sold just one-tenth of the company to BP for $571 
million, Fridman was furious and sought revenge. According to Browne, ‘Fridman produced a 
																																																								
29 According to the FT, BP said it would ‘meet $172m of the future costs of the appraisal programme for the 
Russian discoveries’ in return for its interest in Rusia Petroleum (Brice & Kibazo, 1997). 
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document which seemed to support his moral, if not legal, claim to Chernogorneft’ (Browne, 2010: 
p.142).30 
 
‘TNK’s chief weapon in the war against Potanin was a new bankruptcy law that gave a lopsided advantage to 
creditors… TNK’s strategy was to buy up the debt of the subsidiaries [of Sidanco] on the secondary market 
and to force them into bankruptcy, thus peeling them away from the parent company… Their chief target 
was… Chernogorneft. TNK soon succeeded in placing its own man in charge as receiver and began diluting 
or removing Chernogorneft’s other creditors so as to gain sole control.’ (Gustafson, 2012: pp.420-21) 
In November 1999, TNK bought Chernogorneft at a bankruptcy auction for just $176 million 
(Jack, 1999a; Piepul, 2000; Raff, 2001).31 
 
But BP was fighting back. The essence of the BP-TNK struggle is well captured in a remark by one 
of Browne’s deputies to TNK’s Fridman: ‘“I told him he could beat us up inside Russia,” the 
deputy later recalled, “but we could beat him up outside Russia”’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.422). Browne 
himself recounts BP’s fight back: 
‘By this stage we had become BP Amoco and I felt we now had the power and reach to get our assets back 
from TNK through a broad international campaign. The first thing we had to do was to work out where 
TNK got the money to buy up the Sidanco debt. A lot, as we had guessed, came from Western banks, 
including the Ex[port]-Im[port] bank in the US. We reasoned that if we could cut off TNK’s sources of credit 
we had a good chance of getting our assets back. And that is just what we did. 
We made it known that we thought the Chernogorneft affair was a demonstration of corrupt business 
practices and that if Ex-Im were to advance further loans to TNK they would be sanctioning corruption. We 
asked the US Vice President, Al Gore, and Tony Blair to lend their weight to the campaign against TNK by 
intervening with the Russian government.’ (Browne, 2010: p.141) 
According to Tom Bower: 
‘First he [Browne] asked Tony Blair to dispatch a warning to the Kremlin. On 7 September 1999 [before 
Chernogorneft’s bankruptcy auction], the prime minister wrote to Yeltsin: “BP fears that what should and 
could be a healthy and profitable company will be manipulated into bankruptcy and collapse.” He asked 
Yeltsin to “give this case your close personal attention”, because “the case is being closely followed by other 
major investors in Russia”.’ (Bower, 2009: p.98) 
But ‘Browne’s most important retaliation was in America’ (Bower, 2009: p.98). In the middle of 
negotiations between BP and Fridman in London: 
‘Browne urged [US Secretary of State] Madeleine Albright to order Harmon [head of the US Export-Import 
Bank] to withdraw the loan to TNK, on the grounds that it was against US interests. On 21 December 1999, 
Harmon obeyed… Just hours before the order was formalised, realising that BP could permanently damage 
his reputation, Fridman finalised a settlement with the company… In return, the Export-Import Bank loan 
was approved.’ (Bower, 2009: p.99)32 
 
  
																																																								
30 Gustafson (2012: p.420) and Tom Bower (2009: pp.95-97) present similar accounts. 
31 Similar accounts are presented by Henderson and Ferguson (2014: pp.45-46,207-208) and Marshall 
Goldman (2008: p.70). See also Jack (1999b). 
32 The accounts provided by Browne and Bower are supported by those of Gustafson (2012: pp.421-422), 
Henderson and Ferguson (2014: p.208), Goldman (2008: p.70), and the FT (Jack, 1999b; Jack and Corzine, 
1999). 
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Under the terms of the settlement, TNK would return Chernogorneft to Sidanco in exchange for a 
blocking stake of 25 per cent plus one share in the company; BP’s equity stake was to remain at 10 
per cent (Jack, 1999c; Piepul, 2000; Raff, 2001). But the agreement was never consummated. Then, 
in June 2001, an affiliate of TNK bought Kantupan’s 40 per cent stake in Sidanco - although 
Sidanco ‘contested the sale and asked a London judge to freeze the 40 percent stake’ (Raff, 2001; 
see also Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, 2001a; Alfa Group, 2001). Soon after, in August 2001, 
the battle for Sidanco was over. TNK emerged victorious: It returned Chernogorneft to Sidanco 
and acquired Interros’s 44 per cent stake in the company. As a result, it (effectively) owned 84 per 
cent of Sidanco. BP had survived the battle: it held on to its 10 per cent stake in the company 
(Interros, 2017; BP, 2001b; Raff, 2001; Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, 2001b; Alfa Group, 
2001). 
 
In the course of the battle, TNK had secured a licence to operate in part of the Kovytka gas field, 
alongside Rusia Petroleum. Under the terms of the August 2001 deal, TNK would merge its licence 
into the assets of Rusia and take a blocking stake of 25 per cent plus one share in the company. 
Interros would also take a blocking stake, while BP would retain its shareholding (Jack, 2001; Raff, 
2001). 
 
5.3.3 The creation of TNK-BP 
 
TNK-BP - ‘the third largest integrated oil company operating in Russia’ - emerged out of the battle 
for Sidanco (BP, 2004a: p.17). The August 2001 deal did not represent the end point of 
negotiations between the players. According to BP’s CEO at the time, in the course of the 
negotiations, BP: 
‘agreed to purchase an increased shareholding in Sidanco of 25 per cent, provided the company [i.e., Sidanco] 
got its assets back [Chernogorneft etc.]. The owners of TNK agreed to the condition, but only if BP would 
pursue negotiations to buy 25 per cent of their company.’ (Browne, 2010: pp.142-143) 
In 2002, BP bought the additional 15 per cent of Sidanco from TNK for $375 million, to secure a 
blocking stake of 25 per cent plus one share in the company (Buchan & Jack, 2002; Oil & Gas 
Journal, 2002b; Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: p.208). 
 
AAR - a consortium of three companies: Alfa Group, Access Industries and Renova - owned TNK 
(Yenikeyeff, 2011: pp.3,6). In August 2003, BP and AAR: 
‘combined certain of their Russian and Ukranian oil and gas businesses to create TNK-BP, a new company 
owned and managed 50:50 by BP and AAR… BP contributed its 29% interest in Sidanco, its 29% interest in 
Rusia Petroleum and its holding in the BP Moscow retail network. There was additional consideration from 
BP to AAR comprising an immediate $2,604 million in cash… together with annual tranches of $1,250 
million in BP shares payable in 2004, 2005 and 2006… BP also agreed with AAR to incorporate AAR’s 50% 
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interest in Slavneft into TNK-BP in return for $1,418 million in cash… This transaction was completed on 
16 January 2004.’ (BP, 2005a: p.55) 
BP’s CEO Browne recalls: 
‘I tried to push for 51 per cent of TNK but Putin and [AAR’s] Fridman both told me we could not have it. I 
knew if we had 49 per cent we would have no power whatsoever. So in the end the only option was to go for 
a 50:50 deal.’ (Browne, 2010: p.146) 
Both Blair and Putin were involved in the TNK-BP deal (Browne, 2010: p.146). Browne adds: 
‘Having Blair and Putin witness the deal was important. It gave a sense of credibility, particularly as it was 
such a huge investment. I had not wanted either of them involved in the negotiations but had wanted them to 
bless the new company, as if they were its godparents.’ (Browne, 2010: p.147) 
 
5.3.4 An unsuccessful BP-Rosneft exploration programme 
 
In 1998, BP and Rosneft formed an alliance to develop Sakhalin-5 hydrocarbons (BP 49 per cent-
Rosneft 51 per cent). In 2002, the Russian company was awarded an exploration licence for one of 
the two Sakhalin-5 blocks on behalf of the partnership (Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections, 2002; 
Oil & Gas Journal, 2002a). BP would carry the initial exploration and development costs, which it 
hoped ‘to recover from revenues should the project reach production stage’ (Friederike, 2004; see 
also Boxell, 2004b).33 In 2006, two further licence blocks were added to the alliance: the second 
block in Sakhalin-5 and one of the two Sakhalin-4 blocks (Crooks, 2006; BP, 2008a: p.24; BP, 2009: 
p.27; Rosneft, 2007: pp.8,32-33; Henderson, 2011: p.55). One by one the licences were allowed to 
lapse and the partnership liquidated following unsuccessful exploration programmes (BP, 2009: 
p.27; BP, 2012a: p.87; Henderson, 2011: pp.55-56). 
 
  
																																																								
33 This BP-Rosneft alliance was not incorporated into TNK-BP. The FT first reported in 2003 that BP 
‘decided to exclude “for the moment” its own interests in Sakhalin Island’ from TNK-BP but ‘BP said 
Sakhalin would be incorporated into the venture “within the year” after completing negotiations with 
Rosneft’ (Chung, 2003) then in 2004 that TNK ‘has declined to become involved in Sakhalin’ (Boxell, 2004b) 
and then in 2005 that ‘[p]reliminary plans to incorporate the Sakhalin project into the TNK-BP portfolio 
were put on ice after the Russian authorities’ attack on Yukos… and its founder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky’ 
(Gorst, Buckley & Boxell, 2005). Rosneft did join TNK-BP in Verkhnechonskneftegaz (VCNG). VCNG 
held the license for the development of the Verkhnechonsk oil and gas condensate field in Eastern Siberia. In 
2005 Rosneft bought a stake in VCNG from Potanin’s Interros (Rosneft, 2006: pp.9,44). VCNG’s 
shareholders were then TNK-BP 63 per cent, Rosneft 26 per cent and the East-Siberian Gas Company 
(ESGC) 11 per cent (Rosneft, 2007: p.30). Later, TNK-BP acquired ESGC’s stake in VCNG, taking its 
shareholding to 74 per cent at the end of 2011. In 2010, ‘Rosneft and TNK-BP concluded a shareholder 
agreement… which gave Rosneft additional rights related to managing’ VCNG (Rosneft, 2011: p.62). 
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5.3.5 TNK-BP loses Kovykta to Gazprom 
 
The Kovykta gas field was one of BP’s ‘main Russian assets’ (Boxell, 2004a). In 2006, the Russian 
authorities were threatening - not for the first time - to suspend TNK-BP’s licence for the field 
(Hoyos & Ostrovsky, 2006).34 These threats seem to have been part of a state plan to gain control 
of Kovykta. Such a plan can be seen in turn as part of the wider nationalisation agenda and/or the 
parallel ‘general hardening of the Kremlin’s line towards foreign energy companies’ (Crooks & 
Hoyos, 2006; see also Buckley, 2007; Watkins, 2007). In particular, threats to withdraw TNK-BP’s 
licence seem to have been ‘part of a wider gambit by state-controlled Gazprom to gain control of 
Kovykta’ (Financial Times, 2007). As well as Gazprom’s general political power as a state-controlled 
company, it had specific leverage in this situation. This was because TNK-BP was looking to export 
gas from the inland field to China and South Korea, and Gazprom held a monopoly on the pipeline 
export of gas from Russia (Boxell, 2004a; Gorst, Buckley & Boxell, 2005; Mcgregor & Buckley, 
2006). Gazprom could block, therefore, TNK-BP’s development of the field and did so (Mcgregor 
& Buckley, 2006; Hoyos & Ostrovsky, 2006). In doing so, it prevented TNK-BP from fulfilling the 
licence conditions for Kovykta, thereby weakening TNK-BP’s grip on the field. 
 
The pressure on TNK-BP over Kovykta continued into 2007. In January, Russia’s ‘natural 
resources ministry said it was launching checks into whether’ TNK-BP ‘was fulfilling the licencing 
terms’ (Buckley & Crooks, 2007). One month later, its subsoil agency confirmed TNK-BP ‘was 
now in violation of terms to develop’ Kovykta and said it had given the company ‘three months to 
fix the violations or risk losing its licence’ (Belton, 2007i). Then, in May, its environmental 
watchdog warned that it was ready to revoke TNK-BP licence ‘within “a matter of days”’ (Belton, 
2007f). At the same time, talks between TNK-BP and Gazprom - on and off since at least 2004 - 
‘intensified over… Gazprom taking a stake in the operation’ (Belton, 2007f; see also Ostrovsky & 
Jack, 2004; Gorst & Boxell, 2005; Mcgregor & Buckley, 2006; Buckley & Crooks, 2007; Belton, 
2007i). 
 
The FT thought that the ‘long struggle over Kovykta appeared to be entering its final phase’ 
(Buckley, 2007). At this point, an unnamed senior western diplomat and Britain’s Prime Minister 
rallied to BP’s side. The diplomat warned ‘that Russia risked further damage to its investment 
climate if it went ahead with threats to revoke’ TNK-BP’s licence (Belton, 2007a). Blair’s 
spokesperson repeated the warning: ‘“The sort of investment climate in a country depends on the 
way in which it treats companies: that is simply a statement of fact”’ (Crooks & Eaglesham, 2007). 																																																								
34 In 2004, ‘the Russian natural resources minister threatened to withdraw TNK-BP’s licence for the Kovykta 
field “within a month”’ (Boxell, 2004a; see also Ostrovsky & Jack, 2004). 
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Blair himself was ‘expected to raise the issue of Russia’s treatment of BP and Royal Dutch Shell at a 
meeting with Vladimir Putin’ in June (Crooks & Eaglesham, 2007).35 Blair’s intervention did not 
appear to help since later that month: 
‘TNK-BP… bowed to [Kremlin] pressure and agreed to cede its controlling 62.9 per cent stake in the… 
Kovykta gas field to Gazprom, for $700m-$900m [well below the market price]… BP, TNK-BP and 
Gazprom also signed a deal to create a $3bn joint venture for [pooling] investments in both Russia and 
overseas. The agreement gives TNK-BP an option to buy a quarter of the Kovykta project, at a fair market 
price, that will be activated once joint investments are agreed on.’ (Crooks & Belton, 2007; see also Crooks, 
2007; Belton, 2007e; BP, 2008a: p.24) 
The joint venture was, in part at least, a BP concession. According to the FT, BP had offered 
‘Gazprom participation in several of its international projects as part of a broader deal to resolve 
the standoff’ (Belton, 2007h). 
 
This June 2007 deal with Gazprom never materialised. In February 2010, threats to TNK-BP’s 
licence returned: ‘Russia’s environment watchdog… was recommending TNK-BP be stripped of its 
licence’ (Belton, 2010a). At the same time, Rosneft also had an eye on the field. Then, in June, in 
the absence of a deal with either Gazprom or Rosneft, TNK-BP pushed Rusia Petroleum - the 
holder of Kovykta’s licence - into bankruptcy, in a bid to recoup its investments in the field. In 
February 2011, Gazprom snapped up Kovykta at the bankruptcy auction for just $770 million 
(Belton, 2010b; Belton, 2011; BP, 2011: p.48). This was the end of the saga. 
 
The threats back in 2006-2007 to revoke TNK-BP’s Kovykta licence were seen, not only as part of 
a state plan to gain control of Kovykta, but also as part of a broader state plan to gain control of 
TNK-BP itself. In the second half of 2006, the FT considered the stakes of both TNK-BP’s 
shareholders - BP and AAR - as potential targets for Gazprom and Rosneft (Crooks & Hoyos, 
2006; see also Hoyos & Ostrovsky, 2006; Buckley & Crooks 2007).36 But in the first half of 2007, 
the newspaper considered AAR’s stake the only target (Belton, 2007i; Belton, 2007b; Financial Times, 
2007; Belton, 2007f; Buckley, 2007). In 2008, and perhaps earlier, BP was in cahoots with Gazprom 
(and possibly Rosneft too) to this end (Belton & Crooks, 2008a; Belton, Buckley & Crooks, 2008; 
Yenikeyeff, 2011: p.7; Gustafson, 2012: p.426; Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: pp.56,209-210). As 
Shamil Yenikeyeff notes: 
‘TNK-BP was established during the transition between two eras in Russia, when the era of considerable 
influence of Russian oligarchs in domestic political and economic affairs was coming to its end, and while an 
era of greater state involvement in the energy sector was already on the horizon.’ (Yenikeyeff, 2011: p.3) 
																																																								
35 Shell and its partners in the Sakhalin-2 PSA had just sold half their stakes in the project to Gazprom under 
pressure from the Russian state. 
36 The paper also reported speculation in this period that ‘Moscow may pressure BP to cede some of its 50 
per cent stake’ in TNK-BP, ‘handing control to the Russian side [i.e., AAR]’ as opposed to Gazprom or 
Rosneft (Buckley & Crooks, 2007). 
 145 
At this point (and later too - as we shall see), BP was plotting to swap its partnership with oligarchs 
for a partnership with one of the national energy companies.37 
 
5.3.6 A TNK-BP civil war 
 
BP’s oligarch partners in TNK-BP soon heard of the plot. This amongst other subjects of discord 
sparked an AAR attack on BP (Gustafson, 2012: pp.424-426; Yenikeyeff, 2011: pp.9-12; Henderson 
& Ferguson, 2014: pp.56,209-210; The Economist, 2012). 
‘Beginning in March 2008, in what had all the appearances of an orchestrated campaign, pressure mounted on 
the British side in TNK-BP from several quarters at once. Over the next two months, FSB officers raided 
TNK-BP’s offices, arrested a TNK-BP employee…, and hauled away computers and documents. The 
environmental agency… announced a probe of TNK-BP’s environmental practices at Samotlor. TNK-BP 
was forced to withdraw 148 of its expatriate staff from Russia when their visas were not renewed. Minprirody 
hinted that TNK-BP might be stripped of its license at Kovykta. The Ministry of Tax Collections launched a 
claim for back taxes. Although government officials denied that there was any intent to harass TNK-BP, it 
was nevertheless a classic display of what Russians euphemistically call ‘administrative resource.’ 
By May 2008, the conflict between the foreigners and the Russians in TNK-BP had burst into the open, each 
side denouncing the other for obstructionism and bad faith. The Russian partners demanded [BP-appointed 
TNK-BP CEO] Dudley’s resignation and turned up the pressure on him both inside and outside the 
company. A direct appeal to Putin and [Deputy Prime Minister for Energy] Sechin by BP’s CEO, Tony 
Hayward… produced no letup. By the end of June, Dudley abruptly left Russia, reportedly in fear of personal 
actions against him… 
The Russians had made their point.’ (Gustafson, 2012: p.426; see also Yenikeyeff (2011: p.11), and 
Henderson and Ferguson (2014: pp.56,210) 
The FT concluded that ‘The spat was not Kremlin-instigated… But it appears to have been 
Kremlin-facilitated’ (Financial Times, 2008b). 
 
The FT noted a turnaround in BP’s fortunes - in retrospect a momentary boost only - ‘after 
diplomatic pressure and a media outcry’ (Belton, Crooks & Hoyos, 2008a). Later, British Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s spokesperson ‘called for the dispute to be resolved’ (Belton, Crooks & 
Hoyos, 2008a). Brown himself was ‘determined to take up the case’ at his meeting with Russia’s 
President Dmitry Medvedev. But, as with Blair’s intervention over Kovykta the year before, this did 
not appear to help BP. ‘No progress [was] made on [the] TNK-BP dispute’ in the talks (Belton & 
Parker, 2008). Brown was rebuffed by Medvedev and ‘came away empty-handed’ (Belton & Parker, 
2008). The day after the meeting, (Lord) George Robertson, deputy chairman of TNK-BP and 
former NATO secretary-general, attacked TNK-BP’s Russian shareholders (Robertson, 2008; 
Belton & Crooks, 2008c). 
 
  
																																																								
37 Henderson and Ferguson argue that ‘from 2005 it became increasingly apparent that any foreign investor 
wishing to play a significant role in the oil and gas sector would need to partner with one of the main state-
owned companies’ (Henderson & Ferguson, 2014: p.49). 
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In September 2008, the two sides in the TNK-BP civil war - a conflict for control of the joint 
venture - signed a (preliminary) ceasefire agreement.38 Victory belonged to AAR. The FT concluded 
that ‘BP ceded ground on most of the demands of its Russian partners’ (Financial Times, 2008b; see 
also Belton, Crooks & Hoyos, 2008b; Financial Times, 2008a). As a result of these concessions, the 
Russian side now dominated the joint venture (Gustafson, 2012: pp.426-427; Henderson & 
Ferguson, 2014: pp.56-57,210).39 
 
5.3.7 Planned BP-Rosneft alliance blocked by AAR 
 
According to Gustafson: 
‘BP now redoubled its efforts to build a strategic alliance with one of the state-owned giants… By early 2010 
the main lines of a deal [with Rosneft] had been worked out… Then in the spring of 2010 came the 
Deepwater Horizon disaster in the Gulf of Mexico… [BP’s new CEO] Bob Dudley… began the daunting 
task of rebuilding the company and diversifying its portfolio. Russia was not initially at the top of his list. BP 
was already heavily invested in Russia… But Putin… appeared ready to support the Rosneft alliance… 
Dudley was persuaded. At the beginning of 2011 the two companies announced their alliance, which was 
made even broader when… the two sides agreed to swap minority shares of their stock’. (Gustafson, 2012: 
p.427; cf. Belton, Crooks & Pfeifer, 2011; BP, 2011: p.11) 
 
BP’s upstream centre of gravity seemed on the verge of shifting from the USA to Russia. Before 
the Deepwater Horizon disaster, ‘BP had hoped to make the US its principal source of growth’ 
(Pfeifer, 2011). But its opportunities for growth in the country looked uncertain after it. While the 
US was ‘too important to BP for it to walk away’, the planned alliance with Rosneft was intended to 
provide a new source of growth for the company (Belton & Crooks, 2011; see also Belton, Crooks 
& Pfeifer (2011)).40 
 
The FT argued that a BP-Rosneft alliance risked damaging further BP’s relations in the US (Belton 
& Pfeifer, 2011a; Financial Times, 2011b). BP was a significant supplier of fuel to the US military and 
under the planned alliance the Russian state would ‘indirectly become the [company’s] single largest 
shareholder’ (Belton & Pfeifer, 2011a). Two US politicians - Edward Markey, the top Democrat on 
the House natural resources committee, and Michael Burgess, a Republican on the House energy 																																																								
38 For a characterisation of the conflict by BP’s CEO Tony Hayward as a battle for control of TNK-BP, see 
Belton and Crooks (2008b). For the same characterisation of the conflict by AAR’s largest shareholder 
Mikhail Fridman, see Fridman (2008). The ceasefire agreement was finalised in January 2009. 
39 For brief descriptions of the ceasefire agreement, see Belton, Crooks and Hoyos (2008b), Gustafson (2012: 
pp.426-427), BP (2009: p.27) and BP (2010a: p.32). Under the agreement, the main board structure changed 
from a ‘50:50 split to four BP members, four AAR members and three independents’ (Belton, Crooks & 
Hoyos, 2008b). In January 2009, the three independent directors appointed were ‘Gerhard Schroeder, former 
chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, James Leng, former chairman of Corus Steel and Alexander 
Shokhin, president of the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs [a Russian business leader and 
politician]’ (BP, 2010a: p.32). Schroeder’s appointment reflected his close ties to Vladimir Putin (Bertrand & 
Crooks, 2009; Belton & Crooks, 2009a; Gustafson, 2012: pp.426-427). 
40 In contrast, TNK-BP’s growth prospects in Russia were constrained. 
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and commerce committee - called for the planned alliance to be examined for national security 
reasons (Belton & Pfeifer, 2011a; Belton, Gorst & Pfeifer, 2011).41 
 
AAR saw the planned alliance ‘as a threat to its investment in TNK-BP’ and filed a suit in the 
English High Court for an injunction to halt it (Financial Times, 2011a; see also Belton & Pfeifer, 
2011b). AAR claimed that the planned alliance breached the terms of the TNK-BP shareholder 
agreement. The FT reported that: 
‘The agreement stipulates that TNK-BP is used as the ‘primary vehicle’ for carrying out business by the 
shareholders and that BP must pursue all [new] oil and gas opportunities in Russia exclusively through TNK-
BP, unless the TNK-BP board grants it an exemption.’ (Belton & Pfeifer, 2011b) 
On 1 February the English High Court granted an injunction until 25 February and the two sides - 
BP and AAR - agreed to go to UNCITRAL arbitration proceedings (Belton, Croft & Pfeifer, 2011; 
BP, 2011: p.133).42 The arbitration tribunal extended the injunction until March pending a final 
hearing. Then, on 24 March, it extended the injunction permanently (Belton & Pfeifer, 2011c; 
Kleinman, 2011; Gorst & Pfeifer, 2011; BP, 2012a: p.166). AAR had won the legal battle. 
 
At midnight on 16 May the deadline for the planned alliance expired without agreement between 
the parties (Belton & Pfeifer, 2011d; BP, 2012a: p.166). The BP-Rosneft deal had collapsed. The FT 
concluded that: 
‘BP has only itself to blame. While it grasped the strategic opportunity, its execution was inept. It 
overestimated the political heft of Rosneft, relying on the support of Vladimir Putin, Russia’s prime minister, 
to ease any possible problems the deal might cause with its Russian partners in TNK-BP… This was a big 
miscalculation’. (Financial Times, 2011c) 
To add salt to BP’s wounds, ExxonMobil soon signed an agreement with Rosneft ‘to explore in the 
same blocks in the Kara Sea that were at the heart of BP’s alliance with Rosneft’ (Burgess & Pfeifer, 
2011).43 
 
  
																																																								
41 ‘“BP once stood for British Petroleum”’ Markey said. ‘“With this deal, it now stands for Bolshoi 
Petroleum”’ (Belton & Pfeifer, 2011a). 
42 According to its own website, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
is ‘[t]he core legal body of the United Nations system in the field of international trade law’ (UNCITRAL, 
2017). 
43 For other accounts of this episode see Yenikeyeff (2011), Gustafson (2012: pp.427-428) and Henderson 
and Ferguson (2014: pp.57,211). 
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5.3.8 The death of TNK-BP and the birth of a BP-Rosneft alliance 
 
In June 2012, BP said that it was looking to sell its 50 per cent stake in TNK-BP ‘after receiving 
“unsolicited approaches”’ (Belton & Chazan, 2012a). BP’s move seemed connected to changes in 
the Kremlin: 
‘Igor Sechin, Russia’s hawkish energy tsar, was sidelined from government but appointed chief executive of 
Rosneft… At the same time the Rosneftegaz investment vehicle he controls was given a broad mandate to 
consolidate state stakes in the energy sector.’ (Belton, 2012b) 
In July, AAR expressed an interest in half of BP’s shareholding in TNK-BP. The next week, 
Rosneft declared an interest in the whole of it (Chazan, 2012a; Clover & Weaver, 2012).44 
 
The FT argued that: ‘Winning Mr Putin’s support is critical for a transaction that has thrown BP 
into the centre of Kremlin infighting over control of the energy sector’ (Belton & Chazan, 2012e).45 
In September, BP’s CEO and Chairman met Putin to discuss the negotiations (Belton & Chazan, 
2012e). Sechin - who was at the meeting - told the FT that the negotiations concerned BP selling its 
stake in TNK-BP to Rosneft and investing part of the proceeds into ‘“new projects in Russia, 
including Rosneft shares”’ (Belton, 2012a).46 Putin supported this plan, Sechin said (Belton & 
Chazan, 2012d). 
 
The death of TNK-BP and the birth of a BP-Rosneft alliance occurred in March 2013.47 Rosneft 
bought all of TNK-BP, purchasing both BP’s and AAR’s stakes. BP exchanged its stake for $12.3 
billion in cash and an 18.5 per cent shareholding in Rosneft.48 Combined with its existing 1.25 per 
cent shareholding, this resulted in BP owning 19.75 per cent of Rosneft. Under the Rosneft 
Charter, BP had the right to nominate for election two directors to Rosneft’s nine-person board of 
directors.49 At long last, BP had fulfilled its dream of swapping its partnership with oligarchs for a 
partnership with one of the national energy companies. 
 
 
 																																																								
44 Later, AAR was also preparing a bid for the whole of BP’s stake (Belton & Chazan, 2012c). 
45 In particular, ‘Dmitry Medvedev, prime minister, is battling Mr Sechin for control of the industry’ (Belton 
& Chazan, 2012e). 
46 This was confirmed by BP (Belton, 2012a). 
47 This was when the transactions were finalised. BP, Rosneft and Rosneftegaz (the Russian state-owned 
parent company of Rosneft) agreed ‘heads of terms’ on 22 October 2012 and on 22 November BP 
announced the signing of definitive and binding sale and purchase agreements in respect of the transaction 
(BP, 2013a: p.80). 
48 The cash component figure of $12.3 billion is taken from BP’s Annual Report (BP, 2014: p.148). BP’s 
website includes a figure of ‘approximately $12.5 billion’ (BP, 2017a). 
49 In June 2013, BP’s CEO was elected to Rosneft’s board (BP, 2014: pp.35,127,148). In June 2015: ‘A 
second BP nominee, Guillermo Quintero, was elected to Rosneft’s Board of Directors’ (BP, 2016a: p.38). 
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As the FT reported: 
‘Relations with AAR had reached an impasse; but operationally, TNK-BP was also at the end of the road. BP 
had scored big early successes by using modern technology to increase production at TNK-BP’s mature or 
‘brownfield’ sites in Siberia. Yet its output was now flat and its growth prospects constrained. “The Russian 
brownfield revolution is coming to an end,” says Stuart Joyner, an analyst at Investec. “It’s now all about the 
Arctic. So BP has got to switch horses.”’ (Belton and Chazan, 2012b) 
But TNK-BP proved highly profitable for BP. From an initial cash investment in the joint venture 
of around $8 billion in 2003-6 (plus its stake in Sidanco - acquired for almost $1 billion - its stake in 
Rusia Petroleum and its holdings in the BP Moscow retail network), BP received around $19 billion 
of net dividends, before selling out for close to $28 billion in 2013.50 
 
This account of BP and other foreign energy companies in Russia ends at the moment when the 
US and EU imposed sanctions against Russia over Ukraine in March 2014. But the briefest of 
comments on what has followed. Unsurprising, BP lobbied against the sanctions. The company 
‘warned ministers of possible repercussions if relations with Moscow deteriorate’ (Fontanella-Khan 
et al., 2014). Despite sanctions, BP and Rosneft have struck new deals. Yet, at the time of writing 
(April 2018), Anglo-Russian political relations are at a low. As the FT noted: 
‘Britain has for more than a decade tried to prevent its deteriorating political relationship with Moscow from 
damaging the extensive business links with Russia, which have seen hefty investment flows in both 
directions.’ (Buckley, 2018) 
BP’s hefty investment in Rosneft is at risk of expropriation if Anglo-Russian relations deteriorate 
further. How big a constraint is this on the British state? 
 
  
																																																								
50 BP sold its 50 per cent stake in TNK-BP for $25.425 billion in cash plus 3.04 per cent of Rosneft shares. 
(The BP-Rosneft transaction consisted of three tranches. This was the first trance. The net result of the three 
tranches is reported in the main text.) BP’s Annual Report (implicitly) values the 3.04 per cent of Rosneft 
shares at $2,446 million ($10,755 million minus $8,309 million) (BP, 2014: p.148). This implies a total sale 
price of $27.871 billion ($25.425 billion plus $2.446 billion). 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This thesis concludes by answering the research questions set out in the Introduction. 
 
In broad terms, how does the history of BP fit into the history of British imperialism as a whole up until the 
nationalisations of the 1970s? 
 
BP was a company of Britain’s empire. Its oil concessions, including in Iran (until the early 1940s or 
1950s) and in Iraq and Libya (until the nationalist, republican coups in those countries), were in 
Britain’s empire. And its principal pre-WW2 markets were in Britain itself, including to the 
Admiralty, and in its empire, including ‘at bunkering ports on the sea lanes of the Eastern 
Hemisphere, where Britain was the supreme maritime power’ (Bamberg 2000: p.252). 
 
The company acquired its oil concessions in pre-existing spaces of Britain’s empire.1 But the 
discovery of oil in a territory, or the prospect of its discovery, and BP’s acquisition of a concession 
to exploit oil in a territory, magnified the territory’s value to British capitalism. This was because oil 
was becoming the lifeblood of capitalism, both militarily, propelling navies across the seas, and 
economically. The British state thus did everything within its powers to control access to sources of 
oil, and to help British oil companies, principally BP, first to acquire concessions, and then to 
protect those concessions.2 As we saw in Chapter 3, the history of BP is replete with examples of 
this. To repeat just one of these, in Iran, the British state helped William Knox D’Arcy gain the 
concession. Later it helped sustain his company and protect the concession. On the eve of WWI, 
the company wanted money, a market and diplomatic support in “Mesopotamia” from the 
government. It secured all three things. In both world wars, the British government sent troops to 
protect the oilfields. In between the wars, it threatened to use force when the Iranian government 
cancelled the company’s concession. A new concession was agreed. 
 																																																								
1 Iraq was the exception: The company and its partners in the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC) acquired a 
concession at the very moment the British state secured the colonial “mandate” for Iraq. 
2 As Peter Sluglett argues: ‘Once oil began to be widely used by the world’s navies around the turn of the 
twentieth century, it became a policy axiom that Britain, with the largest navy in the world, should be in a 
position to exert political influence in territories where oil was known, or equally important, thought likely to 
exist... Much of the subsequent history of Britain’s relations with the various states of the Arabian peninsula, 
Iran and Iraq... was dictated by the perceived need to have access to oil, combined with a preference for 
having Middle Eastern oil exploited by British interests’ (Sluglett 1999: p.444). Likewise, Marian Kent 
describes ‘the efforts of British governments to obtain and safeguard oil supplies for the armed forces and 
the economy, and... how such efforts contributed towards evolving a national oil policy’ in the period 1900-
20 (Kent 1976: p.xi). By 1920, ‘The outlines of national [oil] policy had become clear: that is, the British 
Government recognised the need to control as far as possible both the sources and the suppliers of Britain’s 
oil’ (Kent 1976: p.155). 
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BP was a company of Britain’s empire. It was also a concrete case of the archetypal imperial 
company analysed in classical Marxist theories of imperialism. In these theories, finance capital has 
an interest in exporting capital, importing raw materials and exporting products to/from colonies, 
semi-colonies etc.. The company did all three things. It exported industrial capital to explore for 
and produce crude oil, and to refine crude oil into products (such as benzine, kerosine, gas oil and 
fuel oil). According to BP’s official history, its refinery at Abadan in Iran was at one point in time 
Britain’s single largest overseas investment (Bamberg 1994: p.513). It imported raw materials (crude 
oil) as well as refined oil products to the British market. And it exported refined oil products to 
Britain’s empire. 
 
Debate on the export of capital and expansion of empire at the end of the nineteenth century 
 
BP’s story begins at a moment when inter-imperial rivalry produced an expansion of the Britain’s 
formal empire. As discussed in the Introduction, there is a debate in Marxist studies of British 
imperialism about whether or not the export of capital was the driving force behind the colonial 
expansion that took place at the end of the nineteenth century. Two small comments on this 
debate. First, the British state increased its control over Bahrain, the “Trucial States” and Kuwait in 
this period, “Exclusive Agreements” were signed with the rulers ‘that bound them into exclusive 
political relations with, and ceded control of their external affairs to, the British Government’ 
(Onley 2005: p.32), but BP did not acquire concessions covering any of these territories until the 
1930s. Second, the British state did increase its control over Iran at the start of the twentieth 
century after D’Arcy acquired his concession. But it is hard to argue that the export of capital 
explains this imperial expansion either. D’Arcy needed to ask the British government for injections 
of capital. In 1904, the British government urged the Burmah Oil Company to rescue D’Arcy 
financially. In 1914, it invested in the company itself, acquiring its majority shareholding. 
 
How does the history of BP intersect with inter-imperial relations in the classical age of imperialism? 
 
BP’s concessions were the products not just of inter-imperial rivalries but of inter-imperial 
cooperation too. D’Arcy’s concession in Iran was acquired during a wider Anglo-Russian race for 
concessions in the country. And when the British government encouraged the Burmah Oil 
Company to rescue D’Arcy it did so to prevent the concession falling under Russian control. But 
Britain’s main imperial rival after circa 1900 was Germany. In this context, Britain and Russia 
formed an alliance in 1907. The entente partitioned Iran into British and Russian “spheres of 
influence” and a neutral zone, with D’Arcy’s concession outside the Russian sphere but inside the 
neutral zone. This was not just to moderate Anglo-Russian rivalry, but to keep Germany out of 
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Iran; the Turkish empire being one arena of Anglo-German rivalry. In 1908, D’Arcy struck oil in 
the neutral zone. Then, in 1915, Britain recognised Russia’s claim to control of the Straits and 
Constantinople in return for the assignment of the hitherto neutral zone to itself. 
 
Before the war, British and German imperialisms were competing for the concession for 
Mesopotamian oil: D’Arcy’s rivals were the Turkish Petroleum Company (TPC), owned by 
Deutsche Bank, (Anglo-Dutch) Shell and the British-controlled Turkish National Bank. Here, 
momentarily, the imperial rivals became allies: the two groups of concession-hunters merged into 
an enlarged TPC, and the British and German governments pressed the Ottoman government to 
grant the TPC a concession. This was a “truce” between imperial rivals literally on the eve of war. 
Britain’s second rival-turned-ally for Mesopotamian oil was France. Anglo-French competition was 
resolved via the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916 and at the San Remo conference in 1920. At San 
Remo, Britain secured the colonial “mandate” for Iraq, the TPC secured the oil concession in the 
country, and Deutsche Bank’s stake in the TPC was handed over to France’s CFP. 
 
How does the history of BP intersect with Anglo-American redistribution, in particular, of Middle Eastern oil? 
 
The start of the classical age of imperialism is the moment the Pax Britannica ends, the moment 
Britain starts its relative decline as an imperial power, the moment imperial rivals, most notably 
German and America, emerge. World War One was an expression of this inter-imperial rivalry. 
And it accelerated the on-going change in the relative strengths of two imperial powers, Britain and 
America. In both economic and military terms, WW1 weakened Britain vis-à-vis the USA. While 
the war weakened capitalism in Britain, it also expanded its empire, principally in the Middle East. 
Oil was a critical reason for this imperial expansion (as was access to India). BP’s TPC concession 
in Iraq was an expression of this. But the change in the relative strength of Britain and America 
necessitated a redistribution of control over Middle Eastern oil. Pace Lenin, this was redistribution 
without war. 
 
The TPC and Red Line agreement were the first acts of Anglo-American redistribution. The Anglo-
French agreement at San Remo could not withstand American pressure and a new redivision of the 
prospective Iraqi oil was agreed with US companies taking a cut too - TPC’s shareholders were now 
BP, Shell, France’s CFP and a consortium of American companies (plus Calouste Gulbenkian). 
This was not just an agreement to exploit Iraqi oil jointly. TPC’s shareholders also agreed to exploit 
oil only jointly in the vast area of the ex-Ottoman Empire except Kuwait, the so-called Red Line 
agreement. In the 1930s, the Iraq Petroleum Company (the renamed TPC) gained concessions in 
two British protectorates covered by the agreement, Qatar and Abu Dhabi. 
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The next acts of Anglo-American redistribution of Middle Eastern oil were in Bahrain and Kuwait, 
two other British protectorates. At first the British state insisted that any concession granted by the 
Shaykhs of Kuwait or Bahrain include a British nationality clause. But as in Iraq it caved in under 
pressure from the American state. The nationality clauses were dropped. The Bahraini concession 
ended up in the hands of Standard Oil of California. Kuwait’s oil would be exploited jointly by the 
company and America’s Gulf Oil. In the Arab Gulf states, Anglo-American redistribution was 
limited by the so-called “political agreements”. These gave the British government the right to 
block the transfer of a concession and the right of pre-emption over oil in the event of war. 
 
Henk Overbeek argues that the circa 1929-32 Great Slump led to a British turn to ‘protection from 
international competition through imperial preference and international cartellization’ (Overbeek 
1990: p.81). BP’s great turn to international cartellization was in 1928. In that year, the major oil 
companies, predominantly Anglo-American, colluded both in production, via the Red Line 
Agreement, and in the international oil markets, via the Achnacarry Agreement. These two 
agreements ‘involved the direct intervention of states acting on behalf of their respective capitals’, 
notably the British and American states (Bromley 1991: p.98). 
 
The second world war, like the first, weakened British capitalism. Nevertheless, the post-war 
Labour government attempted to preserve - and even to extend - Britain’s empire, and to solve the 
country’s economic difficulties by intensified imperial exploitation. One of the country’s major 
imperial assets was Middle Eastern oil. And these assets were principally in BP’s hands. 
 
The end of WW2 marked the end of the “classical” age of imperialism, and the beginning of 
American hegemony and empire, and an age of inter-systemic conflict, the Cold War. In this 
context, it was only possible to attempt to preserve - and extend - Britain’s empire under American 
protection. And the cost of protection was American penetration of Britain’s empire.3 BP’s 
concession in Iran was the first overt act of US protection-at-the-cost-of-penetration. When Iran 
nationalised the company’s operations in 1951, the British state needed the American state to 
protect the concession, which was achieved via an Anglo-American orchestrated coup d’état. In 
return for this protection, 40 per cent of Iran’s oil production was redistributed to five US oil 
companies.4 Anglo-American redistribution had befallen all BP’s concessions in the Middle East. 																																																								
3 WW2 accelerated the shift in the relative strength of Britain and America. In parallel, Anglo-American 
redivision accelerated. 
4 Iran was now in America’s empire. Shaken by the nationalisation of its assets in Iran, the company searched 
for new sources of crude oil outside the Middle East. This search yielded two significant new sources, both in 
Britain’s empire, in Nigeria and Libya. 
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Britain’s and BP’s imperial grip was slipping. At the end of the 1950s, Iraq was lost to a nationalist, 
republican coup d’état. A decade later, another nationalist, republican coup meant the end of the 
Libyan client state. At the start of the 1960s, Nigeria and Kuwait left Britain’s formal empire, but 
the latter remained a protectorate. Ten years on, the British state revoked its treaty obligations to 
protect Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the “Trucial States”. 
 
Then one-by-one the company’s Middle Eastern and African concessions were nationalised in the 
1970s. As Gilbert Achcar argues, the nationalisations were the result of ‘the rise of Third World 
economic nationalism, a corollary to the decline of U.S. hegemony’ (Achcar 2006: p.24). In Iran it 
was the Islamic revolution, rather than de facto nationalisation, that precipitated the loss of the 
company’s crude oil supplies. The company’s principal sources of oil were now no longer in the 
Middle East but in Britain and America. 
 
The history of BP and Lenin’s inter-imperial rivalry in the “classical” age of imperialism 
 
For Lenin, the only conceivable basis for the division of the world is the relative strength of the 
imperialist powers, this changes over time, because of uneven development, necessitating a 
redivision of the world, and this, in turn, necessitates war, as the only means of redivision (Lenin, 
1968). This is not to say that ultra-imperialist alliances may not arise, indeed, they have actually 
arisen. However, ‘“ultra-imperialist” alliances, no matter what form they may assume, whether of 
one imperialist coalition against another, or of a general alliance embracing all the imperialist 
powers, are inevitably nothing more than a “truce” in periods between wars’ (Lenin 1968: p.112, 
italics in original). 
 
These ideas help us to understand how the history of BP intersects with inter-imperial relations in 
the “classical” age of imperialism. In particular, the change in the relative strength of Britain and 
America did necessitate a redivision of control over Middle Eastern oil. The thesis charts these acts 
of Anglo-American redistribution. But BP’s concessions were the products, not just of inter-
imperial rivalries, but of inter-imperial alliances too. Lenin warns us that “ultra-imperialist” alliances 
are nothing more than a “truce” in periods between wars. Obviously, the Anglo-German TPC 
alliance turned out to be a “truce” before a war. The 1907 Anglo-Russian alliance, with its 
implications for BP’s concession in Iran, is best understood as such a “truce” too. But the principle 
problem with Lenin’s account, for the history of BP, is that Anglo-American redistribution, the 
redivision of the world, not just between any imperial powers, but between the old and new 
hegemons, occurred without war. In the Cold War era, when Anglo-American redistribution 
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accelerated, Lenin’s theory of inter-imperial rivalry is more problematic still. Britain and America 
were economic but not political rivals. More generally, we need a theoretical palette with more than 
just two colours, rivalries and alliances, or three, including super-imperialism. 
 
How did BP attempt to protect its US assets in the light of its fears of American state hostility towards it? 
 
After the company struck oil in Alaska in 1969 its production, sales and assets Americanised. 
Rightly or wrongly, BP constantly feared US state hostility towards prize parts of the American oil 
industry being controlled by a company owned by non-Americans and, worse still, part-owned by a 
foreign state. To minimise the political risks to its US assets, or, to put it the other way around, to 
maximise the political protection of its US assets, BP sought to limit its ownership by such states 
(in particular, Britain and Kuwait) and to expand its ownership by Americans. Three examples 
make this clear. First, instead of establishing its own downstream operation in America to sell its 
Alaskan oil, BP sold its American assets to Standard Oil of Ohio (Sohio) in return for an equity 
stake in the company, in part so that Sohio’s American shareholders would guard BP’s US assets. 
Second, when the company feared that its American assets were put at risk by the size of the 
shareholdings of first the British and later the Kuwaiti state, it lobbied successfully for these 
shareholdings to be reduced. Third, on the occasion of the 1977 and 1987 British government share 
sales, BP sought to politically protect its US assets by Americanising its shareholder base. 
 
Why did BP want to Americanize itself at the end of the 1980s? 
 
In 1987, BP bought out Sohio’s predominantly American stockholders, thereby losing the 
guardians of its US assets. Soon after it began exploring outside its OECD stronghold, e.g. Algeria, 
Azerbaijan, Colombia, Kazakhstan, Venezuela and Vietnam. At exactly this time, BP launched a 
new push to Americanise its shareholder base. New American shareholders were needed not just to 
protect its American assets but also to protect its prospective assets outside America, via the US 
state. The British state would be more willing but less able to protect any such assets than its 
American counterpart. 
 
A decade later, at the turn of the millennium, BP acquired two American oil companies, Amoco 
and ARCO. The takeovers Americanised BP’s production, sales and assets, as well as its 
shareholders and board of directors. One reason for the acquisitions was to increase BP’s ability to 
call on the American state for support in the international arena. 
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Was BP “British” or “Anglo-American” capital? 
 
After the takeovers, BP’s owners/shareholders and its board of directors were more-or-less bi-
national, more British than American up until 2010, but equally British and American thereafter.5 
But BP was still incorporated in Britain and in Anglo-American law the state of incorporation is the 
main test of corporate nationality. In addition, the company’s “seat” and primary stock market 
listing were still in London. 
 
What has been the relationship between BP and the British and American states? 
 
The “nationality” vs. “transnationality” vs. “globality” of capital is under-theorised in Marxist 
theory. Given this, the issue is examined from another angle: What has been the relationship 
between BP and the British and American states? This question is addressed starting from a theory 
of the state as opposed to a theory of imperialism.6 In particular, I operationalise instrumentalist 
and structuralist conceptualisations of the state. In terms of the instrumentalist argument that 
members of the capitalist class occupy or “colonise” positions in the state apparatus, BP had 
greater ties of colonisation to the British than the American state. Likewise, in terms of the 
structuralist argument that a national state is dependent on BP to the extent that the company 
contributes to the national economy, the British state was more dependent on BP’s domestic 
operations than the American state was.7 This finding - of greater ties of colonisation and 
dependencies between BP and the British as opposed to American state - is consistent with the 
support BP received in the international arena from the two states: Whereas the US state did 
protect BP’s Russian assets on one occasion, BP received more support from the British than the 
American state, and less support from the American state than ExxonMobil (America’s largest oil 
company).8 This is not what would be expected based on theories of the 
internationalisation/transnationalisation of the state. In simple terms, these theories contend that 
national states act in the interest of capital in general, not just national capital. 
 
  
																																																								
5 The “nationality” of BP is considered, in part, in terms of measures of “ownership” and “control”. In 
particular, I examined the nationalities of BP’s shareholders and directors. On these measures, BP has been 
more-or-less bi-national since its acquisitions of the American oil companies. 
6 Both starting points are problematic: most theories of the state under-theorise “the international”, most 
theories of imperialism under-theorise the state. 
7 What is missing here, in part, because theories of the state under-theorise the international, in part, because 
of data limitations, is an analysis of the dependence of both states on BP’s global operations. 
8 I assume here greater ties of colonisation and dependencies between the American state and ExxonMobil in 
comparison to BP. 
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The history of BP and the interpenetration of “national” capitals 
 
Chapter 4 discussed the interpenetration of “national” capitals. More specifically, it discussed cases 
of “British” capital taking over (acquiring) “American” capital. It also discussed a related issue: BP’s 
attempts to Americanise its shareholder base (its ownership). American penetration of British 
capitalism (and other European capitalisms) is often seen as indicative of the relative strength of the 
two capitalisms (e.g., in the 1970s writings of Ernest Mandel and Nicos Poulantzas). How should 
British penetration of American capitalism be understood? Should we understand the two 
phenomena symmetrically? Perhaps not. It has been argued here that BP acquired Standard Oil of 
Ohio (Sohio), in part, so that Sohio’s American shareholders would guard BP’s US assets. BP 
wanted to Americanise its shareholder base, in part, for the same reason. It has also been argued 
that BP gained American shareholders (via all-stock acquisitions of American oil companies and 
sales of its shares) to protect its assets outside America, via the US state. In other words, British 
penetration of American capitalism was an indication of, was a recognition by BP of, the relative 
strength of America’s compared to Britain’s imperialism/imperial states. The American state was 
more able to protect BP’s assets outside America than the British state was. This is Panitch’s 
argument too: 
‘as Europe penetrates the United States with foreign investment, this doesn’t at all indicate a challenge to 
American supremacy; what it does indicate is that, when Daimler buys Chrysler, it’s trying to get the 
American state on its side – as well as the German state. Of course, it has more immediate economic 
purposes, but a political purpose, as well. This isn’t a challenge to American imperial power by German 
capital.’ (Gowan, Panitch & Shaw 2001: p.30) 
 
What has been the position of foreign energy companies in the upstream Russian oil industry? 
 
I focus in these conclusions on American and European foreign energy companies. In the 1990s, 
smaller Western companies formed joint ventures with Russian companies. By 2000-01, the joint 
ventures were being taken over by the newly powerful Russian companies, and had all but 
disappeared within a few more years. The largest companies took to the stage in the mid-1990s via 
either Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) or partnerships with privately-owned Russian 
companies. By 2003, a decade of effort by foreign energy companies to adopt PSAs as the preferred 
investment vehicle was defeated by Russia’s private oil companies and government. At this time, 
and in the context, not just of the death of PSAs, but also of a sharp rise in oil prices since the late 
1990s, BP, (Anglo-Dutch) Shell and (American) ConocoPhillips decided to form new partnerships 
with privately-owned Russian companies. Soon after the new partnerships were formed, the partial 
re-nationalisation of the Russian oil industry began and, in parallel with this, the wind shifted 
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against foreign oil companies. At the end of the 2000s/start of the 2010s, Russia’s state-owned 
companies were muscling into existing projects involving Western oil companies. Around the same 
time that Russia’s national champions were getting their claws into existing projects, Rosneft 
formed new partnerships with (American) ExxonMobil, (Norwegian) Statoil and (Italian) Eni.  
 
A comparison of foreign energy companies in terms of their hydrocarbon production volumes in 
Russia shows that BP has been (by far) the country’s largest foreign producer. In addition, Russia 
has been BP’s largest source of hydrocarbons since 2003. 
 
What were the threats to BP’s Russian assets? How did the British and American states attempt to protect BP’s 
assets from these threats? 
 
Kees van der Pijl argues that ‘While the US [under Clinton’s first administration] was overtly 
cultivating Russia’s newly-independent southern neighbours with an eye to their mineral wealth, the 
main European states had plans for the oil and gas of Russia proper’ (van der Pijl, 2006: p.274). 
Already by 1990, BP was scoping out both Azerbaijan (still part of the Soviet Union) and Russia. It 
ended up being the largest foreign producer in both countries. The company’s first investment in 
Russia, the acquisition of equity stakes in Sidanco and Rusia Petroleum, came in 1997. It saw an 
opportunity to sell Russian natural gas to China. 
 
Soon BP was caught in the crossfire of a battle for Sidanco. BP had just taken-over Amoco and 
called on both the American and British states for protection. The biggest weapon Britain’s state 
could muster was for its prime minister Blair to warn Russian president Yeltsin that ‘“the case is 
being closely followed by other major investors in Russia”’ (Bower, 2009: p.98). In contrast, the 
American state threatened BP’s rival, Russian oil company TNK, that it would withdraw its loan 
from the US Export-Import Bank. It was this US financial warfare that meant that BP survived the 
battle.9 
 
A TNK-BP partnership emerged out of the battle in 2003. Since then, Russia has been BP’s largest 
source of hydrocarbons and BP has been Russia’s largest foreign producer. But the Russian state 
was re-nationalising the oil industry and one of BP’s main Russian assets was under threat. The 
British state again entered the fray wielding exactly the same weapon: ‘“The sort of investment 
climate in a country depends on the way in which it treats companies”’, Blair’s spokesman warned 
																																																								
9 The British state was more willing but less able to protect BP’s Russian assets than its American 
counterpart. 
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(Crooks & Eaglesham, 2007). Blair himself raised the issue with president Putin, but to no avail. 
The British state could not protect BP. TNK-BP lost its asset to Gazprom. 
 
In this context of re-nationalisation, BP plotted to jettison its “oligarch” partners in favour of one 
of Russia’s national energy companies, Gazprom or Rosneft. TNK’s owners soon heard of the plot 
and attacked BP in retaliation, an attack facilitated by the Kremlin. British prime minister Brown 
took up the case with Russia’s president Medvedev. Again the British imperialist state was 
impotent. BP lost the civil war. 
 
The company continued to plot and a deal with Rosneft was worked out. Then came BP’s Gulf of 
Mexico oil spill. Its future growth prospects in America were now in doubt. BP and Rosneft 
announced their alliance. BP’s upstream centre of gravity seemed on the verge of shifting from the 
USA to Russia. The planned alliance risked damaging further BP’s relations in the US. But TNK’s 
owners filed a suit in the English High Court to halt the alliance and won the legal battle. The 
alliance collapsed in 2011 as a result but was reincarnated in 2013. BP exchanged its stake in TNK-
BP for one in Rosneft. TNK-BP had proved highly profitable but BP now owned close to 20 per 
cent of Rosneft instead and had the right to nominate for election two directors to Rosneft’s nine-
person board of directors. 
 
This is how things stand. In the context of US and EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine 
(sanctions BP lobbied against), and deteriorating Anglo-Russian political relations, one of the UK’s 
very biggest capitalist concerns is producing almost one-third of its hydrocarbons via its stake in 
one of Russia’s national energy companies. 
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Appendix 1. BP’s directors since 1995 
 
 
For all BP’s directors in the years 1995-2017 the following information is provided: 
Name, Years on Board, Nationality; 
Directorships with other companies whilst on BP’s board;  
Past, current and future positions within states. 
Principal sources: BP annual reports; Companies House; Collations of biographies, including, Who’s 
Who & Who Was Who, Marquis Who’s Who, Who’s Who in American Politics and Nexis Biographies; 
British government and parliament websites; Personal communication with directors. 
 
Lord Ashburton (John Francis Harcourt Baring), 1982-95, British 
Directorships:  
Baring Stratton Investment Trust PLC (1995)  
Political positions:  
Member, Bank of England’s Court of Directors, 1983-91.  
Chairman, National Economic Development Council, Committee on Finance for Industry, 1980-
86. 
House of Lords, 1991-99. 
 
David Alec Gwyn Simon, 1986-97, British 
Directorships:  
Grand Metropolitan (1995-96) 
RTZ (1996-97) 
Allianz AG (1997) 
Political positions: 
Member, Bank of England’s Court of Directors, 1995-97.  
Member, House of Lords, 1997-2017. 
Minister of State, HM Treasury and Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 1997-99.  
Advisor, Cabinet Office, 1999-2003.  
Member, Prodi Group advising on Enlargement Implications, EU, 1999.  
 
Stephen James Ahearne, 1992-96, British 
Directorships:  
None 
Political positions: 
Member, UK’s Restrictive Practices Court1 (1995-96) 
 
Edmund John Phillip Browne (Lord Browne of Madingley), 1991-2007, British 
Directorships: 
Redland (1995-96) 
SmithKline Beecham (1995-99) 
Intel Corporation (1997-2006) 
DaimlerChrysler (1998-2001) 
Goldman Sachs (1999-2007) 
Political positions: 
House of Lords, 2001-present. 
Lead Non-Executive Director, Cabinet Office, 2010-15. 
Lead Non-Executive Board Member, UK Government, 2010-15. 
Chairman, Independent Review of Higher Education Funding, 2010. 																																																								
1 Restrictive Practices Court: “A UK court set up under the Restrictive Trade Practices Acts to judge whether 
restrictive trading agreements were in the public interest” 
(http://oxfordindex.oup.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100416367). 
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Sir James Glover, 1987-98, British 
Directorships: 
Royal Armouries (International) PLC (1995-98) 
Merlin Communications International (1997-98) 
Political positions: 
Col. General Staff, Ministry of Defence, 1972-73.  
Brigadier General Staff (Intelligence), Ministry of Defence, 1977-78;  
Commander Land Forces Northern Ireland, 1979-80.  
Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Intelligence) and Member, Joint Intelligence Committee, 1981-83.  
Vice Chief of General Staff, and Member, Army Board, 1983-85. 
Commander-in-Chief, UK Land Forces, 1985-87.  
 
Dr Carl Horst Hahn, 1990-96, Austrian 
Directorships: 
Saurer (1995-96) 
Volkswagen (1995-96) 
Benetton (1995) 
Commerzbank (1995-96)  
Gerling (1995-96)  
Paccar (1995-96) 
Perot Systems (1995-96)  
Thyssen (1995-96) 
TRW (1995-96) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Dr Karen N Horn, 1992-98, American 
Directorships: 
Bank One (1995-96) (American) 
Eli Lilly (1995-98) 
TRW (1995-98) 
Rubbermaid (1995-98) 
The international private bank at Bankers Trust Company (1997-98) 
Political positions: 
President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 1982-87 
 
Charles F Knight, 1987-2005, American 
Directorships: 
Emerson Electric (1995-2004) 
Anheuser-Busch (1995-2005) 
SBC Communications (1995-2005) 
IBM (1995-2005) 
Morgan Stanley Dean Witter (1999-2005) 
Political positions: 
Not known 
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Rodney F Chase, 1992-2003, British 
Directorships: 
BOC Group (1995-2001) 
Diageo (1999-2003) 
Computer Sciences Corporation (2001-2003) 
Tesco (2002-2003) 
Political positions: 
Member, Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment, 1993-2000.2  
 
Hugh Edward Norton, 1989-95, British 
Directorships: 
Inchcape (1995) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Bryan Kaye Sanderson, 1992-2000, British 
Directorships: 
British Steel/Corus (1994-2000) 
Sunderland PLC (1997-2000) 
Political positions: 
Member, DTI Company Law Review Steering Group, 1998-2001 
Chairman, Learning and Skills Council, 2000-04 
Chairman, Low Pay Commission, 2017-present 
 
(Karl) Russell Seal, 1991-97, British 
Directorships: 
Blue Circle Industries (1996-1997) 
Political positions: 
Commonwealth Development Corporation3 (1996-97) 
 
(Henry) Michael (Pearson) Miles OBE, 1994-2006, British 
Directorships: 
John Swire & Sons (1994-99) 
Barings/ING Baring Holdings (1994-2002) 
Johnson Matthey PLC (1995-2006) 
BICC (1996-2002) 
Balfour Beatty (2001-02) 
Schroders PLC (2003-06) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
  
																																																								
2 “The Advisory Committee on Business and the Environment (ACBE) provides for dialogue between 
Government and business on environmental issues and aims to help mobilise the business community in 
demonstrating good environmental practice and management.” 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20031221205354/http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/acbe/ 
3 Commonwealth Development Corporation is “the UK’s Development Finance Institution (DFI) and 
wholly owned by the UK Government.” (http://www.cdcgroup.com/Who-we-are/Key-Facts/) 
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Sir Robin Nicholson, 1987-2005, British 
Directorships: 
Pilkington/Pilkington Optronics (1995-98) 
Rolls-Royce (1995-2005) 
Political positions: 
Member, UK government’s Council for Science and Technology, 1993-2000 
Chief Scientific Adviser to Cabinet Office, 1981-85 (Central Policy Review Staff, 1981-83) 
 
Sir Patrick Sheehy, 1984-98, British 
Directorships: 
B.A.T. Industries (1995) 
Cluff Resources/Cluff Mining (1995) 
ASDA Properties/ASDA Property Company (1995-98) 
Marlborough Underwriting Agency (1996-98) 
Sherritt International/Sherritt Power (1995-98) 
Celtic PLC (1997-98) 
Political positions: 
Chairman, Inquiry into Police Responsibilities and Rewards, 1992-93.  
 
Lord Wright of Richmond (Patrick Richard Henry Wright), 1991-2001, British 
Directorships: 
Barclays Bank (1995-96) 
De La Rue (1995-2000) 
BAA (1995-98) 
Political positions: 
Third Secretary, British Embassy, Beirut, 1958-60. 
Private Secretary to Ambassador and later First Secretary, British Embassy, Washington, 1960-65.  
Private Secretary to Permanent Under-Secretary, Foreign Office, 1965-67.  
First Secretary and Head of Chancery, Cairo, 1967-70.  
Deputy Political Resident, Bahrain, 1971-72. 
Head of Middle East Department, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), 1972-74. 
Private Secretary (Overseas Affairs) to Prime Minister, 1974-77.  
Ambassador to Luxembourg, 1977-79.  
Ambassador to Syria, 1979-81.  
Deputy Under-Secretary of State, FCO and Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, 1982-84.  
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 1984-86.  
Permanent Under-Secretary of State and Head of Diplomatic Service, 1986-91.  
Member, Standing Security Commission (Cabinet Office)4, 1993-2002.  
House of Lords, 1994-present. 
Member, House of Lords Sub-Committee on Home Affairs, 2001-07 (Chairman, 2004-07).  
Member, EU Select Committee, 2005-07.  
Member, House of Lords Sub-Committee on Law and Institutions, 2007-12.  
Member, Joint Committee on Conventions, 2006. 
Member, UK Delegation to Parly Assembly, Council of Europe, 2016-present.  
 																																																								
4 Standing Security Commission: “Following the Vassall case in 1963 Harold Macmillan consulted Hugh 
Gaitskell about a proposal for a standing commission to inquire into the security issues raised by cases 
prosecuted under the Official Secrets Acts and there was discussion of the proposal in Parliament. In January 
1964 Alec Douglas-Home announced the appointment of the Standing Security Commission in the House of 
Commons. The Commission was to comprise a High Court judge as chairman, assisted by two lay members. 
The Commission convenes when requested to do so by the prime minister, and submits its reports to him. 
The Commission is supported from within the Cabinet Office.” 
(http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C1373) 
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Peter D Sutherland 1990-93, 1995-2009, Irish 
Directorships: 
Goldman Sachs International (1995-2009) 
Delta Airlines (1997) 
Allied Irish Banks (1997) 
Investor AB (1997-2007) 
ABB Asea Brown Boveri (1997-2000) 
Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson (1998-2004) 
The Royal Bank of Scotland (2001-09) 
Political positions:5 
Attorney General of Ireland, 1981-84. 
EC Commissioner responsible for Competition Policy, 1985-89. 
Founding Director General of The World Trade Organisation (WTO), formerly GATT, 1993-95. 
UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Migration and Development, 2006-17. 
 
Dr Rolf Wilhelm Heinrich Stomberg, 1995-97, German 
Directorships: 
None 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Sir John (Gordon St Clair) Buchanan, 1996-2002, British 
Directorships: 
Boots (1997-2002) 
Political positions: 
Seconded to Central Policy Review Staff, Cabinet Office, 1976-77 
 
Dr Christopher Shaw Gibson-Smith, 1997-2001, British 
Directorships: 
Lloyds TSB (1999-2001) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Sir Richard (Lake) Olver, 1998-2004, British 
Directorships: 
Reuters Holdings (1998-2004) 
Political positions: 
UK Business Ambassador, 2008-present 
Member, Prime Minister’s Business Advisory Group, 2010-15 
 
Sir Ian Prosser, 1997-2010, British 
Directorships: 
Bass/Six Continents/InterContinental Hotels Group PLC (1998-2003) 
Lloyds TSB (1997-99) 
SmithKline Beecham/GlaxoSmithKline (1999-2009) 
Sara Lee Corporation (2004-10) 
The Navy, Army and Air Force Institutes (NAAFI) (2008-10) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
  																																																								
5 Source: http://petersutherland.co.uk/biography/ 
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Ruth S Block, 1999-2001, American 
Directorships: 
Ecolab (1999-2001) 
39 Alliance Capital Mutual Funds (1999-2001) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
John H Bryan, 1999-2007, American 
Directorships: 
Sara Lee Corporation (1999-2000) 
Bank One Corporation (1999-2004) 
The First National Bank of Chicago (1999) 
General Motors Corporation (1999-2007) 
Goldman Sachs (1999-2007) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Erroll Brown Davis, Jr., 1999-2010, American 
Directorships: 
Alliant Energy (1999-2006) 
 PPG Industries (1999-2007) 
Union Pacific Corporation (2004-10) 
General Motors Corporation (2007-10) 
Political positions: 
Member of the advisory board of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago (2005) 
 
Richard J Ferris, 1999-2001, American 
Directorships: 
The Procter & Gamble Company (1999-2001)  
Candlewood Hotel Corporation (1999) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Harold Laurance Fuller (Larry Fuller), 1999-2000, American 
Directorships: 
Chase Manhattan Corporation (1999-2000) 
Chase Manhattan Bank (1999-2000) 
Motorola (1999-2000) 
Security Capital Group (1999-2000) 
Abbott Laboratories (1999-2000) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Floris Anton Maljers, 1999-2004, Dutch 
Directorships: 
SHV Holding (1999-2004) 
Vendex NV/Vendex-KBB NV (1999-2004) 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (1999-2004)  
Philips Electronics (1999) 
Political positions: 
None 
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Dr Walter Eugene Massey, 1999-2008, American 
Directorships: 
Motorola (1999-2006) 
Bank of America (1999-2008) 
McDonald’s Corporation (1999-2008) 
Delta Airlines (2007-08) 
Political positions: 
Member, National Science Board,6 1978-84 
Member, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,7 1990-92, 2001-09 
Director, National Science Foundation,8 Washington, 1991-93  
Chair, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board,9 1997-99  
 
Michael H Wilson, 1999-2006, Canadian 
Directorships: 
RBC Dominion Securities (1999-2000) 
Manufacturers Life Insurance Company/Manulife Financial Corporation (1999-2006)  
Rio Algom (1999-2000) 
RT Capital Management (2001) 
Brinson Canada (2002) 
UBS Canada (2001-06) 
Political positions: 
Member of the Canadian Parliament, 1979-93 
Minister of Finance, 1984-91 
Minister of Industry, Science and Technology 
Minister of International Trade 
Canadian Ambassador to the United States, 2006-09 
 
Sir Robert Peter Wilson, 1998-2002, British 
Directorships: 
Rio Tinto (1998-2002) 
Diageo (1998-2002) 
Political positions: 
None 
 
William Douglas (Doug) Ford, 2000-02, American 
Directorships: 
USG Corporation, 2000-02 
Political positions: 
Not known 
 
  																																																								
6 National Science Board: “The NSB establishes the policies of the National Science Foundation and serves 
as advisor to Congress and the President. The Board approves major NSF awards, provides congressional 
testimony and issues statements relevant to the nation’s S&E enterprise.” (https://www.nsf.gov/nsb/) 
7 President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology: “An advisory group of the nation’s leading 
scientist and engineers who directly advise the President and the Executive Office of the President.” 
(https://www.nitrd.gov/pcast/Index.aspx) 
8 “The National Science Foundation (NSF) is an independent federal agency created by Congress in 1950.” 
(https://www.nsf.gov/about/) 
9 Secretary of Energy Advisory Board: “The Board provides advice and recommendations to the Secretary of 
Energy on the Department's basic and applied research and development activities, economic and national 
security policy, educational issues, operational issues and any other activities and operations of the 
Department of Energy as the Secretary may direct. The duties of the Board are solely advisory.” 
(https://www.energy.gov/seab/secretary-energy-advisory-board) 
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Dr Byron Elmer Grote, 2000-13, British and American citizen 
Directorships: 
Unilever NV and Unilever PLC, 2006-13 
Political positions: 
Vice-chairman, UK government’s Public Services Productivity Panel, 1998-2000 
Chairman, Chemicals and Innovation Growth Team, UK chemicals sector and Department of 
Trade and Industry, 2001-02 
 
Dame DeAnne (Shirley) Julius, 2001-11, American British 
Directorships: 
Lloyds TSB Group PLC, 2001-07 
Serco Group PLC, 2001-07 
Roche Holding SA, 2002-11 
Jones Lang LaSalle Inc., 2008-11 
Political positions: 
Member, Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England, 1997-2001 
Member, Court of Directors of the Bank of England, 2001-04 
Chairman, Banking Code Review Group, 2000-01 
Chairman, Public Services Industry Review for the Department for Business Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform, 2007-08 
 
Dr David C Allen, 2003-08, British 
Directorships: 
None 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Dr Anthony Bryan Hayward, 2003-10, British 
Directorships: 
Corus Group PLC/Tata Steel, 2002-09 
Political positions: 
None 
 
John Alexander Manzoni, 2003-07, British 
Directorships: 
SABMiller PLC, 2004-07 
Political positions:10 
Chief Executive, Civil Service, 2014-present 
Chief Executive, Major Projects Authority, Cabinet Office, 2014-?  
Permanent Secretary, Cabinet Office, 2015-present 
 
Antony Burgmans, 2004-16, Dutch 
Directorships: 
Unilever NV and Unilever PLC, 2004-07 
ABN AMRO Bank NV, 2004-06 
Akzo Nobel NV, 2007-16 
Aegon NV, 2006-14 
SHV Holdings NV, 2010-16 
TNT Express, 2013-16 
Political positions: 
None 
 																																																								
10 Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/people/john-manzoni 
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Iain C Conn, 2004-14, British 
Directorships: 
Rolls-Royce Group PLC/Rolls-Royce Holdings PLC, 2005-14 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Douglas Jardine Flint, 2005-11, British 
Directorships: 
HSBC Holdings PLC, 1995-2011 
Political positions:11 
Member, Large Business Forum on Tax and Competitiveness, Unknown dates 
Member, Consultative Committee of the Large Business Advisory Board, HM Revenue & 
Customs, 2007-2010 
Member, Business Government Forum on Tax and Globalisation, 2009-2010 
Member, Financial Services Trade and Investment Board, 2013-15  
UK Business Ambassador, 2014-present 
 
Sir Tom McKillop, 2004-09, British 
Directorships: 
AstraZeneca PLC, 1999-2005 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group, 2005-09 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Andy G Inglis, 2007-10, British 
Directorships: 
BAE Systems PLC, 2007-10 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Sir William Castell, 2006-12, British 
Directorships: 
GE [General Electric], 2006-12 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Cynthia B Carroll, 2007-present, American 
Directorships: 
Anglo American PLC, 2007-13 
De Beers S.A., 2008-13 
Anglo Platinum Ltd, 2008-13 
Hitachi Ltd, 2013-present 
Vedanta Resources Holding Ltd, 2015-present 
Political positions: 
None 
 
George David, 2008-15, American 
Directorships: 
United Technologies Corporation (UTC), 2008-09 
Citigroup Inc., 2008 
Political positions: 
None 																																																								
11 Source: HSBC Annual Reports. 
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Carl-Henric Svanberg, 2009-present, Swedish 
Directorships: 
Ericsson, 2009-12 
AB Volvo, 2012-present 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Paul Anderson, 2010-present, American 
Directorships: 
BAE Systems PLC, 2010-14 
Spectra Energy Corp., 2010-12 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Robert W Dudley, 2009-present, American/American and British since 2016 Annual Report 
Directorships: 
Rosneft, 2013-present 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Admiral Frank L Bowman, 2010-present, American 
Directorships: 
Strategic Decisions LLC, 2011-present 
Morgan Stanley Mutual Funds, 2011-present 
Naval and Nuclear Technologies LLP, 2013-present 
Political positions: 
‘He served for over 38 years in the United States Navy, during which time he served as commander 
of the nuclear submarine USS City of Corpus Christi and commander of the submarine tender USS 
Holland, director of political-military affairs on the joint staff and chief of naval personnel. He was 
director of the naval nuclear propulsion programme in the Department of Navy and Department 
of Energy.’ (BP, 2011: p.85)  
 
Ian E L Davis, 2010-present, British 
Directorships: 
Johnson & Johnson Inc., 2012-present 
Rolls Royce PLC, 2013-present 
Majid Al Futtaim Holding LLC, 2016-present 
Political positions: 
‘Ian Davis was appointed as a Non-Executive Board Member for Cabinet Office on 16 December 
2010. He was then the Lead Non-Executive Board Member for the department on 1 February 2015 
until 22 March 2016.’ (https://www.gov.uk/government/people/ian-davis) 
 
Brendan R Nelson, 2010-present, British 
Directorships: 
The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, 2011-present 
Political positions: 
Not known 
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(Freedom) Phuthuma Nhleko, 2011-16, South African 
Directorships: 
MTN Group Ltd., 2011-16 
Anglo American PLC, 2012-15 
Pembani Group, 2015-16 
Political positions: 
Not known 
 
Professor Dame Ann Dowling, 2012-present, British 
Directorships: 
None 
Political positions: 
Member, Defence and Aerospace Technology Foresight Panel, 1994-97 
Non-executive Director, Defence Research Agency (Ministry of Defence), 1995-97 
Member, Scientific Advisory Board, Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (Ministry of 
Defence), 1997-2001 
Member, Defence Science Advisory Council (Ministry of Defence), 1998-2001 
Non-executive director, Department for Business, Innovation and Skills/Department for Business, 
Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2014-present 
Member, Prime Minister’s Council for Science and Technology, 2015-present 
 
Dr Brian Gilvary, 2012-present, British 
Directorships: 
L’Air Liquide S.A., 2016-present 
Political positions: 
External advisor to director general (spending and finance), HM Treasury Financial Management 
Review Board, 2014-16 
Non-executive director of the Navy Board,12 2017-present 
 
Andrew Shilston, 2012-present, British 
Directorships: 
Circle Holdings PLC, 2012-present 
Morgan Crucible Company PLC, 2013-present 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Alan Boeckmann, 2014-present, American 
Directorships: 
Sempra Energy, 2015-present 
Archer Daniels Midland, 2015-present 
Political positions: 
He has served on the board of the National Petroleum Council13  
 
  
																																																								
12  “The Navy Board is the body responsible for running the Royal Navy” 
(https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-organisation/senior-naval-staff/first-sea-lord/navy-board) 
13 National Petroleum Council: “An Oil and Natural Gas Advisory Committee to the [US] Secretary of 
Energy” (http://www.npc.org) 
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Sir John Sawers, 2015-present, British 
Directorships: 
Macro Advisory Partners LLP, 2015-present 
Political positions: 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 1977-2009: Sana’a (Yemen), 1980; Damascus (Syria), 
1982; FCO, 1984; Pretoria/Cape Town (South Africa), 1988; Head, EU Presidency Unit, 1991; 
Principal Private Secretary to Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, 1993-95; 
Counsellor, Washington (USA), 1996-99; Foreign Affairs Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, 
1999-2001; Ambassador to Egypt, 2001-03; Special Representative for Iraq, 2003; Political 
Director, FCO, 2003-07; UK Permanent Representative to UN, 2007-09.  
Chief, Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), 2009-14.  
 
Paula Rosput Reynolds, 2015-present, American 
Directorships: 
BAE Systems Ltd, 2015-present 
TransCanada Corporation, 2015-present 
Siluria Technologies, 2016-17 
CBRE Group, 2017-present 
Political positions: 
None 
 
Nils Anderson, 2016-present, Danish 
Directorships: 
Unilever PLC and Unilever NV, 2016-present 
Dansk Supermarked Group A/S, 2016-present 
Political positions: 
Not known 
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Appendix 2: Foreign energy companies in the upstream Russian 
natural gas industry, 2000-2014 
 
 
Part I. Partnerships with Gazprom 
 
E.ON Ruhrgas 
In December 1998, German gas group Ruhrgas acquired a 2.5 per cent stake in Gazprom (from the 
Russian government at auction for DM 1.1 billion) (Ruhrgas, 2004: p.36). Ruhrgas increased its 
stake in Gazprom to 4 per cent in 1999 and the Vice-Chair of its Executive Board (Burckhard 
Bergmann) became ‘the first foreign representative to be elected onto the Board of Directors of 
Gazprom’ the following year (Ruhrgas, 2004: p.36). By 2003, Ruhrgas (now a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of German energy group E.ON) owned 6.4 per cent of Gazprom (Ruhrgas, 2004). Then, 
in 2009, the German company secured direct access to Russia’s gas production sector for the first 
time. In particular, it acquired from Gazprom 25 per cent (minus three shares) of 
Severneftegazprom, which held the development licence for the Yuzhno Russkoye natural gas field 
(E.ON, 2010b: p.78). As we shall see, Gazprom had also sold a stake in Severneftegazprom to 
E.ON’s German competitor BASF Wintershall two years earlier. The economic interests in Yuzhno 
Russkoye were now divided three ways: Gazprom 40 per cent (but just over 50 per cent of the 
voting stock), BASF 35 per cent and E.ON 25 per cent. In exchange, Gazprom received almost 
one-half of E.ON’s equity in Gazprom (2.93 per cent of Gazprom’s equity valued at 2.3 billion 
euros) ‘along with a small cash component’ (E.ON, 2010b: p.78). One year after acquiring its 
interest in Yuzhno Russkoye, E.ON sold most of its residue 3.5 per cent of Gazprom equity to 
Russia’s state-owned Vnesheconombank (for approximately 2.6 billion euros). The small remaining 
stake (just 0.8 per cent) was sold the next year, in 2011.  
 
BASF Wintershall 
Wintershall is a German oil and gas company and a fully owned subsidiary of German chemicals 
group BASF. In 2003, Wintershall and Gazprom established Achimgaz, a 50:50 joint venture to 
develop gas deposits in the Urengoiskoye field (Block 1A) in western Siberia (Gazprom, 2004: p.11; 
BASF, 2004: p.5). Achimgaz started-up production in 2008 (BASF, 2009: p.81; Gazprom, 2009: 
p.5). In 2007: 
‘Wintershall acquired a stake of 25% less one share in Severneftegazprom, through an asset swap with 
Gazprom. Severneftegazprom holds the production license to the Yuzhno Russkoye natural gas field in 
Western Siberia. By means of an additional preference share, Wintershall holds a 35% share in the economic 
rewards of the field, which started production in… 2007. In return, Gazprom took a 49% stake in a German 
Wintershall subsidiary which holds the exploration and production rights to onshore concessions… in Libya. 
In addition, Gazprom has increased its stake in WINGAS [a Wintershall-Gazprom joint venture distributing 
 176 
Russian gas in the German market and across most of western Europe] from 35 to 50% minus one share.’ 
(BASF, 2008: p.42) 
In addition, Wintershall has been ‘involved in the oilfield exploration and production of the 
Volgograd area together with Lukoil’ since 1999 through its stake in the Volgodeminoil joint 
venture (BASF, 2015: p.87). 
 
Eni and Enel 
In 2006, Eni, the Italian oil and gas company, and Gazprom signed a strategic agreement. In the 
upstream sector: 
‘Eni and Gazprom have identified major projects (companies and assets) in Russia and outside Russia that 
will be jointly pursued by the two partners. Eni and Gazprom have agreed to work with each other on an 
exclusive basis on these projects, which are expected to be finalized by the end of 2007.’ (Eni, 2007: p.37; see 
also Gazprom, 2007: p.51) 
Upstream Russian companies and assets were indeed acquired in 2007 at the Yukos liquidation 
auction. SeverEnergia, an Eni partnership with Italian utility group Enel (Eni 60 per cent, Enel 40 
per cent), purchased ‘three Russian companies operating in the exploration and development of 
[predominantly] natural gas reserves’ in the Yamal Nenets region (Eni, 2008: pp.28-29). ‘Eni and 
Enel granted to Gazprom a call option on a 51% interest in SeverEnergia to be exercisable within 
two years from the purchase date’ (Eni, 2008: p.29). Writing before the auction, the Financial Times 
noted that ‘Eni will be bidding in part to help Gazprom, which is declining to participate for fear of 
lawsuits from Yukos shareholders’ (Belton, 2007c).14 Exercising its call option, Gazprom acquired 
51 per cent of SeverEnergia in 2009 (Eni, 2010: p.14; Gazprom, 2010a: p.14). As a result, the stakes 
in SeverEnergia became Gazprom 51 per cent, Eni 29.4 per cent and Enel 19.6 per cent. One year 
later, in 2010, Gazprom sold its shareholding in SeverEnergia to Yamal Razvitie, a joint venture 
between Gazprom Neft (Gazprom’s oil division) and Novatek (Gazprom, 2011: p.50). Production 
started-up at one of SeverEnergia’s three subsidiaries in 2012 (Eni, 2013: p.40). This was ‘Eni’s first 
development in the Russian upstream’ (Eni, 2014: p.31). But just one year later both Eni and Enel 
had sold their stakes in the company. First Enel sold its ‘stake in Severenergia to Rosneft for $1.8bn 
in September’ 2013 (Hille, 2013). In response, Yamal Razvitie bought Eni’s stake for $2.9bn 
‘escalating a fight with rival state oil group Rosneft over control of the company’ (Hille, 2013; 
Gazprom, 2014: p.39; Eni, 2014: p.31). The Financial Times reported that: 
‘A person familiar with the matter said Eni’s decision to sell out of Severenergia was “opportunistic” and that 
it represented “excellent value” to Eni shareholders, considering the company had acquired the stake for 
$600m in 2007.’ (Hille, 2013) 
 
  																																																								
14 This is the same auction at which Eni purchased a 20 per cent interest in Gazprom Neft (the renamed 
Sibneft) on Gazprom’s behalf. ‘Eni granted to Gazprom a call option on this 20 per cent interest in… 
GazpromNeft to be exercisable within two years from the purchase date’ (Eni, 2007: p.29). Gazprom 
exercised this call option in 2009 (Eni, 2010: p.14; Hoyos, 2009). 
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Total and Statoil 
In 2007, Gazprom selected Total and StatoilHydro ‘to become Gazprom’s partners in… the 
development of the Shtokmanovskoye gas condensate field’ in the Barents Sea 
(Gazprom,2008:p.5). Gazprom, Total and Statoil established: 
‘a special-purpose company… to design, develop, construct, finance, and operate the facilities for the first 
stage of the development of the Shtokman gas condensate field… Gazprom has a 51% shareholding in the 
company, with 25% belonging to Total and 24% to StatoilHydro.’ (Gazprom, 2009: p.7) 
But by 2012 the project had been pulled. According to the Financial Times, Gazprom said: 
‘that the company and its partners… had decided that the costs of developing the project were too high… 
Much of Shtokman’s gas had been destined for the US. But the abundance of shale turned the country’s gas 
deficit into a surplus and Gazprom lost its most promising new market. Shtokman was also undermined by 
the discovery of vast new gas resources in more accessible places… that will probably cost much less to 
develop. The partnership, too, was marred by disagreements and dissatisfaction with the financial terms on 
offer from the Russian government.’ (Chazan, 2012b) 
 
Part II. Partnerships with Novatek 
 
Terneftegas holds the license for exploration and production of gas and gas condensate at the 
Termokarstovoye field in Yamal-Nenets region and was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Novatek 
until Novatek sold a 49 per cent stake in the company to Total in 2009/10 (Novatek, 2011: p.12; 
Total, 2010: p.25). Commercial production in the field commenced in 2015. Yamal LNG ‘is 
engaged in the engineering and design work for the construction of an onshore LNG [Liquefied 
Natural Gas] facility… on the Yamal’ peninsula and ‘holds the exploration and production license 
for the South-Tambeyskoye field, which will provide the resources for the [p]roject’ (Novatek, 
2012: p.30). Novatek also owned all of the equity in Yamal LNG when it sold a 20 per cent stake in 
the company to Total in 2011. On the back of the final investment decision on the Yamal LNG 
project in 2013, ‘TOTAL signed two [long-term] LNG purchase agreements with the project’ 
(Total, 2015: p.33). Total was the first but not the only foreign energy company to acquire a stake in 
Yamal LNG from Novatek. In 2013/14, Novatek and CNPC concluded an agreement that: 
‘provided for the acquisition by CNPC of a 20% stake in the project, conclusion of a long-term contract for 
supply of at least three (3) million tons of LNG per annum [for at least 15 years] and the active assistance by 
CNPC in organizing the provision of external financing for the project from Chinese financial institutions.’ 
(Novatek, 2014: p.52) 
Back in 2004, Total ‘entered into negotiations to acquire 25% of Novatek’ itself but ‘[t]he 
transaction was not completed as the required approval from the authorities was not obtained’ 
(Total, 2007: p.30). Total had better luck second time around. After two transactions in 2011, Total 
had obtained a 14.09 per cent interest in Novatek, ‘by purchasing shares from Novatek’s two major 
shareholders’, and as a result of these transactions a seat on the company’s Board of Directors 
(Total, 2012: p.177). By the end of 2014, Total’s interest in Novatek had increased, in steps, to 
18.24 per cent at a total cost of US$6.4 billion (Total, 2012:p.194; Total, 2015:pp.256-7).   
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